Expression and extended cognition

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 329-340

  Cochrane, Tom ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61049145818     PISSN: 00218529     EISSN: 15406245     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6245.2008.00314.x     Document Type: Review

References (34)

1. See Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness (London: Vintage, 2000)
2. Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford University Press, 2004)
3. Jenefer Robinson, Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art (Oxford University Press, 2006)
4. Malcolm Budd, Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry and Music (London: Penguin, 1995)
5. I also accept many of the claims of resemblance between music and expressive behavior made by Stephen Davies and Peter Kivy. For a recent statement, see Stephen Davies, "Artistic Expression and the Hard Case of Pure Music," in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kieran (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005)
6. Based on a review of a number of studies into the relation between music and emotion, neuroscientists Istvan Molnar-Szakacs and Katie Overy argue that recognizing emotions in music is grounded by the mirror neuron system (which underlies our empathic activities), whereby the same neurons that are active when engaging in some activity are also active when observing others engaging in the same activity. Here they focus on mirroring the intentional actions required to produce the movements we perceive in music rather than the more generalized mirroring of bodily patterns (some of which could be generated by deliberate actions). Istvan Molnar-Szakacs and Katie Overy, "Music and Mirror Neurons: From Motion to 'E'motion," Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 1 (2006): 235-241
7. Damasio makes the crucial connection between the mirror system and the neural map of one's own bodily changes, which he calls the "as-if body loop." Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza (London: Vintage, 2004)
8. Phenomenologically, it is comparable to visually perceiving the solidity of an object. Compare Derek Matravers, "The Experience of Emotion in Music," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (2003): 353-363
9. Tom Cochrane, Shared Emotions in Music [PhD Thesis] (University of Nottingham, U.K., 2007), accessible at http://etheses.nottingham.ac.uk/archive/ 00000286/
10. For example, Prinz, Gut Reactions
11. Also Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000)
12. Such as Ajay Heble, Landing on the Wrong Note: Jazz, Dissonance, and Critical Practice (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 93
13. Compare Paul Berliner, Thinking in Jazz: The Infinite Art of Improvisation (University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 256, 261, 274
14. R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 304
15. John Dewey, "The Act of Expression," in Artistic Expression, ed. John Hospers (New York: Meredith, 1971), pp. 72-94, quote from pp. 78-79
16. See rather Aaron Ridley, "Not Ideal: Collingwood's Expression Theory," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55 (1997): 263-272
17. Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects (Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 42
18. Ridley, "Not Ideal," p. 264
19. Andy Clark and David Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," Analysis 58 (1998): 10-23
20. Compare Robert Anton Wilson, Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 183
21. Eric Clarke, "Listening to Performance," in Musical Performance: A Guide to Understanding, ed. J. Rink (Cambridge University Press, 2002), chap. 13, see p. 68
22. Compare William James, "What Is an Emotion?" Mind 9 (1884): 188-205
23. Robinson, Deeper Than Reason, pp. 32-37
24. James Laird, Feelings: The Perception of Self (Oxford University Press, 2007)
25. For an example of changes in physiological arousal (rather than self-reports) resulting from facial expression, see R. W. Levenson, P. Ekman, and W. V. Friesen, "Voluntary Facial Action Generates Emotion-Specific Nervous System Activity," Psychophysiology 27 (1990): 363-384. Laird notes that some people are more prone to such manipulations than others. He explains that when experiencing emotions, some focus more on the personal cues of their bodies or actions whereas others focus more on situational cues. Such differences are even preserved when measuring physiological arousal. This suggests that the ways we attend to our emotions can manipulate arousal in a manner compatible with my account, though perhaps the personal cue group is better suited to the kinds of possibilities I suggest here
26. See E. Hatfield, C. K. Hsee, J. Costello, M. S. Weisman, and C. Denney, "The Impact of Vocal Feedback on Emotional Experience and Expression," Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 10 (1995): 293-312
27. Also see A. W. Siegman and S. Boyle, "Voices of Fear and Anxiety and Sadness and Depression: The Effects of Speech Rate and Loudness on Fear and Anxiety and Sadness and Depression," Journal of Abnormal Psychology 102 (1993): 430-437
28. Sandy Duclos and James Laird, "The Deliberate Control of Emotional Experience through Control of Expressions," Cognition and Emotions 15 (2001): 27-56
29. James, "What Is an Emotion?" p. 45
30. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza
31. Compare Ned Block, "Review of Alva Noë, Action in Perception," The Journal of Philosophy 5 (2005): 259-272
32. Ira Sullivan (trumpet and saxophone) quoted in D. D. Spitzer, "Ira Sullivan: Living Legend," Down Beat 39 (17 February 1972): 14
33. Jim Hall (guitar) quoted in Berliner, Thinking in Jazz, p. 798, note 38
34. Curtis Fuller (trombone) quoted in Berliner, Thinking in Jazz, p. 217