How to read "epistemology naturalized"

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 102, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 78-93

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EID: 60950581765     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil200510221     Document Type: Review

References (24)

1. Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim, eds., Epistemology: An Anthology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), p. 289
2. Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske, eds., Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (New York: Oxford, 2000), p. 233
3. John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, eds., Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999, 2d ed.), p. 165
4. In Quine's Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia, 1969), pp. 69-90; hereafter EN
5. In Quine's From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard, 1961, rev. ed.), pp. 20-46
6. Cambridge: Harvard, 1992, rev. ed
7. Putnam, "Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized," Howison Lecture, University of California, 1981
8. published in Realism and Reason, volume 3 of his Philosophical Papers (New York: Cambridge, 1983), pp. 229-47
9. See Quine, "Reply to Morton White," in Lewis Edwin Hahn and Paul Arthur Schilpp. eds., The Philosophy of W.V. Quine (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1986), pp. 664-65
10. and Pursuit of Truth, p. 19. I will return to this point later
11. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," p. 45; my emphases. Perhaps it is worth noting that "expediting our dealings with sense experiences" is not solely a matter of enabling us to get the predictions right; considerations of simplicity, economy, and so forth also enter in
12. Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT, 1960), p. 24; my emphases
13. For a defense of the idea that this was the heart of Hume's skeptical argument concerning inductive inference, see Colin Howson, Hume's Problem (New York: Oxford, 2000), pp. 10-21
14. We should perhaps note Quine's suggestion that "something like...rational reconstruction" might still be worth pursuing for heuristic reasons - "imaginative constructions can afford hints of actual psychological processes" (EN 83) - and the possibility that he continued to think, with Nelson Goodman and others, that efforts at partial reconstruction can be of intrinsic interest. See Quine's "On What There Is," Review of Metaphysics, II (1948): 21-38
15. and Goodman's The Structure of Appearance (Cambridge: Harvard, 1951), along with sections 1-3 of his "The Revision of Philosophy," in Sidney Hook, ed., American Philosophers at Work (New York: Criterion Books, 1956)
16. reprinted in his Problems and Projects (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), pp. 5-23
17. Word and Object, p. 11
18. See "Hypothesis," chapter 5 of Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York: Random House, 1970)
19. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," p. 43; my emphasis
20. Quine, "The Nature of Natural Knowledge," in Samuel Guttenplan, ed., Mind and Language (New York: Oxford, 1975), pp. 67-81; quote from pp. 74-75, my emphases
21. For a striking illustration of individual differences in weighting, see Freeman Dyson's sketch of Einstein's and Poincaré's differing degrees of receptivity to radical theory change in his "Clockwork Science," New York Review of Books (November 6, 2003): 42-44
22. "Reply to Morton White," pp. 664-65
23. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard, 1974), especially chapter III, sections 24-26
24. "The Nature of Natural Knowledge," p. 70