Xunzi's systematic critique of Mencius

Philosophy East and West

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 215-233

  Chong, Kim Chong ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60950575088     PISSN: 00318221     EISSN: 15291898     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/pew.2003.0012     Document Type: Review

References (28)

1. David Nivison states that Xunzi resorts to "linguistic legislation" concerning the difference between xing and wei (human artifice) (David Nivison, "Xunzi on 'Human Nature'," in Bryan Van Norden, ed., The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy [Chicago: Open Court, 1996], p. 212)
2. A. C. Graham holds that it is because of a "shift" in the sense of xing in Xunzi's "Xing e pian" that, "although its theory is as coherent in terms of its own definitions as Mencius' in terms of his, [it] never quite makes contact with the Mencian theory which it criticises" (A. C. Graham, "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature," in Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature [Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986], p. 56)
3. Paul Rakita Goldin agrees with Graham. He locates Xunzi's disagreement with Mencius in terms of the former's stress on wei or human artifice (Paul Rakita Goldin, Rituals of the Way: the Philosophy of Xunzi [Chicago: Open Court, 1999], pp. 11, 13). Goldin refers by analogy to the "policies" as against the "resources" of a state: "Success or failure rest[s] with the policies; the resources play no appreciable role in the determination of the state's ultimate fate" (p. 16)
4. D. C. Lau argues that the capacity of inventing morality must belong to human nature: "There is no reason why we should not extend the name human nature to cover the capacity of invention possessed by the mind which is part of it" (D. C. Lau, "Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi," in T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000], p. 208
5. Lau's paper originally appeared in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15 [1953]: 541-565)
6. Nivison notes that when Xunzi argues (in 23.2b) that we desire goodness because we lack it, a Mencian could reply that this is evidence of a good human nature (Nivison, "Xunzi on 'Human Nature'," pp. 211-212)
7. (A. S. Cua, however, does not see this as central to Xunzi: "All that follows from the conceptual point [that we desire what we lack] is that given a man desiring goodness, he lacks goodness in some sense to be specified under a certain description, but this throws no light upon the character or nature of the man." See A. S. Cua, "The Quasi-empirical Aspect of Hsün Tzu's Philosophy of Human Nature," Philosophy East and West 28 (1) [1978]: 4-5)
8. Lau takes Xunzi to be making a distinction between being "capable" and "succeeding" (Lau, "Theories of Human Nature," pp. 204-205)
9. But it is unclear why success should come into the picture. Given various contingencies, someone who is able to be or to do something might not succeed. Kwong-loi Shun is much clearer about the distinction between "capacity" and "ability" (Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997]; see in particular pp. 218 and 225). My essay owes much to Shun's clarification. However, unless the significance of the distinction is elaborated on in terms of the whole argument in the "Xing e pian," Shun's account is still open to the objection that Xunzi admits that human nature is good since it is admitted that everyone has the capacity to be good
10. All citations of the Mencius refer to the bilingual edition of D. C. Lau, Mencius, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984)
11. David Nivison and Kwong-loi Shun have noted these points. See Nivison, "Weakness of Will in Ancient Chinese Philosophy" and "Motivation and Moral Action in Mencius," in Van Norden, The Ways of Confucianism, pp. 83-84 and 94-95, respectively
12. and see Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, pp. 217-218
13. Tu zhi ren, rendered by Watson and Knoblock as "The (a) man in the street." "Ordinary person" is less cumbersome
14. In using "rationale" for I follow A. S. Cua, who says: "I take this passage [23.5a] to mean that jen [ren], i [yi], and standards of proper conduct can be understood in terms of their rationales. In other words, they are proper objects of knowledge. An understanding of their rationales is a precondition for moral practice" (A. S. Cua, Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu's Moral Epistemology [Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985], p. 26). For Xunzi morality and the laws have a rationale that can be known and practiced: ke zhi ke neng zhi li. Since he argues next that the ordinary person is unable to become a sage, we should not claim that ke neng here means that people in general are actually able to practice morality and the laws. Instead, the claim is that there is a rationale, and people have the capacity to know and to practice it. This is emphasized counterfactually: "If morality and the laws do not have a rationale that can be known and practiced, then even Yu could not know and practice morality and the laws."
15. Donald J. Munro, "A Villain in the Xunzi," in Philip J. Ivanhoe, ed., Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics (Chicago: Open Court, 1996). According to Munro the core issue is not evil per se but the problem of how to manage the surfeit of desires with the scarcity of goods through ritual enforcement and rank-orderings (p. 199)
16. More recently, however, he reads yi in the sense of li yi, as "an institutional feature exhibited by humans as a species" (see James Behuniak, "Nivison and the 'Problem' in Xunzi's Ethics," and Nivison's response in Philosophy East and West 50 [1] [2000]: 97-110 and 110-115, respectively)
17. Eric Hutton argues that you yi or "having yi," in 9.16a, does not have to be read as "having innately" (Eric Hutton, "Does Xunzi Have a Consistent Theory of Human Nature?" in Kline and Ivanhoe, Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, p. 224)
18. See also David B. Wong, "Xunzi on Moral Motivation," and Donald J. Munro "A Villain in the Xunzi," in Ivanhoe, Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture, pp. 215 and 198, respectively
19. John Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'," Philosophical Review 73 (1964)
20. quoted in A. S. Cua, "Basic Concepts of Confucian Ethics," in Cua, Moral Vision and Tradition (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), p. 295
21. Cua, "Basic Concepts of Confucian Ethics," pp. 292-295
22. The li, or rationale of morality and the laws, is intimately connected with li, the rites. Wen is often paired with li as wen li, which can be synonymous with li yi, rites and righteousness - for example, when it is stated that simply following the desires of the senses would give rise to yin luan, dissolute and wanton behavior, and the perishing of li yi wen li (ICS 23/113/5). In the sense of zhi, order and governance, li is contrasted with various forms of disorderliness (luan). Wen li connotes being cultured and acting according to reasonable form; it is this attention to cultural form and the rationale of li yi that enables a transformation of character. For instance, Xunzi says that the way of the filial son is the cultural form and rationale of rites and righteousness, xiao zi zhi dao, li yi zhi wen li ye (23/ 114/5). Similarly, the sage has the same nature as the masses but differs in his wei because he has been transformed by the cultural form and rationale contained in rites and righteousness, hua li yi zhi wen li (23/114/ 17). Tang Junyi notes that wen li is the sense of li most emphasized in the "Xing e pian" and that it is closely connected with its homophone (Tang Junyi, 1 (1) (1995)
23. Wong, "Xunzi on Moral Motivation," p. 218
24. See Donald J. Munro, "A Villain in the Xunzi,"
25. and Scott Cook, "Xunzi on Ritual and Music," Monumenta Serica 45 (1997): 1-38
26. See Sun Yi-jang, Mozi xiangu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), vol. 1, p. 111
27. and Burton Watson, Mo Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 44
28. Roger Ames, who was in the audience when I presented this essay in Taipei, asked whether the ascription of a "naive" position to Mencius is accurate. David Wong, in discussion, has also pointed out that the interpretation of Mencius that is given in this essay (as Xunzi sees it) neglects other aspects of Mencius. In reply, we should note that there is independent support for Xunzi's accusation that in his theory of human nature, Mencius relies heavily on simple, organic pictures. For example, although Mencius does talk of the necessity of the four sprouts being developed before they can become the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom (ren, yi, li, and zhi) (Mencius 2A6), he does not seem to give any concrete account of the process of development. At most, he speaks metaphorically of the nature of humanity, as, for example, in the account of Ox Mountain (Mencius 6A8): people, seeing that it is deforested, think that this is its original nature. This is one indication of Mencius' reliance on the picture of a simple, organic state. But I see the point of Roger Ames' and David Wong's comments and must make a qualification here: it would be a mistake to conclude that Mencius is totally naive. I show elsewhere that Mencius has a rich account of moral psychology and what it is to be a human being. Mencius himself shows a capacity for keen logical distinctions in his debate with Gaozi. Thus, he questions Gaozi's usage of "internal" and "external," and in various places in the text gives a more sophisticated account of what he himself means by "internal." See my "Mengzi on Nei and Wai," in Alan Chan, ed., Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002)