Decentralization under the Fox administration: Progress or stagnation?

Mexican Studies - Estudios Mexicanos

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 387-416

  Edmonds Poli, Emily ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Decentralization; Federalism; Fiscal reform; Governors; Local autonomy; Mexico; National Budget Convention (CNH); National Conference of Governors (CONAGO); Subnational Government; Vicente Fox

Indexed keywords

EID: 60950569258     PISSN: 07429797     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/msem.2006.22.2.387     Document Type: Review

References (43)

1. Decentralization is most commonly used to refer to the devolution of power to subnational governments and federal agencies. In this paper, the term is used more broadly to also encompass power sharing among branches of the central government. This follows the approach used by Peter Ward and Victoria Rodríguez, New Federalism and State Government in Mexico: Bringing the States Back In (Austin: LBJ School of Public Affairs, the University of Texas at Austin, U. S. -Mexican Policy Report No. 9, 1999).
2. Low accountability to voters was also exacerbated by Mexico's prohibition on re-election.
3. These theorized benefits made decentralization an extremely popular policy prescription in the 1980s and 1990s in the developing world. For more on the economic and political advantages attributed to decentralization, see Charles Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," in Journal of Political Economy 64, no. 5 (1956)
4. Richard Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959)
5. Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1972)
6. Roy Bahl and Johannes Linn, Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)
7. Richard Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
8. and B. C. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985).
9. There is a rich and growing body of literature on the nature and consequences of decentralization in Mexico. See, for example, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, Desarrollo económico e inequidad regional: hacia un nuevo pacto federal en México (Mexico: Fundación Friedrich Naumann, Grupo Editorial Porrúa and Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, 1995)
10. Victoria Rodríguez and Peter Ward, eds. , Opposition Government in Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995)
11. Victoria Rodríguez, Decentralization in Mexico: From Reforma Municipal to Solidaridad to Nuevo Federalismo (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997)
12. Marcelo Giugale and Steven Webb, eds. , Achievements and Challenges of Fiscal Decentralization. Lessons from Mexico (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2000)
13. Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, José Antonio González and Fernando Rojas, Mexico's Decentralization at a Cross-Roads (Working Paper No. 153, Center for Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform, Stanford University, 2002).
14. These are but some examples. For a more thorough discussion of presidencialismo's meta- and anti-constitutional powers, see Luis Javier Garrido "The Crisis of Presidencialismo," in Mexico's Alternative Political Futures, Wayne Cornelius, Judith Gentleman and Peter Smith, eds. , (La Jolla: Center for U. S. -Mexican Studies, 1989).
15. See Jodi Finkel, "Supreme Court Decisions on Electoral Rules after Mexico's 1994 Judicial Reform: An Empowered Court," in Journal of Latin American Studies 35 (2003).
16. On the traditional role of governors in Mexico, see Ward and Rodríguez, New Federalism, 65-73.
17. Richard Fagen and William Tuohy, Politics and Privilege in a Mexican City (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 27.
18. Prior to 1983, decentralization efforts were aimed primarily at promoting regional development rather than devolving authority to subnational governments. For example, the Echeverría administration (1970-1976) introduced the Ley General de Asentamientos Humanos (LGAH) to coordinate urban planning for the three levels of government. The López Portillo administration (1976-1982) continued this idea in the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano (PNDU), which specifically aimed to discourage the growth of Mexico City and to promote the decentralization of industry, private sector activities, and public services by encouraging them to locate in the thirteen "priority zones. " For more on these programs, see Victoria Rodríguez, The Politics of Decentralization, 65-69.
19. Before the 1990s, the federal government systematically favored some states and the Federal District over others because of their political importance. See Roderic Camp, "A Re-examination of Political Leadership and Allocation of Federal Revenues in Mexico," in Journal of Developing Areas, (January, 1976).
20. Rodríguez, The Politics of Decentralization, 69-76.
21. Roberto Ortega Lomelín Federalismo y municipio (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994), 70-72
22. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1998), 108
23. In retrospect, it is clear that Salinas's goal was to use Solidaridad to restore legitimacy to the PRI and his presidency, and to garner domestic support for his neoliberal economic agenda. To this end, the Solidaridad resources were disproportionately allocated to favor electorally important municipalities. For extended treatment of the Solidaridad program see Wayne Cornelius, Ann Craig and Jonathan Fox, eds. , Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico (La Jolla: Center for U. S. -Mexican Studies, 1994). On the use of Solidaridad to shore up electoral support for the PRI, see Juan Molinar and Jeff Weldon "Electoral Determinants and Consequences of National Solidarity," in the same volume.
24. See also Jonathan Fox and Josefina Aranda, Decentralization and Rural Development in Mexico: Community Participation in Oaxaca's Municipal Funds Program (La Jolla: Center for U. S. -Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1996)
25. and Robert Kaufman and Guillermo Trejo, "Regionalism, Regime Transformation and PRONASOL: The Politics of the National Solidarity Programme in Four Mexican States," in Journal of Latin American Studies 29 (1997): 717-745.
26. On the relationship between electoral competition and decentralization, see Jonathan Hiskey, "Does Democracy Matter? Electoral Competition and Local Development in Mexico" (Ph. D. diss. , University of Pittsburgh, 2000)
27. Caroline Beer "Assessing the Consequences of Electoral Democracy: Subnational Legislative Change in Mexico Comparative Politics 33:4 (2001)
28. Emily Edmonds, "Decentralization and Local Autonomy in Mexico"(Ph. D. diss, University of California, San Diego, 2001)
29. and Carlos Moreno, Decentralization, Electoral Competition and Performance of Local Governments in Mexico (Paper prepared for the Southern Political Science Association Conference, 2004).
30. and Finkel, "Supreme Court Decisions. "
31. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Subsecretaría de Egresos: www. schp. see. gob. mx.
32. For detailed treatment of the 58th Congress, see Jeffrey Weldon, The Spring 2003 Term of the Mexican Congress (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mexico Project, Mexican Congressional Report Series, 2003).
33. Roderic Camp, Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Transformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 180.
34. Yemile Mizrahi, "Making Mexican Federalism Work a year after the Election of Vicente Fox," Federations 2:1 (2001).
35. See also Thomas Courchene, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, and Steven Webb, "Historical Forces: Geographical and Political" and "Transfers and the Nature of the Mexican Federation," in Giugale and Webb Achievements and Challenges.
36. Between 1998 and 2001, federal transfers made up an average of 66. 6 percent of all municipal income. INEGI, Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales, 1998-2001.
37. Some of the criteria used in the formula include: per capita income, average level of education, and the availability of basic infrastructure (e. g. , housing, potable water and drainage, electricity). Instituto para el Desarrollo Técnico de las Haciendas Públicas, "Ingresos municipals derivados del sistema de coordinación fiscal. " (INDETEC presentation, Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, July 27, 2002. ) See: www. indetec. gob. mx.
38. Municipal officials of all three major parties expressed frustration with this state of affairs in personal interviews with the author. See Edmonds, Decentralization and Local Autonomy in Mexico.
39. The formula also takes into account the disparities associated with allocating the funds based on the origin of tax receipts. See R. Andrew Nickson, Local Government in Latin America (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1995), 204.
40. The author thanks one of the anonymous reviewers for clarifying this. For more on this issue see Reforma's interview with Vicente Fox, published January 7, 2001.
41. See Reforma, January 7, 2001. More information and the contents of specific proposals and developments of the CNH can be found on the Convention's website: http://www. indetec. gob. mx/cnh/
42. Latin American Weekly Report, (February 10, 2004).
43. This argument is advanced by Wayne Cornelius, "Blind Spots in Democratization: Sub-national Politics as a Constraint on Mexico's Transition," in Democratization 7:3 (2000), 117-132.