War and ghosts in Mozi's political philosophy

Philosophy East and West

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 343-363

  Wong, Benjamin ^a   Loy, Hui Chieh ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60950438417     PISSN: 00318221     EISSN: 15291898     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/pew.2004.0024     Document Type: Review

References (30)

1. All unmarked citations refer to chapter and line number in the Harvard-Yenching text of the Mozi. The translations generally follow Burton Watson, trans., Mo-tzu: The Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), but with modifications
2. The Chinese text used is that of Sun Yirang, Mozi xian'gu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1982)
3. As is well known, there are three versions of each of the eleven synoptic chapters of the Mozi, possibly reflecting the views of different sects of Mohists; see Angus C. Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of Mo-tzu (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1985)
4. For the purpose of this study, we will be focusing primarily on chapter 16, "Impartial Love C"; chapter 19, "Against Offensive War C"; and chapter 31, "Explaining Ghosts C," and we will be referring to them in the body of the essay without the subscription (i.e., the 'C'). These have been chosen as they appear to be the most interesting versions defending the corresponding Mohist teaching; they also match more or less the chapters selected for translation in Watson and in Philip J. Ivanhoe, "Mozi," in Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan Van Norden, eds., Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2001), both of which we have consulted extensively
5. By "Confucian opponents" is meant Mencius and Xunzi. See, for example, Mencius 3B.9 and Xunzi chaps. 12 and 17
6. See Mark E. Lewis, "Warring States Political History," in Edward L. Shaughnessy and Michael Loewe, eds., The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Beginnings of Civilization to 221 B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 597ff
7. David Nivison takes the view that for Mozi the "chiefest" danger is "human violence against other humans"; see David S. Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy, ed. with introd. Bryan W. Van Norden (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), pp. 82-83
8. Because most modern studies neglect to give serious consideration to Mozi's arguments concerning ghosts, they consequently fail to draw out the vital connection of "Against Warfare" with Mozi's concern with ghosts. See, for example, Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 138-145, 170-171
9. David S. Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," in Shaughnessy and Loewe, The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Beginnings of Civilization to 221 B.C., pp. 760-765
10. concentrates on impartial love and devotes only one paragraph to Mozi's view of the spiritual; cf. Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, pp. 38-39, 82-84
11. Consider also Hsiao K'ung-chuan, A History of Chinese Political Thought, vol. 1, From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century A.D, trans. F. W. Mote (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 214-272
12. Hsiao is very explicit in this regard: "The religious thought of the Mohists was somewhat crudely and loosely conceived and does not warrant profound examination" (p. 248). A. C. Graham notes the puzzling character of Mozi's moral philosophy: "at once the most religious and the most logical of the ancient thinkers"; see his Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978), p. 4
13. And in terms of Mozi's reliance on ancient documents to support his religious arguments, Graham likens the approach to "a Protestant sectarian using and misusing scripture" (p. 12). H. G. Creel altogether ignores the reference to ghosts or religion in his account of Mozi's view of war; see his Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 53-54
14. Even modern scholars who pay more serious attention to Mozi's views on religion fail to do justice to his arguments concerning ghosts; see, for example, Augustine Tseu, The Moral Philosophy of Mozi (Taipei: China Printing Limited, 1965), pp. 95-199
15. In defending Mozi's theism, Tseu claims that it is necessary to "distinguish and even separate the belief in the existence of God from that in the existence of spirits and ghosts" (p. 145), so as to minimize the importance of the latter in Mozi's system. See also Scott Lowe, Mo Tzu's Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia: The Will and the Way (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), pp. 137-141
16. In his short discussion of the chapter on ghosts, Lowe fails to consider the difficulties involved in Mozi's attempt to defend the existence of ghosts. This appears to explain his rather complacent discussion of the supernatural elements in Mozi's chapter on war (p. 114). See also the discussions of Mozi's utilitarianism and theism in Dennis M. Ahern, "Is Mo Tzu a Utilitarian," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3 (1976): 185-193
17. Dirck Vorenkamp, "Another Look at Utilitarianism in Mo Tzu's Thought," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 19 (1992): 423-443
18. David E. Soles, "Mo Tzu and the Foundations of Morality," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 26 (1) (1999): 37-48
19. and Kristopher Duda, "Reconsidering Mo Tzu on the Foundations of Morality," Asian Philosophy 11 (1) (2001 ): 23-31
20. Some scholars do take Mozi's concern with ghosts more seriously; see, for example, Rodney L. Taylor, "Religion and Utilitarianism: Mo Tzu on Spirits and Funerals," Philosophy East and West 29 (3) (1979): 337-346
21. and Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Derk Bodde (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 57. Neither, however, connects his discussion of ghosts with Mozi's arguments against war
22. On this point Mozi is hardly alone. See, for example, Roger T. Ames, trans., Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare (New York: Ballentine Books, 1993), pp. 107-109
23. That is, not ignorant (cf. 19/5). The so-called Neo-Mohists define this word as "self-falsifying, illogical"; see Graham, Later Mohist Logic, pp. 199-200
24. On its own, the first statement of the cause of disorder - the passing away of the orders of the sage-kings - might appear somewhat Confucian. But there is a difference in the understanding of what this "decline" amounts to. For Confucius (see Analects 16.2) it would be the abandonment of the rites, whereas for Mozi it is an increasing skepticism about the existence of providential ghosts. This not only gives Mozi's version of a supposedly historical 'decline from the golden age' a rather un-Confucian twist, but also sets it off sharply from the relatively more abstract and ahistorical account of conflict in "Impartial Love." For an interesting account of the skeptical tendencies of the period and their impact on politics and morality, see Yuri Pines, Foundations of Confucian Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), pp. 76-87. Pines also documents some attempts on the part of the princes to manipulate conventional beliefs in ghosts and spirits
25. Watson observes of the closing section (31/105-106) that "Mozi speaks as though he were not himself wholly convinced of the existence of ghosts and spirits" (Watson, Mo-tzu: The Basic Writings, p. 109)
26. As even Plato's Protagoras would argue, "even if someone is known to be wicked, yet if he publicly tells the truth about himself, his truthfulness ... is considered madness" (Plato Protagoras 323B, in W.K.C. Guthrie, trans., Protagoras and Meno (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956), pp. 54-55
27. Even the princes' annals record similar sorts of exhortations: for instance, they teach that "all those who kill innocent men will suffer misfortune and incur the punishment of the ghosts and spirits with just such rapidity!" (31/19-20; see also 29-30, 35, 40-41). The skeptics might have refused to bow to the authority of the princes on account of the evident cynicism and manipulation on the part of the latter of the very beliefs they preach. See Pines, Foundations of Confucian Thought
28. It is another matter altogether as to whether this is Mozi's considered opinion on the subject (see, e.g., 26/36-41). In any case, his not appealing directly to a distinction between might and right when presenting his case against war before the princes would find congenial expression in the words of a Machiavelli no less: [S]ince my intent is to write something useful to whoever understands it, it has appeared to me more fitting to go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it. And many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation. For a man who wants to make a profession of good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good. Hence it is necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able not to be good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity. (Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, XV, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985], p. 61)
29. Contrary to Nivison's claim that for Mozi, "what people are is not important. All that matters is what they do" (Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, p. 93 and also pp. 38-39; emphases his)
30. Wing-tsit Chan says, "one thing is certain, and that is, philosophically Moism is shallow and unimportant" (Chan, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963], p. 212)