Morality and sensibility in Kant: Toward a theory of virtue

Kantian Review

Volumn 8, Issue , 2004, Pages 89-114

  Reid, James ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 60950431800     PISSN: 13694154     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1369415400001886     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. See, for example, Martha Nussbaum's essay 'Perceptive equilibrium: literary theory and ethical theory', in Love's Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 168-94.
2. More sustained criticisms of Kantian ethics along similar lines can be found in Bernard Williams's Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983),
3. Both the Anthropology and the Metaphysics of Morals eulogize the Stoic rejection of compassion and the ideal of apatheia. (See Anthropology, 7: 253 and The Metaphysics of Morals, 6: 405-9 and 457.)
4. 'Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan intent', in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), p. 32.
5. The dualism of freedom and nature runs throughout the Groundwork and structures Kant's conception of the system of philosophy as a whole, including its division into theoretical and practical philosophy. See, for example, Groundwork, 4:387-9
6. and Critique of Judgment, 5: 171-6.
7. Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 5: 175.
8. and Nancy Sherman's Making a Necessity of Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
9. The expression is Dewey's. See Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court, 1925), p. 38.
10. 'The discernment of perception: an Aristotelian conception of private and public rationality' in Love's Knowledge, pp. 54-105.
11. Although I have not been effectively moved by Williams's arguments, I cannot defend Kant's position here. However, it is certainly wrong to assert that Kant simply assumes, without argument, the distinction in question. The distinction between the doctrine of happiness and the doctrine of morality is 'the first and most important task charged to the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason' (Critique of Practical Reason, p. 92).
12. Critique of Judgment, p. 187.
13. Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 75.
14. See Critique of Pure Reason, A 132-4/B 171-3
15. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1109b18-23.
16. For a discerning analysis of Aristotle's conception of practical rationality, see Martha Nussbaum's 'Discernment of perception', pp. 54-105.
17. and Metaphysics of Morals, p. 457.
18. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, trans. John Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 60-1.
19. See Kant's Anthropology, pp. 133-4.
20. 'Mourning and melancholia', in Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. J. Strachey (London, Hogarth Press, 1981) vol. 14, p. 245.
21. Critique of Practical Reason, 76.
22. Making a Necessity of Virtue, 178.
23. See Anthropology, pp. 233-5.
24. 'What Kant might have said: moral worth and the overdetermination of dutiful action', Philosophical Review, p. 90 (1979), 359-82.
25. Kant's Theory of Freedom, pp. 107-20.
26. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, 59 n.