Absolutist moral theories and uncertainty

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 103, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 267-283

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EID: 60950362991     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2006103614     Document Type: Review

References (6)

1. Kant, "On the Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Motives, " in The Metaphysics of Morals (Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797).
2. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy, " in Ethics, Religion, and Politics: The Collected Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Volume III (Minneapolis:Minnesota UP, 1981), pp. 26-42.
3. As in some versions of the principle of double effect, see, for example, Anscombe, "War and Murder, " in Ethics, Religion and Politics, chapter6.
4. The most worked-out version of a "mind in action" ethicaltheory we know of is Michael Slote's "agent-based" approach in Moralsfrom Motives (New York: Oxford, 2001); however, he is not defending absolutism.Slote has detailed discussions of who can and who cannot be read as agent-basedtheorists. Thanks to Dave Sobel for discussion here.
5. See, for example, the discussion of Kantian theories in C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1930).
6. Donald Davidson, "Agency, " in Essays on Actions and Events (New York: Oxford, 1980), pp. 43-61.