Between rhetoric and reality: Nationalist China's Tibetan agenda during the Second World War

Canadian Journal of History

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 485-509

  Lin, Hsiao Ting ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60950184054     PISSN: 00084107     EISSN: 00084107     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3138/cjh.37.3.485     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. See, for example, G. Moseley, "The Frontier Regions in China's Recent International Politics," in Jack Gray, ed., Modern China's Search for a Political Form (Oxford, 1969), pp. 299-329
2. Alastair. Lamb, Tibet, China and India, 1914-1950: A History of Imperial Diplomacy (Hertfordshire, 1989), pp. 299-349
3. Yan Ce and Peng Wulin eds., Zhongguo Jindai Minzu Guanxishi [History of the relationship between the Nationalities in modern China] (Beijing, 1999), pp. 390-97
4. William C. Kirby, "The Nationalist Regime and the Chinese Party-State," in Merle Goldman and Andrew Gordon (eds.), Historical Perspectives on Contemporary East Asia (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000), pp. 211-12
5. Warren W. Smith, Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder, Colorado, 1996), p. 228
6. See, for example, Wang Jianmin, "Lun siqiang zhiyi" [On becoming one of the Great Four], Zhongyang Zhoubao [KMT Central Weekly; hereafter cited as ZZ], 4 (1942), 220
7. Ze Ren, "Lun bianjiang gongzuo zhi zhanwang" [On the prospect of frontier affairs], Bianzheng Gonglun [Frontier Affairs, hereafter cited as BG], 3 (1944), 1-3
8. An Qinglan, "Hui Han ronghe zhi guanjian" [Key factors to a Han-Muslim fusion], Bianjiang Tongxun [Frontier Newsletter], 1 (1943), 5-9
9. See: Xu Yitang, "Bianjiang jingji zhi xiangduei fazhan" [The relative economical development of the border region], BG, 3 (1944), 48-50
10. Jiang Junzhang, "Xikang Jinkuang kaifa wenti," ZZ, 5 (1942), 3
11. There has been considerable controversy as to how much of the actual writing of China's Destiny was done by Chiang Kai-shek himself. However, it is certain that Chiang's attitudes towards China's territorial and minority issues were considerably revealed in this book, the publication of which could not have been done without Chiang's ultimate consent. See Philip J. Jaffe's introductory article "The Secret of China's Destiny," in Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny (London, 1947), pp. 20-21
12. Writing shortly after the birth of the republic, Sun Yat-sen asserted that "Although there are a little over ten million non-Han in China, including Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans and Tatars, their number is small compared with the purely Han population...." He further explained that, "The name Five-Race Republic exists only because there exists a certain racial distinction which distorts the meaning of a single republic. We must facilitate the dying out of all names of individual peoples inhabiting China ... we must satisfy the demands of all races and unite them in a single cultural and political whole." See Leonard Shih-lien Hsu (ed.), Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals (Los Angeles, 1933), pp. 167-69
13. Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolution (Taipei, 1953), p. 180. Thus Sun Yat-sen recognized the existence of four distinct minority groups and is unequivocally on record as favoring the equality of all racial groups in China, although his ideas on minorities in China lacked a general theory of what a nationality actually was
14. Chiang, China's Destiny, pp. 35-43. Chiang's fresh statements concerning frontier and nationality themes became the paramount political focus around 1943-44. Chiang's new arguments were put in textbooks, and China's Destiny became the designated work of reference for all of government officials. Chongqing also ordered local provincial authorities to propagate these freshly proposed frontier and minority thoughts to the masses
15. Liu Xiaoyuan, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 23
16. Jin Shaoxian, "Yishu Kuomindang yuanlao Wu Zhongxin" ["A memorial narration of the KMT veteran Wu Zhongxin"], Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji [Selections of Literary and Historical Materials, hereafter cited as WZX], 118 (1989), 78-79. According to the author, who later went on to serve in Wu Zhongxin's new Xinjiang Government in 1944, Chongqing first persuaded Ma Bufang to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek in helping the KMT to gain the control of Western Gansu. In return, Chongqing later issued an order allowing Ma Bufang to take over the forces in the Tsaidam. By doing so, Ma Buqing's political and military authority in the Northwest thus came to an end
17. See Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek: His life and Times (New York, 1981), pp. 744-45
18. Allen Whiting and Shen Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? (East Lansing, 1958), pp.51-53. According to British sources, in late 1943 Chongqing successfully launched its land-settlement policy in Eastern Xinjiang. More than 20,000 Han Chinese were moved to Hami and Turfan to do reclamation work. There were also a series of KMT programmes of cultural and economic development aiming at an eventual strengthening of political and administrative control in the Inner Asian border regions
19. "Directives of party affairs in the frontier regions," 23 Sept. 1942, in Zhongyang Dangwu Gongbao [Gazette of the Central Party Affairs], 4 (1942), 23-24
20. Zhu Jiahua (Head of the KMT Organization Department), "Bianjiang wenti yu bianjiang gongzuo" [Frontier questions and frontier affairs], ZZ, 5 (1942)
21. N. Clifford, Retreat from China: British Policy in the Far East 1937-1941 (London, 1967), pp. 149-50
22. Minutes of meeting between Chiang Kai-shek and Clark-Kerr, 31 Oct. 1940, 9 Nov. 1940, in Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyao Shiliao Chubian [Preliminary compilation of important historical records of the Repulbic of China], 3 (1976), 44-51
23. According to Chinese public opinion, the Japanese were expected to occupy key cities along the Indian coast as a first step towards controlling India. After this, several puppet regimes would be set up to take advantage of the chaotic political situation in India. Finally, the Chinese believed that the Japanese would utilize Buddhism to win over Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. The result would be the end of Nationalist dominance in southwest China. See: Jiang Junzhang, "Kang Zang Jiaotong yu Kanzhan jianguo" [The Xikang-Tibétan communication and the war of resistance], BG, 5/6 (1942), 39-47
24. Zhu Shaoyi, "Lun Kang Zang yiyun" [On the Xikang-Tibetan pack transportation], BG, 9/10 (1942), 60-62. It was obvious that the Chinese could not rule out the possibility of a dreadful collaboration between their Japanese enemy and the Tibetans even if the Japanese would not risk attacking and occupying at least north India and Tibet
25. Waijiaobu Dang'an [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Academia Historica (Taipei), hereafter cited as WJBD] 172-1/0012, Military Affairs Commission to Waijiaobu, 24 Dec. 1942
26. Regarding Japanese propaganda in north India and south Tibet, see WJBD, 172-1/0100-1, Chinese Consulate-General in Calcutta to Waijiaobu, 3 Jun. 1942. Kong Qingzpng, then the Chinese Representative in Tibet, did not really believe that there were already quite a large number of Japanese in Lhasa. He was, however, convinced that a considerable number of Mongolians or Tibetans, who could easily cross the Tibetan boundary from Gansu and Kokonor, were already working as spies for the Japanese
27. WJBD, 172-1/0100-1, Wellington Koo (Chinese Ambassador to Britain) to Waijiaobu, 9 Jul. 1942
28. Some scholars have suggested that the real threat to China's war effort came not only from the Japanese military machine, but also from impending economic collapse. The Japanese economic blockade, China's increasing isolation from the outside world, and vetoes imposed on imports were particularly damaging. All these factors were directly or indirectly related to the issue of China's supply lines. See, for example, A. N. Young, China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), p. 216
29. BL-IOR, L/P&S/20/D222, Tibetan Precis, p.70
30. WJBD, 172-1/0099-1, conference minute of the Executive Yuan, dated 8 Feb. 1940
31. WJBD, 172-1/0099-2, MTAC to Waijiaobu, 13 Sept. 1941
32. Chang Kia-ngau (Minister of Communication) to Guo Taiqi (Chinese Foreign Minister), 6 Oct. 1941. According to the Chinese, the Tibetans at first agreed, but then refused to let the Chinese survey parties into the Tibetan territories
33. PRO FO 436/16373 F3456/1535/10, "China Political Review-1942," enclosed in Seymour to FO, 22 Jun. 1943
34. WJBD, 172-1/0099-2, Waijiaobu to Ministry of Communication, 7 Mar. 1942
35. Waijiaobu to Chinese Embassy in London, 23 Mar. 1942
36. See WJBD, 172-1/0100-1, Wellington Koo to Guo Taiqi. 12 Jun. 1942
37. Zhou Yishi, Zhongguo Gonglu shi [A History of China's Highways] (Taipei, 1957), pp.236-42
38. BL-IOR, L/P&S/12/757, FO draft letter dated 23 Jul. 1943; L/P&S/12/4609, Seymour to GOI, 19 Nov. 1942
39. FO draft paper dated 3 Feb. 1943. In the latter document the British Government sought to make the most of the newly opened Karakorum pack route to impress upon the Chinese that their British ally was doing something to help them. With regards to the question of transit rights via Soviet territory, see also John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (Oxford, 1988), pp.187-91
40. BL-IOR, L/P&S/12/4182, reportby the British Consular-General in Chongqing, 31 Jan. 1942
41. The Qinghai Provincial Government ed., Qinghai San Ma [The three Mas of Qinghai], (Beijing, 1988), pp. 157-58
42. See also Merrill R. Hunsberger, Ma Bufang in Qinghai Province, 1931-1949, Diss. Temple University, Philadelphia, 1978
43. WJBD, 172-1/0100-1, Military Affairs Commission to Waijiaobu, 1 Jul. 1942
44. WJBD, 172-1/0100-1, conference minute of the Military Affairs Commission, 14 Jul. 1942
45. BL-IOR, L/P&S/12/4201, weekly report by the British Mission in Lhasa ending 28 Jun. 1942. In this telegram, the British officials reported that the Chinese Representative in Tibet was instructed by Chongqing to cooperate and associate with the British Mission in Tibet "in every possible way." Similarly, according to the British Embassy in Chongqing, the KMT regime clearly instructed its representative in Lhasa, Dr. Kong Qingzong, to contact the British Political Officer in Sikkim who was in charge of the Tibetan affairs, and negotiate a tripartite contract regarding pack route issues
46. PRO FO 436/17097 F5220/78/10, Seymour to FO, 9 Jul. 1942
47. WJBD, 172-1/0100-1, Waijiaobu memo dated 9 Jul. 1942
48. Waijiaobu conference minute dated 13 Jul. 1942
49. See also: PRO FO 436/17097 F8482/828/10, A. Eden to the U.S. Charge d'Affaires, 29 Dec. 1942
50. PRO F0371 F8566/828/10, London War Cabinet to the British Embassyin the U.S.,31 Dec. 1942
51. WJBD, 172-1/0011, Waijiaobu memo dated 12 Aug. 1948
52. BL-IOR, L/P&S/12/4201, weekly report of the British Mission in Lhasa, dated 5 Jul. 1942
53. Tibetan Precis, pp. 68-69
54. GZD, 419/1600-419/1606, Kong Qingzong (Chinese Representative to Tibet) to MTAC, enclosed in MTAC to Chiang Kai-shek, 11 Jul. 1942
55. WJBD, 172-1/0016, Waijiaobu memo dated 1 Jul. 1942
56. GZD, 419/1615-419/1618 WengWenhao (Minister of Economic Affairs) to Chiang Kai-shek, 22 Sept. 1942
57. BL-IOR, L/P&S/12/4201, weekly report of the British Mission in Lhasa, dated 24 Aug. 1942
58. GZD, 419/0065-419/0070, the Tibetan representative in Chonqing to MTAC, enclosed in MTAC to Chiang Kai-shek, 30 Nov. 1942
59. GZD, 419/0018-419/0021, Wu Zhongxin to Chiang Kai-shek, 20 Oct. 1942
60. 419/0061-419/0064, Wu to Chiang, 30 Nov. 1942
61. British Mission in Lhasa to the Political Officer in Sikkim, 26 Nov. 1944. Chiang's attitude was obviously influenced by Wellington Koo. According to Koo, when conversing with Chiang in early March 1943, he persuaded Chiang to dispatch an able, senior diplomat as China's representative to Tibet. Koo also suggested that China should avoid a hard line policy towards Tibet, believing that a conciliatory stance would be favorable to both Sino-Tibetan and Anglo-Chinese relations. Chiang agreed with Koo's. See GWJH, volume 5, pp.231-32
62. WJBD, 172-1/0016, conference minutes of the executive Yuan, 22 Jul. 1942
63. BL-IOR, L/P&S/12/4201, GOI minutes, 27 April 1943
64. See WJBD, 172-1/01Q0-1, MTAC to Waijiaobu, June, undated, 1942
65. JZZD, Choubi [Directives and Plans], 09-1541, Chiang Kai-shek to Ma Bufang, 8 May 1943
66. Tejiao Wendian [Exchanged Messages], volume 6, no. 32017694, Ma to Chiang, 12 Jun. 1943
67. PRO FO 371 F4322/40/10, FO to the British Embassy in Washington, 29 Aug. 1943
68. BL-IOR, L/P&S/12/4210, Seymour to FO, 8 May 1943, 10 to GOI, May 26, 1943
69. JZZD, Choubi, 09-1556, Chiang Kai-shek to T. V. Soong (Chinese Foreign Minister), 23 May 1943
70. See: Liu Wenhui, "Zoudao renmin zhenying di lishi daolu" ["The historic path of my walking towards the mass's side"], WZX, 33 (1986), 1-58
71. Wu Peiying, "Jiang Jieshi jia zheng Zang yi tu Kang di jingguo" ["The story of how Chiang Kai-shek plotted for Xikang under the pretext of attacking Tibet"], WZX, ibid., pp. 140-54. According to Liu's own account, Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to infiltrate Xikang and Yunnan militarily eventually failed. The warlords counteracted Chiang's idea of attacking Tibet by asking for more military equipment and other resources from Chongqing, which Chiang refused
72. See also BL-IOR, L/P&S/12/4210, British Embassy to FO, 25 May 1943. In this report the British recorded that Liu Wenhui disregarded Chiang's order to move Liu's troops to the Tibetan border, and Liu was reported to have flown to Chengdu to negotiate with Chiang's officials
73. JZZD, Choubi, 09-1413, Chiang Kai-shek to Xu Yongchang (Minister of Military Ordinance), 19 Oct. 1942
74. PRO FO 436/16459 F2132/1955/10, Seymour to FO, 22 Apr. 1943
75. In his telegram to the Minister of Military Ordinance, Chiang thought it impractical to use the Chinese troops stationed in India for the Tibetan issue, as such an idea would not be accepted by the United States and Britain. But Chiang pointed out that an exception might arise if the "situation suddenly shifted in the Burma or India theatres." Clearly Chiang only considered that it might be necessary to use force towards Tibet if this region happened to be under Japanese control and thus a threat to the safety of southwest China. See JZZD, Choubi, 09-1413, Chiang to Xu Yongchang, 19 Oct. 1942
76. WJBD, 172-1/0100-2, memo of the Executive Yuan, 5 Aug. 1942
77. GZD, 419/1592-419/1593, Wu Zhongxin to Chiang Kai-shek, 4 Apr. 1942
78. GZD, 419/1621-419/1629, Ho Yingqin and Wu Zhongxin to Chiang Kai-shek, 14 Dec. 1942
79. See also BL-IOR, L/P&S/12/4210, Seymour to FO, 22 Apr. 1943. In his telegram, the British Ambassador to China reported "there was a story that the Japanese were sending munitions of war to the Tibetans who were preparing airfield in Xikang for Japanese aircraft."
80. WJBD, 172-1/0100-1, KongQingzongtoMTAC,21 Mar. 1942
81. Chiang Kai-shek's instruction to the Military Affairs Commission, enclosed in Chiang to Waijiaobu, 6 Jun. 1942
82. Wolfram Eberhand, China's Minorities: Yesterday and Today (Belmont, California, 1982), pp. 152-55
83. Linda Benson, The lli Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (London, 1990), pp. 10-18
84. Colin Mackerras, China's Minority: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century (Hong Kong, 1994), chapter 3
85. See: Alastair Lamb, The China-India Border: the origin of the disputed boundaries (Oxford, 1964), pp. 14-15
86. G. Curzon, Frontiers (Oxford, 1908)
87. L.K.D. Kristof, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 49 (1959), 269-71
88. Wim van Spengen, Tibetan Border World: A Geohistorical Analysis of Trade and Traders (London, 2000), p. 49