Aristotle's notion of "bringing-before-the-eyes": Its contributions to Aristotelian and contemporary conceptualizations of metaphor, style, and audience

Rhetorica - Journal of the History of Rhetoric

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-23

  Newman, Sara ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60950000705     PISSN: 07348584     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/rh.2002.20.1.1     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. J. Kirby, "Aristotle on Metaphor," American Journal of Philology 118 (1997) p. 517
2. E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (London and Cambridge: MacMillan and Co., 1867) p. 376
3. W. B. Stanford, Greek Metaphor (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1936) p. 21
4. A. Ortony, "Metaphor, language, and thought," in A. Ortony ed., Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 1-19
5. G. Lakoff, and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) pp. 4 ff
6. On the scholarly history of Aristotle's theory and the traditional and recent approaches to language and metaphor, see J. Kirby, "Aristotle on Metaphor," p. 542
7. S. Newman, "Aristotle and Metaphor: His Theory and Its Practice," Diss. University of Minnesota (Ann Arbor: UMI No.: 9826845, 1998) pp. 22-27
8. R. Moran, "Artifice and Persuasion: The Work of Metaphor in the Rhetoric," in A. O. Rorty ed., Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) p. 392
9. "Artifice and Persuasion," p. 393
10. "Artifice and Persuasion," p. 392
11. Kirby "Aristotle on Metaphor," p. 542
12. Aristotle, On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. G. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 249 note 133 and p. 245 note 118
13. Greek Metaphor, pp. 12-13
14. J. Lallot, "METAPHORA. Le Fonctionnement semiotique de la metaphore selon Aristote," Recherches sur la philosophieat le langage 9 (1988) pp. 50-54
15. P. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. R. Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) pp. 192-93
16. P. Swiggers, "Cognitive aspects of Aristotle's theory of metaphor," Glotta. Zeitschrift fur griechische und lateinische Sprache LXII/1-2 (1984) pp. 40-45
17. and I. Tamba-Mecz and P. Veyne, "Metaphora et comparaison chez Aristote," Revue des Etudes Grecques 92 (1979) pp. 79ff
18. For example, the linguistic system in which Aristotle works has no explicit conceptual element and his understanding of audience is strictly monologic; see Newman, "Aristotle and Metaphor," pp. 15-22
19. Because no translation captures the meaning of energeia, I use the Greek term throughout this paper, as I also do for psuche. All citations from the Rhetoric are from the Kennedy translation mentioned in footnote 10. All other citations to Aristotle are from the following: Aristotle, The Complete Works, trans. J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Bekker numbers follow the quoted text parenthetically
20. On the relationship between the discussion of metaphor in the Poetics and the Rhetoric see Kirby, "Aristotle on Metaphor," p. 541
21. A. Laks, "Aristote Sur La Metaphore," in D. L. Furley and A. Nehamas eds., Aristotle's Rhetoric. Philosophical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) p. 292
22. Aristotle follows his definition of metaphor in the Poetics with examples of the species: "That from genus to species is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship'; for lying at anchor is a sort of standing. That from species to genus in 'Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought', where 'ten thousand', which is a particular large number, is put in place of the generic 'a large number'. That from species to species in 'Drawing the life with the bronze,' and in "Severing with the enduring bronze'; where the poet uses 'draw' in the sense of 'sever' and 'sever' in that of 'draw', both words meaning to 'take away' something" (21.1457b9-16). In contrast, "That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms related so that the second is to the first as the fourth to the third; for one may then put the fourth in place of the second, and the second in place of the fourth" (21.1457al6-18). In other words, A is to B as C is to D; B and D can also be switched to yield A is to D as C is to B. "Thus a cup [A] is in relation to Dionysus [B] what a shield [C] is to Ares [D]" (21.1457b20)
23. Moving on from the previous note, the analogy (A / B = C / D) can be restated so that the first term is the metaphorical equivalent of the association between the third and second (A=C of B; 21.1457b18-20); that is, the cup = the shield of Dionysus, the second term being the metaphorical equivalent produced by the association between the first and fourth (C=A of D), the shield = the cup of Ares (cf. 21.1457b20-24,25.1461a29-32, and Rh.3.11.11.1412b35- 1413a1). Analogous metaphors can also perform other complex naming functions such as naming unnamed entities (21.1457b24-30). The first analogous species of metaphor is more or less consistent with our understanding of metaphor, while the other three are in effect metonymy or synecdoche; see Newman 2000, 20). On analogous metaphors, see Rhetoric, 3.2.1405a10ff., 3.10.1410b12, 3.11.1411a1ff.; and Laks, "Aristote Sur La Metaphore," pp. 288-89, 298
24. See Aristotle, Poetics, 6.1449b20ff
25. Aristotle also differentiates between poetic and rhetoric language at: Rhetoric, 3.2.1404b14ff.and 3.7.1408b10ff.; and at Poetics, 25.1460b13-15
26. Aristotle often associates learning and pleasure; see Nicomachean Ethics, 10.1. 1172a19ff.; Metaphysics, 1.1. 980a22 and 3.6.1016b31-35; Poetics.4.1448b3ff.; and Rhetoric, 3.11.1411b22ff., 3.11.1412a5, and 3.11.1412b34ff
27. Aristotle does not include "bringing-before-the-eyes" in his account of poetic metaphor in the Poetics; but since poetic and prose metaphors operate in the same way (adjusted to their respective tele), it is likely that "bringing-before-the-eyes" functions in poetic metaphor as that capacity which actualizes contrasts into insights and clear poetic lexis
28. See S. Newman, "Recognizing a Rhetorical Theory of Figures: What Aristotle Tells us About the Relationship Between the Figures of Speech," Advances in the History of Rhetoric 4 (2000) pp. 13-25
29. Aristotle is inconsistent, however, when he describes the first set of metaphors of the first three species as "metaphors and bringing-before-the- eyes" and the second as simply "metaphors"
30. These examples make additional points. First, Aristotle states indirectly here what he later makes explicit: poetic similes that are most like analogous metaphors can be instructive and persuasive in prose situations. This passage also indicates that such instructive poetic similes can exhibit energeia although Aristotle does not directly link these kinds of similes or poetic metaphors with "bringing-before-the-eyes."
31. See C. A. Kosman, "Substance, Being, Energeia," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984) p. 138. Energeia can mean activity but also actuality as opposed to potentiality. See Metaphysics, 9.6.1048a25ff. and H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) p. 564
32. Metaphysics, 9.6.1048b18-30ff.; cf. Metaphysics, 3.7, Physics, 3.1.201a27ff.; J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Distinction Between Energeia and Kinesis," in R. Bambrough ed., New Essays in Plato and Aristotle (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1965) p. 128ff
33. and Kosman, "Substance, Being, Energeia," p. 121
34. Kosman, "Substance, Being, Energeia," p. 127
35. Kosman, "Substance, Being, Energeia," p. 124
36. Kosman "Substance, Being, Energeia," p. 125
37. On De Anima, see S. Everson, Aristotle on Perception (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)
38. W. Hamlyn, Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and III (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968)
39. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty eds., Essays on Aristotle's De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)
40. On Aristotle's psychology, see also J. I. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition (Oxford University Press, 1968)
41. and F. Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)
42. De Anima, 2.4.416b9-15. Cf. De Anima, 2.11.422b23ff; Aristotle Parts of Animals, 2.1.642a9-13 and 647a5ff.; Everson, Aristotle on Perception, pp. 32ff. Aristotle also accounts for more than the five senses through his discussion of accidental perception. Although the proper sensibles cause changes in the eye which result in vision, accidents may also produce changes. If an individual perceives a white object, and that white object is the son of Diares, then he/she has perceived the son of Diares accidentally (2.6.418a20-24), that is, not because Diares is a white object but because he is the son of Diares (cf. Physics, 2.3)
43. As Aristotle continues: "and a certain kind of object which can be described in words but which has not single name" (2.7.418a28). The latter type of thing consists of what appears fiery or shining in the dark (De Anima, 2.7.419a2-5)
44. Touch and taste do not require a medium: they have direct contact with perceptible objects as the other senses do not, and they are able to affect animate and inanimate objects as the other senses cannot; see Everson, Aristotle on Perception, pp.97, 129-136 on associated problems and arguments
45. De Sensu also explains why eyes have the material constitution they do: "It is true that the eye (he opsis) is composed of water, yet seeing occurs not because it is water but because it is transparent-something common to both water and air. But water is more easily confined and condensed than air and that is why the pupil, i.e., the eye proper, consists of water" (2.438a12-16). Because water is better suited to this role, eyes contain water rather than air
46. This entails a specific relationship between light and color. As Aristotle explains at De Anima 2.7.418b10ff., light is the actualization of the transparent. Since light actualizes the transparent, that light needs a medium; air is the medium through which we see. That is, light makes the air transparent: without light, we cannot see if something is transparent or not I would like to thank Michael Byron for explaining this to me
47. Aristotle states in the Nicomachean Ethics that to hit the mean in the case of virtues is accomplished not by reason but by perception. "But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception" (2.9.1109b20-24). For other discussions of contraries, see Generation and Corruption, 323b29-33,324a2-4; and Physics, 1.5.188a35-b3,7.3.246a4-9, and 7.3.246b10ff
48. A. Barker, "Aristotle on Perception and Ratios," Phronesis 25 (1981) p. 248
49. See Barker, "Aristotle on Perception and Ratios."
50. See De Anima, 3.6.430b20-25; Barker, "Aristotle on Perception and Ratios."
51. This circumstance accounts for the fact that some pleasures are less than virtuous, for example, excesses or inappropriate indulgence in sexual or gastronomical appetites; see Nicomachean Ethics, 7.13.1153b1-54a21 and 10.4.1174b14-1175a3, for example
52. Here I follow the "literalist" instead of the "spiritualist" perspective on this change. The literalist holds that perception is about material, physical changes; see Everson, Aristotle on Perception, cit. in n. 32 above, pp. 10-12, 56ff., 84ff., 229ff
53. The spiritualist holds that sensory perception involves a cognitive change; see Burnyeat, in Nussbaum and Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, cit. in n. 32 above, p.18, who denies that perception involves any alteration in the organ. "Although he [Aristotle] certainly does not ignore the fact that perception involves awareness, he shows no interest in the subjective experience enjoyed in perception in his discussion of the senses and their objects in the DA. What interests him are the conditions which are necessary for perception to occur" (Everson, Aristotle on Perception, p.35)
54. Although I have simplified a number of issues involving Aristotle's understanding of these capacities, my characterizations are not controversial, except insofar as I take the "literalist" rather than the "spiritualist" perspective on perception; see previous note. Imagination is probably better represented by phantasia, since the former is not quite the same as the Greek understanding; on the latter, see Everson Aristotle on Perception, pp. 178ff
55. and Nussbaum and Putnam, in Nussbaum and Rorty eds., Essays on Aristotle's De Anima
56. See Aristotle, Movement of Animals, 10.703a39-b1
57. Aristotle, Parts of Animals, 2.1.647a25
58. and Aristotle, On Dreams, 2.455a15-20
59. Cf. Everson, Aristotle on Perception, pp. 141ff
60. Aristotle, On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse, cit. in n. 10 above, p. 311
61. I thank my colleague Alan Gross and the readers for Rhetorica for their help in improving this essay