What do offenders think about CCTV?

Crime Prevention and Community Safety

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 17-25

  Gill, Martin ^a   Loveday, Karryn ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b Safer Middlesborough Partnership ^*  (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

CCTV effectiveness; Offenders' views; risk management

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949851015     PISSN: 14603780     EISSN: 17434629     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.cpcs.8140152     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Professor Martin Gill is Director of Perpetuity Research and Consultancy International (PRCI) Ltd and a Professor of Criminology at the University of Leicester; email: m.gill@perpetuity group.com.
2. Karryn Loveday is the Crime and Disorder Officer for the Safer Middlesborough Partnership; email: karryn-loveday@middlesborough.gov.uk.
3. The authors would like to thank Kate Collins, Ross Little and Dave Mackay for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
4. See Walsh, B. and Farrington, D. (2002) Crime Prevention Effects of Close Circuit Television: A Systematic Review. London: Home Office.
5. There has been a study of those arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime who often viewed CCTV as being useful for protecting their rights; see Newburn, T. and Hayman, S. (2002) Policing, Surveillance, and Social Control: CCTV and Police Monitoring of Suspects. Cullompton: Willan.
6. For a summary of offenders' views on security, see Gill, M. (2000) Commercial Robbery. Oxford: Blackstone Press.
7. For the purposes of this study 'theft' offences were primarily street robbery, burglary and shoplifting and 'fraud' offences were primarily credit card fraud
8. For validity purposes, where the respondent reported that they had been convicted for the offence they were interviewed about, their prison records were checked for confirmation. In all cases the data were valid.
9. Given the way the sample was generated there is no claim of representativeness here and caution is advised in extrapolating these findings. Thus the views, at best, help to generate insights into issues which need to be assessed alongside data generated from other sources.
10. Typically face-to-face card fraud takes the form of the fraudster presenting the card as a means of payment to, for example, a cashier.
11. This differs from card-not-present fraud which is typically, although not exclusively, carried out over the telephone or Internet where only the card number rather than the card itself is provided. In these circumstances there is no direct personal contact with another individual.
12. This same sports retailer was also mentioned by many of the credit card fraudsters due to the collusion of staff or their apparent lack of knowledge in terms of card fraud, coupled with the desirability and ease of resale of their goods
13. Fischer's Test p< 0.01.
14. All tables are based on 74 responses-3 of the sample declined to answer this section of the interview.
15. Other variables, including age, self-reported success rate and type of offence did not explain any differences in findings in the data.
16. Fischer's Test p< 0.01.
17. This was not quite statistically significant.
18. Fischer's Test p<0.001.