Is the assumption of a systematic whole of empirical concepts a necessary condition of knowledge?

Kant-Studien

Volumn 94, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 273-298

  Geiger, Ido ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60949742285     PISSN: 00228877     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/kant.2003.016     Document Type: Review

References (56)

1. I am deeply indebted to Gideon Freudenthal, Ken Gemes, Ron Katwan, Peter McLaughlin, Henry Pickford, Yaron Senderowicz, Ori Simchen, Allen Wood and a reader for Kant-Studien for invaluable comments on earlier versions of this paper.
2. Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason. Eds. and trans. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood. New-York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
3. References are to pagination in the second (B) German edition, which appears in the margins of the English translation; hereafter, B. Immanuel Kant: Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Trans. J. W. Ellington. In: Philosophy of Material Nature. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985. References are to the Academy pagination, which appears in the margins of the English translation; hereafter, MFNS.
4. In the Appendix Kant identifies systematic unity with purposiveness or teleology. He does not allot any special standing to the unity of organisms. See Gregor Schiemann: Totalität oder Zweckmäßigkeit? Kants Ringen mit dem Mannigfaltigen der Erfahrung im Ausgang der Vernunftkritik. In: Kant-Studien 83, 1992, 300, note 8. But Heinrich Cassirer claims that the Appendix leaves it an open question whether the teleological principle is to be limited to certain phenomena only - notably, to organisms - or whether it is applicable to nature as a whole. I think it is clear that Kant means the latter. His examples, as well as his identification of systematization with the teleological principle, can be interpreted in no other way. Cassirer seems to be applying Kant's later purported distinction between systematization and teleology to the earlier Appendix. Cassirer holds the Critique of Teleological Judgment to speak exclusively of organisms.
5. Heinrich Cassirer: Kant's First Critique - An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London: George Allen & Unwin - The Macmillan Company, 1954, 356-357;
6. Heinrich Cassirer: A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgment. New York: Barnes and Noble and Methuen, 1970, 322.
7. In the Appendix, Kant refers to examples taken from Stahlian chemistry in B 674, B 680-681 and B 685. Michael Friedman argues convincingly that by the time the Opus Postumum was written Kant was hopeful that the chemistry of Lavoisier would become a genuine science. Michael Friedman: Kant and the Exact Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, 264-290. In the Appendix, when an example of a properly scientific law is required Kant refers to planetary orbits and their geometrical properties (B 690-691).
8. When reading the Appendix it is important to note that 'systematic unity' is usually employed to indicate the outcome of applying the principle of similarity, but sometimes the successful application of all three principles - similarity, variety, continuity. Philip Kitcher: Kant's Philosophy of Science. In: Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy. Ed. A. W. Wood. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, 193, note 6.
9. Kant's idea of a systematic whole of empirical knowledge evidently draws from Leibniz. According to Leibniz, God created the most perfect world, "the one which is at the same time the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena;" Discourse on Metaphysics, 39;
10. see also: Principles of Nature and Grace Based on Reason, 210;
11. The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology, 220;
12. in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Essays. Eds. and trans. R. Ariew and D. Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989.
13. Indeed, Kant explicitly identifies his principle of continuity with Leibniz's law of continuity in the Appendix itself (B 696); see, e.g.: New Essays on Human Understanding. Eds. and trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, 307, 473.
14. The Source of Contingent Truths, 99-100. In: Leibniz, Philosophical Essays.
15. See Friedman: Kant and the Exact Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994, 265-267.
16. The application Leibniz envisages for his calculus of real addition is the analysis of empirical concepts. The calculus does not contain an account of order. But Leibniz acknowledges that order is necessary for its application. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: A Study in the Calculus of Real Addition. In: Logical Papers. Ed. and trans. G. H. R. Parkinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, 142-143.
17. For an application of mathematical analysis to optics see Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Tentamen Anagogicum: An Anagogical Essay in the Investigation of Causes. In: Philosophical Papers and Letters. Ed. and trans. L. E. Loemker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.
18. McFarland says explicitly that the Appendix is concerned with scientific methodology. John D. McFarland: Kant's Concept of Teleology. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh Press, 1970, 29.
19. Krausser analyzes the Appendix as a central text dealing with the methodology of science. Though he says that systematization is a very indirect but "necessary condition of the possibility of experience," it follows from other conditions which assume the existence of some empirical knowledge. Peter Krausser: Kant on the Hypothetical Employment of Reason in Science. In: Proceedings: Sixth International Kant Congress. Eds. G. Funke and T. M. Seebohm. Washington D.C.: The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and the University Press of America, 1989, 126.
20. Wartenberg argues that the Appendix gives an account of the use of theoretical concepts in scientific investigation. Thomas E. Wartenberg: Reason and the Practice of Science. In: The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Ed. P. Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 228-248;
21. see also Thomas E. Wartenberg: Order Through Reason. In: Kant-Studien 70, 1979, 409-424.
22. Cassirer, at one point, speaks of scientific investigation. Heinrich Cassirer: Kant's First Critique - An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London: George Allen & Unwin - the Macmillan Company, 1954, 335.
23. Fry reads Kant in a way that resembles the transcendental interpretation. But she rejects the position that the transcendental interpretation attributes to Kant. Like McFarland and Cassirer, Fry holds that some knowledge is independent of the idea of systematic unity; but the distinction does not lie between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. This claim is not made in Iris Fry: Kant's Principle of the Formal Finality of Nature and Its Role in Experience. In: International Philosophical Quarterly 29, 1989, 67-76;
24. but see Iris Fry: On the Principle of Nature's Logical Finality in Kant. In: Iyyun 37, 1988, 203-206 [in Hebrew].
25. Wartenberg, in one place, indicates that his account applies to all empirical concepts. Wartenberg: Order Through Reason, 419, note 3.
26. This, of course, brings him closer to the transcendental interpretation. Guyer too does not tie the ideal of systematic unity to scientific investigation. But he does think that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant does not claim that it is a condition of any empirical experience and knowledge. But he does acknowledge that Kant makes some suggestions to the contrary. Paul Guyer: Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity. In: Noûs 24, 1990, 17-43.
27. Kemp Smith describes the first half of the Appendix as extremely self-contradictory and he notes that its most radical teaching is not developed at any length. He suggests that Kant is "recasting older material, and leaves standing more of his earlier solutions than is consistent with his final conclusions." Norman Kemp Smith: Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1992, 547.
28. See also Jonathan Bennett: Kant's Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, 270.
29. Philip Kitcher notes that further evidence for the intractability of the Appendix is found in the fact that many of Kant's commentators simply ignore it. Philip Kitcher: Projecting the Order of Nature. In: Kant's Philosophy of Physical Science - Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft 1786-1986. Ed. R. E. Butts. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986, 204-215.
30. This, however, is the use McFarland attributes to the term. McFarland: Kant's Concept of Teleology, 29.
31. On Guyer's interpretation of the Appendix the idea of systematic unity would only be "transcendental in some sense". Guyer: Reason and Reflective Judgment, 28.
32. According to Grier when Kant says that the principle is transcendental he means that it is unavoidably or necessarily posited by reason. But its application to objects generally or to the understanding leads to illusion. Michelle Grier: Kant on the Illusion of a Systematic Unity of Knowledge. In: History of Philosophy Quarterly 14, 1997, 9.
33. Wartenberg: Reason and the Practice of Science, 246-247. The claim, however, is both irrefutable and unprovable. It is transcendent.
34. Grier suggests that the illusory transcendental principle is a necessary condition of the legitimate methodological employment of the logical principle. Grier: Kant on the Illusion of a Systematic Unity of Knowledge.
35. Paton holds that a necessary condition of empirical experience is not accounted for by Kant before the Appendix. Herbert J. Paton: Kant's Metaphysic of Experience vol. II. London: George Allen & Unwin and The Macmillan Company, 1951, 276.
36. Henry E. Allison: Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. New-Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, 229.
37. See also, Immanuel Kant: Critique of Judgment. Trans. W. S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987, 185. References are to the Academy pagination, which appears in the margins of the English translation; hereafter, CJ.
38. On the distinction between nominal and real definition see Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Logic. Ed. and trans. J. M. Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 360-361, 493.
39. In his thorough reconstruction of Kant's theory of empirical truth and meaning Hanna claims explicitly that systematic unity is not part of the theory. See, Robert Hanna: The Trouble with Truth in Kant's Theory of Meaning. In: History of Philosophy Quarterly 10, 1993, 12.
40. See also, Kant: Lectures on Logic. 360-361, 490.
41. David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, Book I, Parts I and III.
42. Krausser holds that the perceptual given, the "independent input" of empirical knowledge, is the "given sensible manifolds." Krausser: Kant on the Hypothetical Employment of Reason in Science, 128-129.
43. see also, Paul Guyer: Kant's Conception of Empirical Law. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90, 1990, 221-242.
44. See Wilfrid Sellars: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In: Science, Perception and Reality. Atascadero Ca.: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1991, 127-196.
45. John Locke: An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, Book IV, Chapter I, Section 4. I quote these words because of the striking resemblance they bear to a passage I quote below from B 679; see page 291.
46. See Locke: An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Book III, Chapter III, Sections 6-9;
47. Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature. Book I, Part I, Section VII; Hume attributes the great discovery to Berkeley;
48. see George Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge. Ed. H. Robinson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, Introduction.
49. I am borrowing the illuminating image of openness to the world from McDowell. John McDowell: Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996, e.g., xx.
50. See also, "the systematic unity of the understanding's cognitions . is the touchstone of truth for its rules" (B 675). Philip Kitcher says: "As I understand Kant, he is asserting that the goal of achieving scientific explanations of natural phenomena is necessarily reached by integrating the phenomena into a unified system (there is a necessary connection between explanation and unifying), and this goal is of equal significance with the goal of setting forth the truths about nature precisely because the latter goal makes no sense apart from the former." Kitcher: Projecting the Order of Nature, 213. Kitcher holds that Kant's thoughts on systematization still offer a viable solution to contemporary debates in philosophy of science.
51. Rolf P. Horstmann: Why Must There Be a Transcendental Deduction in Kant's Critique of Judgment. In: Kant's Transcendental Deductions. Ed. E. Foerster. Stanford: Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1989, 170.
52. Dister claims that Kant's deduction of the regulative ideas does not contradict his earlier denial of the possibility of a deduction. John E. Dister: Kant's Regulative Ideas and the 'Objectivity' of Reason. In: Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress. Ed. L. W. Beck. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1972, 266.
53. See Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991, e.g., note 241 and page 226.
54. The indebtedness of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations to Kant is most thoroughly discussed in the work of Cavell. The focal text is Stanley Cavell: The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
55. See McDowell: Mind and World, 95-98.
56. See Seilars: Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 168.