Has Aristotles mind been changed?

Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie

Volumn 84, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 212-222

  Wee, Cecilia ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949693538     PISSN: 00039101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/agph.2002.010     Document Type: Note

References (19)

1. Myles F. Burnyeat, "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)", in: Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, ed. Martha Craven Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 15-26
2. John E. Sisko, "Alteration and Quasi-Alteration: A Critical Notice of Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception", in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. C. C. W. Taylor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 38 (Hereafter AQA)
3. Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, "Changing Aristotle's Mind", in: Nussbaum and Rorty, op. cit., pp. 27-56
4. Arguments against Burnyeat have also been advanced in Jonathan Lear, The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988)
5. S. Marc Cohen, "Hylomorphism and Functionalism", in: Nussbaum and Rorty, op. cit., pp. 57-74
6. Gareth B. Matthews, "De Anima 2.2.-4 and the Meaning of Life", in: Nussbaum and Rorty, op. cit., pp. 185-194
7. Richard Sorabji, "lntentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception", in: Nussbaum and Rorty, op. cit., pp. 195-226
8. Cynthia Freeland, "Aristotle on the Sense of Touch", in: Nussbaum and Rorty, op. cit., pp. 227-248
9. S. Granger, "Aristotle and Perceptual Realism", Southern Journal of Philosophy, XXXI, suppl. (1995), pp. 161-172
10. John E. Sisko, "Material Alteration and Cognitive Activity in Aristotle's De Anima", Phronesis Vol. XLI/2 (1996), pp. 138-157
11. Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997)
12. Deborah Modrak, "Sense Organs: Matter and Function", Apeiron, 31:4 (1998), pp. 351-361
13. Raphael Woolf, "The Coloration of Aristotelian Eye-Jelly: A Note on 'On Dreams' 459b-460a"
14. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 37:3 (1999), pp. 385-391. Arguments in support of Burnyeat have included T. K. Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and (indirectly) Sarah Broadie, "Aristotle's Perceptual Realism", Southern Journal of Philosophy, XXXI, suppl., pp. 137-160. John Sisko's even-handed review (AQA) contains arguments supportive of Burnyeat, though it ultimately disagrees with Burnyeat's position
15. M. F. Burnyeat, "How much happens when Aristotle sees red and hears middle C? Remarks on De Anima 2.7-8", in: Nussbaum and Rorty, op. cit., pp. 421-134
16. The relation between perception, thought and animal movement has been widely discussed, and I cannot do full justice to these discussions here. They include Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium (Princeton, 1985), David Furley, "Self-Movers" in: G E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen, eds., Aristotle on the Mind and the Senses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)
17. Rosamond Kent Sprague, "Models for the Practical Syllogism", Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 7 (1987), pp. 87-94
18. Deborah Modrak, "The Nous-Body Problem in Aristotle", Review of Metaphysics (1991), pp. 755-774.] Once again, I cannot do justice to the wider discussion and confine myself to a direct address of Nussbaum and Putnam's point
19. J. L. Ackrill "Aristotle's Definitions of Psuche", in: J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji, eds., Articles on Aristotle 4: Psychology and Aesthetics (London, 1979), p. 70