Naturalism and the fate of the M-worlds: II - Frank Jackson

Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 269-282

  Price, Huw ^a   Jackson, Frank ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60949527913     PISSN: 03097013     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 74
2. See, for example, Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982) and the literature prompted by it. The problems should not, though, lead us to infer that we cannot know how someone is representing things to be when they speak or write (Should we stop asking people the way to coffee shops?) or that usage is not central (Should we tell dictionary makers to change their ways?)
3. For the connection between the correspondence theory and representation, see Marian David, Correspondence and Disquotation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1994, pp. 31-51
4. Huw Price, Time's Arrow & Archimedes' Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 4. He argues that the Archimedean view of time, the view from nowhen, as he describes it, delivers the block view
5. See, e.g., Ruth Millikan, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993)
6. and David Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), ch. 3
7. A view we might call linguistic idealism, as Mark Sainsbury pointed out to me. Traditional idealists allow that language represents without creating, though what is represented is the nature of actual and possible patterns in ideas. This, however, is plausible only as a view about language in their mouths. As David Lewis, 'Noneism or Allism?', Mind, 99 (1990), pp. 23-31, argues, if idealism is true, 'There is a table in at least one unoccupied room' is true in Berkeley or Mill's mouth, but false in Locke's
8. See, e.g., Barry Taylor, 'On Natural Properties in Metaphysics', Mind, 102 (1993), pp. 81-100
9. esp. §IV. However, late in the paper, Taylor writes as if he were only insisting that our classifications always concern, to one extent or another, how things relate to us, as if he were simply denying the possibility of the Archimedean point (see the reference to realism 'as celebrated in Sydney' on p. 99), and that is a separate issue
10. Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2nd ed. 1991), p. 238
11. See, e.g., Ernest Adams, The Logic of Conditionals (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975)
12. And desire, see, e.g., Donald Davidson, 'Representation and Interpretation', in Modelling the Mind, K. A. Mohyeldin Said et al., eds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 16
13. Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983)
14. and Ned Block, 'Psychologism and Behaviorism', Philosophical Review, 90 (1981), pp. 5-43
15. Paul M. Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1981), pp. 67-90
16. David Lewis, 'How to Define Theoretical Terms', The Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 427-46