Functionalistic pragmatism

Philosophical Forum

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 191-205

  Rescher, Nicholas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949478281     PISSN: 0031806X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0031-806X.00061     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, bk. II, pt. iii, sect. 3. For Hume, the only inappropriate desires are those that depend on logically irrational beliefs
2. On rational versus irrational ends, see Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958)
3. and Bernard Gert, The Moral Rules (New York: Harper and Row, 1973)
4. Some of these issues are also treated in my Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)
5. See my Welfare (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972)
6. Compare John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 421. Rawls traces this line of thought back to Henry Sidgwick
7. My The Validity of Values (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) offers further perspectives on some of the themes of these deliberations