On kripke and statements

Midwest Studies in Philosophy

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 295-308

  Fitch, G W ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60949471129     PISSN: 03636550     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2004.00097.x     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. G. W. Fitch, "Are There Necessary A Posteriori Truths?" Philosophical Studies 30 (1976): 243-247. This is actually a slightly revised version of the argument. The revision consists in a modification of premise (3). In the original argument premise (3) was a substitution principle that governed the use of rigid designators. The principle is overly broad for what it was designed to do, namely establish premise (3). Also I shall ignore in this section of the paper delicate issues concerning the possibility of Venus's failing to exist.
2. Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
3. Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).
4. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
5. Nathan Salmon, "Nonexistence," Nous 32 (1998):277-319.
6. Salmon also notes Peter van Inwagen's (1977) view of fictional names in "Creatures of Fiction," American Philosophical Quarterly 14:299-308, as well as a number of other philosophers whose views are similar to Kripke's position. I refer the reader to Salmon's paper for additional references.
7. For a more detailed account of Kripke's view, see Salmon's paper (1998).
8. Salmon's objection is similar to David Braun's objection to what he calls the Metapropositional View, which is in essence the view that Salmon attributes to Kripke ("Empty Names," Noûs 27 (1993): 449-469).
9. Braun also objects, in this paper, to what he calls the No Proposition View, which is a version of the view I suggested for empty names in "Non Denoting," Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1993): 461-486.
10. This is a point emphasized by Keith Donnellan in his paper "The Contingent A Priori and Rigid Designators" in P. French et al., eds., Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).
11. David Kaplan, "Demonstratives," in X Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481-563.
12. See David Lewis's discussion of what a sentence says in his paper "Index, Context and Content" in Papers in Philosophical Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 21-44.
13. In his paper "Words" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society [Supp.] 64:93-117) Kaplan says the following in a footnote (# 6, p. 95): I have come to think that two sentences whose syntax - perhaps I should say, whose logical syntax - differs as much as "a = a" differs from "a = b" should never be regarded as having the same semantic value (expressing the same proposition), regardless of the semantic values of the individual lexical items "a" and "b." In this quote Kaplan uses the phrase "semantic value" to mean semantic content in the sense used in the text. What I am suggesting is that such sentences do differ in semantic value (linguistic meaning), even though they are used to assert the same proposition (content).