Sources of practical conflicts and reasons for regret

Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 197-222

  Betzler, Monika ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 60949456840     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511616402.009     Document Type: Chapter

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