Two act-omission paradoxes

Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society

Volumn 104, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 149-164

  Persson, Ingmar ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949370841     PISSN: 00667374     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00086.x     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. These qualifications are not of present concern; for a penetrating discussion of them, see Shelly Kagan: The Limits of Morality (Oxford: OUP, 1989)
2. The Act Itself, (Oxford: OUP, 1995), p. 110 (my emphasis)
3. Frances M. Kamm apparently agrees, see Morality, Mortality, II (New York: OUP, 1996), p. 118, note 9
4. Morality, Mortality, p. 22
5. Cf. Warren Quinn, who regards as morally relevant 'the fact that someone's present predicament was of your making', 'Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing', reprinted in his Morality and Action, (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), p. 164. See also Jeff McMahan: The Ethics of Killing, (New York: OUP, 2002), p. 367