Disaster at Darien (1698-1700)? the persistence of Spanish imperial power on the eve of the demise of the Spanish Habsburgs

European History Quarterly

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 5-38

  Storrs, Christopher ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 60949349826     PISSN: 02656914     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/026569149902900101     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. C. 1680 the egent of Savoy sought to marry her son, Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, to the Portuguese Infanta, partly because this might open up the still vast Portuguese overseas trading empire to the Duke's subjects. The scheme failed, as did the Duke's own later attempts to realize his claims to the Spanish Succession, and thus secure Spain's world empire: cf. G. Symcox, Victor A madeus II. Absolutism in the Savoyard State 1675-1730 (London 1983), 82 (and passim)
2. Cf. G.P. Insh, The Darien Scheme (Historical Association, London 1947)
3. J.S. Barbour, A History of William Paterson and the Darien Company (Edinburgh 1907)
4. and F.R. Hart, The Disaster of Darien. The Story of the Scots Settlement and the Causes of its Failure 1699-1701 (London 1930). That Darien soon became seen as a defining moment in Scottish history is suggested by a contemporary comparison of the economic downturn of the 1770s with the events of 1698-1700
5. cited in T.C. Smout, A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830 (London 1969), 229. For a brief recent survey of the debate about the strength and prospects of the Scottish economy c. 1700
6. cf. C.A.W. Whatley, 'Bought and Sold for English Gold'? Explaining the Union of 1707 (Economic and Social History Society of Scotland 1994), esp. 28ff
7. Cf., also, D. Armitage, 'The Scottish vision of empire: intellectual origins of the Darien venture', in J. Robertson, ed., A Union for Empire. Political Thought and the Union of 1707 (Cambridge 1995)
8. F. O'Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century. British Political and Social History 1688-1832 (London 1997), 56
9. J. Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, vol. 2: Spain and America 1598-1700, 2nd edn (Oxford 1981)
10. J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716 (London 1961)
11. and H. Kamen, Spain in the later Seventeenth Century, 1665-1700 (London 1980)
12. R.D. H ussey, The Spanish Empire under Foreign Pressures 1688-1715', in J.S. Bromley, ed., The New Cambridge M odern History [henceforth N C M H], vol. 6
13. The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25 (Cambridge 1970), 360, does briefly describe the episode
14. Cf. P. Molas Ribalta, Manual de Historia de España, 3: Edad Moderna, (1474-1808) (Madrid 1989)
15. and ibid., ed., Historia de España R. Menéndez Pidal, vol. XXVIII: La Transición del Siglo XVII al XVIII. Entre la Decadencia y la Reconstrucción (Madrid 1993)
16. Neither J.O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750 (Cambridge 1940; reprinted Octagon 1974) nor J.H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (H armondsworth 1973), refer to the Darien venture. M.A. Burkholder and L.L. Johnson, Colonial Latin America, 2nd edn (Oxford 1994), a good general survey, also ignores it. Perhaps the best recent English-language introduction to Spain's colonial trade is A. G arcía-Baquero González, 'Andalusia and the crisis of the Indies trade 1610-1720', in I.A.A. Thompson and B. Yun Casalilia, eds, The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century. New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth Century Spain (Cambridge 1994), 115ff. This is a translation of a chapter from A. García-Baquero González, Andalucía y la carrera de Indias (1492-1824) (Seville 1986)
17. J.M. Oliva Melgar, 'Realidad y Ficción en el Monopolio de Indias: una Reflexión sobre el Sistem a Imperial Español en el Siglo XVII', Manuscrits, Vol. 14 (1996), 321-55, is both an important contribution to contemporary debates and a valuable tour d'horizon
18. C. Ward, Imperial Panama. Commerce and Conflict in Isthmian America 1550-1800 (New Mexico 1993), 178 and 255
19. Cf. D. McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815 (London 1983)
20. and S.B. Baxter, William III (London 1966). Earlier, however, Legrelle did pay some attention to the episode in his study of the Spanish succession: cf. Irish, op. cit., 3
21. Cf. J.H. Elliott, 'The Decline of Spain', Past and Present, Vol. 20 (1961)
22. The Elector Palatine, brother of Carlos' second wife, M aria Anna of Pfalz-Neuburg, himself sought Darien from his brother-in-law in the late 1690s as a possible centre of commercial activity on his own account (seeing it as just the sort of launchpad to colonial wealth that the Scots expected their own expeditions to provide), Duque de Maura, Vida y Reinado de Carlos II, ed. P. Gimferrer (Madrid 1990), 563. Although Maura gives no references (his papers were among the mi or casualties of the Spanish Civil War), where it can be checked his study is generally well founded
23. H. Kamen, op. cit., a major re-evaluation, deals only with peninsular Spain, while R. Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain. A Study of the Spanish System 1580-1720, (London 1981), nonetheless sees little positive in the 1680s and 1690s. The recent D. Goodman, Spanish Naval Power 1589-1665. Reconstruction and Defeat (Cambridge 1997), stops at 1665, but admits that there is no compelling reason for this. Many of these issues are discussed more fully in C. Storrs, 'The Army of Lombardy and the resilience of Spanish Power in Italy 1665-1700', War in History, Vol. 4 (1998), 371ff
24. For these institutions, cf. E. Schäfer, El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias, 2 vols. (Seville 1935-47)
25. I.A.A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain 1560-1620 (London 1976)
26. and F. Barrios, El Consejo de Estado de la Monarquia Española 1521-1812 (Madrid 1984)
27. Some of the concerns discussed in the present paragraph were articulated in the consulta of the Council of the Indies of 12 Feb. 1699, in Archivo General de Indias/Audiencia de Panamá [henceforth AGI/Panamá], legajo 160, printed in Hart, Disaster of Darien, op. cit., Appendix XIII, 25 Iff. and in Carlos II 's instructions to Admiral Navarrete of May 1700, for his expedition against the second wave of Scottish settlement at Darien, in Museo Naval de Madrid, Navarrete Collection, Papeles correspondientes a la expedición del Darien [henceforth MN/Navarrete/Darien]. I should like to thank the Museo N aval for supplying a photocopy of this invaluable document. On prestige as a factor in Spanish policy, cf. the review article by J.H. Elliott, 'A Question of Reputation? Spanish Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth Century', Journal of Modern History, Vol. 55 (1983), 475ff. (although it deals with the period before 1665)
28. For Portobelo as the bulwark of Spanish empire in central America and beyond, cf. Anon., 'Copia Legal de Carta Escrita (por persona desapasionada, practica y inteligente) a confidente de Madrid, en razon de la poblacion de Escoceses en el Darien: operaciones executadas por los Ministros de su Magestad Catholica, desde que hizieron los enemigos su primer arrivo, hasta que por Capitulaciones, fueron desalojados: Todo con distincion, y claridad', Biblioteca Nacional, M adrid, MS 19512 [henceforth Copia Legal]. I should like to thank the Biblioteca Nacional for supplying a photocopy of this (incomplete) Spanish account of the Darien episode. Don José may have been unduly pessimistic, but such pessimism was widespread and his fears were not completely unfounded: in 1680 English raiders had sacked Portobelo and crossed the isthmus of Darien to embark on buccaneering activity in the Pacific, Hussey, op. cit., 350. This traumatic episode was a constant term of reference among Spanish policymakers dealing with the Scots incursion in 1 698-9
29. The system of exploitation by monopoly and convoy is usefully described in Lynch, op cit., 187ff., Ward, op. cit., 19ff. and H. Kamen, op cit. 13Iff. (including table of flotas and galeones). Spanish government finance in this period has not been as exhaustively studied as before 1665. N evertheless, M. Garzón Pareja, La Hacienda de Carlos II (M adrid 1980), C. Sanz Ayán, Los Banqueros de Carlos II, (Valladolid 1988), and J.A. Sánchez Belén, La politic a fiscal en Castilla durante el reinado de Carlos II (M adrid 1996) are all useful, while in English the contribution of American bullion to Spain's international defence commitments is clarified in Kamen, op. cit., 131ff. In late 1693 Spanish m inisters saw the flota (and its cargo), then en route to Spain, as the only means to fund a striking increase in Spain's army of more than 40,000 men for 1694; Alexander Stanhope to the Earl of Nottingham, 4 and 11 Nov. 1693, Madrid, SP 94/73 f.233 and 234
30. That the English were inspired in this way by the initial Scots success is suggested by the Spanish ambassador, the Marqués de Canales, to Carlos II, 22 Feb. 1699, London, Archivo General de Simanecas, Council of State [henceforth AGS/Estado], legajo 3971
31. Parry, op. cit., 330, and Burkholder and Johnson, op. cit., 150-1. This is not to ignore the strengthening of Panama's defences, particularly after the buccaneering attacks of Morgan (1668, 1671) and others, Ward, op. cit., 174-5. In 1697 the French had briefly seized Cartagena: A McFarlane, Colombia before Independence. Economy, Society and Politics under Bourbon Rule, (Cambridge 1993), 24
32. Consulta of Council of Indies, 12 Feb. 1699, AG/Panamá/160, in H art, Disaster of Darien, op. cit., Appendix XIII, 25ff. The royal order of 19 April 1698 regarding Pensacola and details of both the expedition to Pensacola and the arrival of Zavala's reinforcement are in the Viceroy's subsequent account, written at the end of 1699, of his conduct regarding the flota, in AGI/México/66. I should like to thank the AGI for supplying a photocopy of this report. For Zavala, cf. also Copia Legal, p. 7. For Spain's Atlantic defence system, cf. Lynch, op. cit., 187 and C.R. Phillips, Six Galleons for the King of Spain. Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century, (Baltimore 1986), 8ff. and passim
33. Moctezuma to Carlos II, 14 July 1699, México, AGI/México/ 61, in Hart, Disaster of Darien, op. cit., Appendix XXI, 299ff. For Havana's role in Spain's transatlantic system throughout the early modern era
34. cf. J.R. McNeill, Atlantic Empires of France and Spain, Louisburg and Havana 1700-1763 (Chapel Hill 1985), 85ff
35. The story is narrated by Canillas himself, ibid. to Carlos II, 6 May 1699, Panamá, AGI/Panamá/162, in Hart, Disaster of Darien, op. cit., Appendix XVI, 261ff.; and by the Viceroy of New Spain, with copies of relevant letters, in AG I/México/66, cf. also Copia Legal, p. 4-5. (This is, in many respects, an apologia for Canillas)
36. and J. Prebble, The Darien Disaster (London 1968), 165ff
37. According to Andrés de Pez to Carlos II, 10 June 1699, Portobelo, AGI/Panamá/160. in Hart, Disaster of Darien, op. cit., Appendix XIX, 293ff., who had denuded his ships of men for the abortive land-based assault, the retreat from Darien was further hastened by reports of English ships heading for Portobelo
38. The argument of the Spanish officer, Don Juan Martínez Retes de la Vega, a veteran of Spain's wars against Louis XIV in Europe (he had served under William III during Louis XIV's so-called Dutch War) for abandoning the attack on the Scots colony on the gro nds that to carry on would waste valuable soldiers (and be counter-productive in the long run), sent with Canillas to Carlos II, 6 May 1699 (above) was typical of the views of Spanish soldiers throughout the Monarchy where conservation was the watchword (and indeed of army officers throughout Europe) and should not be thought of as an unwillingness to fight symbolic of somemore fundamental Spanish military decline
39. P. Haffenden, 'France and England in North America 1689-1713', NCMH, Vol. 6,500
40. Cf. Moctezuma to Zavala, 20 July 1699, México, AGI/México/61, in Hart, Disaster of Darien, Appendix XXIII, 31 Off. Zavala eventually left Vera Cruz for Havana (en route for Darien) at the end of July, Zavala to Carlos II, 28 July 1699, Vera Cruz, AGI/México/61
41. Cf. AGI/México/66, including reference to Carlos II's order to Moctezuma, 3 April 1699, to despatch promptly the flota; and Copia Legal, p, 6
42. Zavala to Carlos II, 11 Jan. 1700, Cádiz, AGI/México/61, in Hart, Disaster of Darien, op. cit., Appendix XXIX, 338
43. AGI/México/66 includes reference to orders from Carlos II to Moctezuma of 30 April and 13 M ay 1699, to give absolute priority to supporting the expedition against the Scots; Copia Legal, passim
44. Cf. memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II, 30 Oct. 1699, cited earlier
45. Carlos II to D on José Pérez de la Puente, 8 June 1699, AGS/GyM/3114
46. Consulta of Council of War, 15 June 1699, AGS/GyM/3100. Although focusing on the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the following studies nevertheless give a valuable insight into the general structure (and explain the terminology) of Spain's armies
47. G. Parker, The Army of Plunders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries (Cambridge 1972)
48. R. Quatrefages, The Military System of the Spanish Habsburgs', in R. Banon Martínez and T.M. Barker, eds, Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present (Columbia 1988)
49. and L. Ribot García, 'El Ejército de los Austria. Aportaciones Recientesy Nuevas Perspectives', Pedralbes, Vol. 3 (1983), 89ff. For a rare study of one later seventeenth-century Spanish army, ef. Storrs, op. cit
50. Cf. memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II, 30 Oct. 1699, in earlier note
51. Cf. Navarrete's instructions, May 1700, M N/Navarrete/Darien, para. 14ff. and the account of Salmon's force in C. Fernandez Duro, La Armada Española desde la Unión de los Reinos de Castilia y de Aragón, 9 vols (Madrid 1894-1903), vol. 5, 300ff. Monclova's three-year term as Viceroy having expired, he was due to be replaced in the summer of 1699 by the Conde de Eril, a creature of Carlos II's queen. However, in view of the Darien crisis, and Monclova's experience and ability (he had been Governor of Oran when that place was under Moorish attack from 1681), his tenure was extended for another three years; Maura, op. cit., 575. In early July 1699, Carlos II ordered the preparation of blank commissions, for the senior military posts of maestre de campo general, general de artillería and sargento general, to be sent to the Viceroy of Peru for the force he was preparing, AG S/GyM/3114
52. Cf. Carlos II to Secretary of Guerra de Tierra, 16 August 1699, AGS/GyM /3114, approving attached consulta of Junta de Guerra de Indias on the supply of bombs for the Darien expedition and ordering the Council of War to give the necessary orders. For Navarrete's earlier career
53. Navarrete to [Philip V of Spain?], 12 June 1703, Cádiz, M N /N avarrete/D arien
54. Cf. consulta of 18 March 1699, on letter from Don Bernardo de Quiros, Spanish minister at the Hague, reporting a Dutch offer to build ships for the Spanish fleet, AGS/GyM/3906
55. AGS/GyM legajo 3114. Cf. memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II to eject the Scots at Darien, 30 Oct. 1699, Madrid, AGI/Panamá/161, in Hart, Disaster of Darien, Appendix XXVIII, 322ff. (at p. 327). On the wide use of privateers
56. ef. J.S. Bromley and A.N. Ryan, 'Navies', NCMH, Vol. 6, 790ff. There is little in print on Spanish privateering, but E. Otero Lana, Los Corsarios españoles durante la decadencia de los A ustrias. El Corso español del A tlántico peninsular en el siglo XVII (1621-97) (Madrid 1992) is a good introduction to the subject. On the 'privatization' of warfare by governments, cf. I.A.A. Thompson, op. cit., passim
57. Order of Carlos II, 22 June 1699, AGS/GyM/3114 and memorandum of measures ordered by Carlos II, 30 Oct. 1699 (above). For the poor state of Spanish shipbuilding ca. 1640s, cf. Lynch, op. cit., 186; and in the 1690s, Kamen, War of Succession, op. cit
58. and G.J. Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade 1700-1789 (London 1979), 94. For a more positive view, ef. Kamen, Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, op. cit., 115. Phillips, op. cit., an account of the building of six vessels for Philip IV in the Basque shipyards in the 1620s, is also useful. Despite its general argument there is evidence of an upturn in (from?) the 1660s in G oodman, op. cit., 136-7 and Appendix D. C.f., also, ibid., 140 and 144 for efforts under Carlos II to ensure greater Spanish self-sufficiency in naval supplies. Generally, on the Spanish navy in this period, cf. C. Fernández D uro, op. cit., vol. 5, passim
59. Early modern Spanish Africa is another sphere which still awaits its historian, but cf. F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (London 1975), passim
60. R. Pike, Penal Servitude in Early Modern Spain (Wisconsin 1983), with a useful map of the whole, 42
61. and J. Mathiex, 'The Mediterranean', NCMH, Vol. 6, 554. In 1681 the Governor of Oran had perished, with nearly all of his 300 infantry and 150 cavalry, on a punitive expedition against M oorish raiders, Maura, op. cit., 274
62. Stanhope to Nottingham, 22 July 1693, Madrid, SP94/73 f. 180; same to Hopkins, 11 May 1695, and to Vernon, 13 and 27 July 1695, all Madrid, SP94/74 f. 30,41 and 43
63. Cf. various consultas in AGS/GyM/3099 and AGS/Estado/4044. A very good idea of Spain's many commitments (and the rapid switch of units from one theatre to another) at this juncture is given by the brief individual regimental histories in Soto de Clonard, Historia Orgánica de las Armas de Infantería y Cahallería Españolas desde la Creación del Ejército Permanente hasta el día, 16 vols. (Madrid 1851-62), esp. vol. 8
64. Consultas of 7 Sept. 1699, AGS/GyM/3115 and of 18 Sept. 1699, AGS/GyM/3101
65. Cf. consulta of 8 Oct. 1699, AGI/Panamá/161 f. 443ff. The captains were prom ised 10 escudos for the first 10 recruits presented at Cadiz, 15 escudos for the next 10, 18 escudos for an additional 20 (which would take their companies to 40 men), 25 escudos for the next 20, and 30 escudos for the 40 men who should bring their companies up to 100 men
66. Cf. consulta of 23 Dec. 1699 for Carlos II's decision (on earlier consulta of 21 Oct. 1699) to use vagabonds on the D arien expedition, and the despatch of appropriate orders to the President of the Chancilleria of G ranada, governors and corregidores, AG S/GyM/3909. (It was pointed out that 300 vagabonds were already being levied for Ceuta.)
67. Carlos II to Marqués de Villadarias and to Duke of Albuquerque, 16 Oct. 1699, San Lorenzo, and Carlos II to Don Pedro Fernández N avarrete, Almirante General of the Armada del Mar Oceano, 21 Oct. 1699, all in AG S/GyM /3908
68. Cf. Duke of Alburquerque to Carlos II, 29 Nov. 1699, Puerto de Santa María, AGS/G yM/3913; and Don Antonio Ortiz de Otalora to Conde de la Corzana, 4 Dec. 1 99, AGS/GyM/3911; and the map of Andalucía (indicating these territories) in P. Pierson, Commander of the Armada. The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia (Yale 1989), 2
69. Navarrete to Don Antonio Ortiz de Otalora, 25 Oct. 1699, Cadiz, AGS/GyM/39
70. Consulta of 1 July 1699, AGS/GyM/Mar/3906. In 1607 Philip III had ordered the compilation of a register of seamen in Guipúzcoa, a measure extended to the rest of Spain in 1625, partly to facilitate the supply of sailors for the royal fleets. However, this system, the so-called matricula de mar, does not seem to have worked entirely effectively before it was overhauled in the eighteenth century, cf. A. O'Dogherty, 'La Matrícula de Mar en el Reinado de Carlos III', Anuario de Estudios Americanos, Vol. 9 (1952), 347ff
71. G. Desdevises du Dezert, La España del Antigua Régimen (Madrid 1989), 504ff. and Goodman, op. cit., 181 ff. A full modern study of the matricula is to be desired
72. Cf. consulta of 19 Dec. 1699, AGS/GyM/3906, on letter from M arqués de Astorga, Governor of Galicia, about the levy of crews for the four vessels in Galicia
73. Consultas of 17 Oct. 1699, AGS/G yM/3906, 20 Oct. 1699, AGI/Panamá/161 f. 560; and 26 Nov. 1699, AGI/Panamá/165 f. 679; Navarrete to [?], 19 Nov. 1699, Cádiz, AG S/GyM/3914. In 1694-5 the English and Dutch fleets had wintered at Cadiz, partly because of its dockyard facilities, J. Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III (Cambridge 1953), 526
74. Cf. consulta on state of preparation of Navarrete's force, 26 Jan. 1700, AGI/Panamá/164f. 87ff
75. Cf. account of costs of providing for Don Jorge de Villalonga's tercio until its departure, enclosed with Duke of Alburquerque to Carlos II, 29 Nov. 1699, Puerto de Santa María, AGS/GyM/3913
76. Consulta of 28 June 1699, AGS/GyM/3114
77. For donatives, cf. I.A.A. Thompson, 'Castile: Polity, Fiscality and Fiscal Crisis', in P.T. Hoffman and K. Norberg, eds, Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government 1450-1789 (Stanford 1994), 174. In this and in his 'Castile: Absolutism, Constitutionalism and Liberty', ibid., Thompson sees the abandonment of its Great Power pretensions by the Castilian Crown as a key to explaining the fiscal and political/constitutional history of Carlos II's reign, for example making reform affordable. I would argue, however, that its continued Great Power pretensions pushed the Castilian Crown in the direction of changes aimed at raising funds for defence purposes. This was not least because, although revenue may have fallen from about 24 million ducats (1665) to about 20 million during Carlos' reign as a whole, expenditure could (e.g. in 1674, during the so-called Dutch War, and when Spain was also having to deal with a serious revolt in Sicily) soar to 23 million ducats (the highest figure since 1504 in Thompson's table, published ibid., 157-8). M any (but not, of course, all) of the 'reforms' identified in Sánchez Belén, op. cit., passim, were effected during the many wars of Carlos II's reign and should above all be regarded as wartime fiscal devices
78. Consulta of 6 Nov. 1699, AGS/GyM /3101
79. Cf consulta on state of preparation of N avarrete's force, 26 Jan. 1700, AGI/Panamá/164 f. 87ff
80. It is worth noting in this respect, however, not least for the insight it offers into perceptions in Madrid of the relationships between the Iberian realms which formed part of the H absburg Monarchy, that Carlos II's ministers were sceptical of the claim that England and Scotland were distinct realms (and that the English should not be punished for the misdemeanours of the Scots), comparing the relationship to that between Aragon and Castile. According to Spanish policy-makers, an international agreement concluded by Carlos II (i.e. a peace treaty with the King of England) was binding on all their realms (Aragon and Castile in the case of the former, England and Scotland in that of the latter): consulta of Council of Indies, 16 M ay 1699, on memo ire received from William III's envoy, Alexander Stanhope, and on despatches received from Carlos II's minister in London, AGI/Panamá/161, in H art, Disaster of Darien, op. cit., Appendix XVIII, 285ff
81. Despite its impressive range and its extensive documentary legacy at Simancas (or perhaps because of this) Spanish diplomacy in this period has hardly been studied. However, a number of younger Spanish scholars are showing interest in it. Cf. Storrs, op. cit, 371ff
82. Cf. consulta of Council of State, of 15 March 1696, on Canales' report from London, of 1 Jan. 1696, on formation of Darien Company, AGS/Estado/3970. He feared that once they had established a foothold in the Spanish dominions the Scots would be difficult to dislodge
83. Cf. con sultas of Council of State of 3 August 1697 on Canales' letter of 9 July 1697, and of 1 March 1699 on Canales' letter of 22 Feb. 1699, both in AGS/Estado/3971. (On the latter occasion, the Conde de Frigiliana articulated many of the arguments noted above as to the nature of the threat posed by the Scots at Darien.) Cf. also Canales to Carlos II, 24 Sept. 1699, London, on learning that morning of reports from Jamaica of the Scots having abandoned Darien, AGS/Estado/3971. There are very brief details of other diplomatic despatches in Hart, Spanish Documents, op. cit., passim. Canales' remarks on the character of the Scots (and English) represent one of the few general assessments of the Scots by one of those involved in countering the Darien threat. Copia Legal, p. 1, also includes a number of rather pejorative observations, on the 'insatiable ambition', 'depraved spirit' and desire for gain of the Scots, which seem to be inspired more by the author's reaction to Darien than to any real knowledge or understanding of the Scots
84. Cf. D. Antonio Navarro to [?], 16 August 1697, AGI/Panamá/159 f. 658, reporting the Scots purchase of ships in H am burg
85. Cf. consulta of Council of State, 24 Nov. 1699, on two letters from Bazán, Carlos II's envoy to the Court of Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy at Turin, AG S/Estado/3660, 129, 130, 131. The Duke of Savoy's own diplomats provide interesting insights into the complexities of Anglo-Spanish relations in the wake of the Darien attempt. According to his minister in London, a libel published there venting Scots grieva ces against William over Darien was attributed by some to the Spanish ambassador. Canales was said to be hoping in this way to distract William from the partition negotiations (above); conte di Pieta to Victor Amadeus, 1 Oct. 1699, London, AST/LM/Gran Bretagna, m 86
86. Cf. AGI/Panamá/159, 162, passim
87. Consulta of Council of State of 8 and 20 August 1699, AGS/Estado/3091; and of 15 Sept. 1699, AG S/Estado/3091, on request of nuncio that Carlos II appoint the clergy who must oversee the levy. Since the Pope did not believe that the Scots' initial evacuation of Darien in the summer of 1699, was the end of the matter (exhorting Carlos II to ensure no possibility of their return), that evacuation did not affect the ecclesiastical subsidy, consulta of Council of State, 24 Dec. 1699, AGS/Estado/3091. These representations are clearly those mentioned in Carlos II's letter to the Marqués del Carpio, summarized in Hart, Spanish Documents, op. cit., 14. A fuller study of the papal reaction to the Darien affair is to be desired. The decision of the Seville merchant community to advance 300,000 pesos in the summer of 1699 was founded in part on the hope of being repaid out of this subsidy
88. AGI/Panama/182f. 388ff
89. Carlos II to Navarrete. April 1700, AGI/Panamá/182 f. 542ff. Not entirely surprisingly, the Cádiz authorities sought to be exempted (at least in part) from the levy (or repartimiento), which inevitably reduced the availability of men to crew merchant vessels and so the port's business, AGI/Panamá/182 f. 634ff
90. Navarrete's instructions, May 1700, MN/Navarrete/Darien; and account of ships, crews and troops, AGI/Panamá/165 f. 611ff. (Of course, few official statistics in this era should be taken completely at face value.) For the provisions carried by N avarrete's expedition, cf. Navarrete to Carlos II, 19 June 1700, off Cadiz, MN/Navarrete/Darien. On the issue of victualling, a massive and time consuming task in its own right, cf. generally Goodman, op. cit., 151 ff
91. Cf. Navarrete to Carlos II, 19 June 1700, off Cádiz, M N/Navarrete/Darien, complaining of the violent behaviour of many of the new recruits and lamenting his lack of veterans
92. For these plans cf. consulta of Council of Indies, 12 Feb. 1699, AGI/Panamá/160, in Hart, Disaster of Darien, op. cit. Appendix XIII, 253
93. Carlos II to G overnor and Captain General of Province of Tierra Firme, and President of Audiencia in Panama, and same to Governor and Captain General of island of Trinidad and of Guyana, 14 May 1700, M N /N avarrete/Darien. Similar letters were sent to the President of Santo Domingo and the Governors of Caracas, Puerto Rico, Maracaibo and Santa María
94. Navarrete to Philip V, 17 March 1701, Cádiz, MN/Navarrete/Darien
95. Cf. Pimienta's campaign diary, and Canillas to Carlos II, 14 April 1700
96. Cf. Don Antonio de Ubilla to Navarrete, 27 July 1700, Madrid, MN/Navarrete/Darien, enclosing Carlos II's orders to return to Spain (thus preventing his carrying out the other parts of his m ission, outlined in his original instructions) on news of the Scots' final withdrawal from Darien
97. and N avarrete to Carlos II, 27 Oct. 1700, Cartagena and 17 March 1701, Cádiz, MN/Navarrete/Darien. For a very brief account, cf. Fernández Duro, op. cit., Vol. 5, 300ff
98. They did not compare with the armada of 56 ships, carrying 12,463, men sent in 1625 to deal with the more serious threat represented by the Dutch incursion in Brazil, Goodman, op. cit., 21, to say nothing of course of that sent against England in 1588. In 1688, W illiam of Orange and the Dutch Republic had mounted an expedition against England of even greater dimensions than that of Philip II, J.I. Israel, 'The Dutch Role in the English Revolution of 1688/9', ibid., ed., The Ango-Dutch M oment: Essays on the Background and World Impact of the British Revolutions of 1688-9 (Cambridge 1991), passim
99. The first flota since 1698 reached Cadiz in March 1701 with a rich cargo of silver and colonial goods, H. Kamen, War of Succession, op. cit., 178-9. The appropriateness of the response has to be qualified by the observation that, at least initially, the Spaniards greatly exaggerated the strength of the Scots
100. cf. Hart, Disaster of Darien, op. cit., 97 and passim