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1
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60949215167
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On the first of these distinctions Quine's work is still essential, and on the second Kripke's. The third may still better survive in the literature in comparison with the first two, but nobody could uncontroversially use it to delimit the logical versus the empirical.
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On the first of these distinctions Quine's work is still essential, and on the second Kripke's. The third may still better survive in the literature in comparison with the first two, but nobody could uncontroversially use it to delimit the logical versus the empirical
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2
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79954803176
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Knowledge and Practice: Wittgenstein s Treatment of Knowledge in on Certainty
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London: Routledge
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Only after I presented this paper at the conference 'Knowledge and Practice: Wittgenstein s Treatment of Knowledge in On Certainty', I read the collection of essays Wittgenstein and Quine, edited by R.L. Arrington and H.J. Glock, London: Routledge 1996
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(1996)
I read the collection of essays Wittgenstein and Quine
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Arrington, R.L.1
Glock, H.J.2
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3
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65849202651
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The essay by addresses some of the issues I discuss in this paper and seems to support a conclusion close to mine
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The essay by Roger F. Gibson, Quine, Wittgenstein, and Holism', pp. 80-96, addresses some of the issues I discuss in this paper and seems to support a conclusion close to mine
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Quine, Wittgenstein, and Holism
, pp. 80-96
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Gibson, R.F.1
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4
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0002820563
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Two Dogmas of Empiricism
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New York, NY: Harper
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'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View, New York, NY: Harper 1961, p. 42-3
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(1961)
From a Logical Point of View
, pp. 42-43
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6
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79954931266
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'Two Dogmas,' op. cit., p. 45
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Two Dogmas
, pp. 45
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7
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60949261809
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Wittgenstein on Certainty
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The Hague, Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoof 59
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G.H. von Wright quotes the remark given in the text and suggests that Wittgenstein believed that the changes of world-pictures in the course of history are due to reasons. See, 'Wittgenstein On Certainty,' in G.H. von Wright, ed., Problems in the Theory of Knowledge, The Hague, Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoof 1972, 47-60, 59
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(1972)
Problems in the Theory of Knowledge
, pp. 47-60
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Wright Von, G.H.1
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8
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79954924711
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439. Even the statement I know that behind this door there is a landing and the stairway down to the ground floor only sounds so convincing because everyone takes for granted that I know it. 440. There is something universal here; not just something personal. Wittgenstein's remarks seem to indicate that there is nothing peculiar about any one particular person s claims to knowledge. We react to one individual's assurance to know a certain empirical fact as if it were not to be doubted.
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439. Even the statement I know that behind this door there is a landing and the stairway down to the ground floor only sounds so convincing because everyone takes for granted that I know it. 440. There is something universal here; not just something personal. Wittgenstein's remarks seem to indicate that there is nothing peculiar about any one particular person s claims to knowledge. We react to one individual's assurance to know a certain empirical fact as if it were not to be doubted
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9
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79954641042
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In 'Wittgenstein's Grammatical-Empirical Distinction, The Journal of Philosophy, LX, No. 20 (1963, Philip P. Hallie argues that Wittgenstein draws too sharp a distinction between the grammatical (logical) and the empirical. I hope to have shown that this is hardly the case. He also argues that Wittgenstein does so because he underestimated the fact that there can be, and there probably are, empirical reasons why we hold the system of beliefs we hold. I agree with him that there probably are empirical reasons why we hold the system of beliefs we actually hold, but I think Wittgenstein was not interested in discussing those reasons. He was trying to provide a theoretical framework to understand how systems of beliefs come to be held and how they work and alter through time. The actual analysis of why we as humans hold this particular system was not part of what he was trying to do
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In 'Wittgenstein's Grammatical-Empirical Distinction,' (The Journal of Philosophy, Vol LX, No. 20 (1963)), Philip P. Hallie argues that Wittgenstein draws too sharp a distinction between the grammatical (logical) and the empirical. I hope to have shown that this is hardly the case. He also argues that Wittgenstein does so because he underestimated the fact that there can be, and there probably are, empirical reasons why we hold the system of beliefs we hold. I agree with him that there probably are empirical reasons why we hold the system of beliefs we actually hold, but I think Wittgenstein was not interested in discussing those reasons. He was trying to provide a theoretical framework to understand how systems of beliefs come to be held and how they work and alter through time. The actual analysis of why we as humans hold this particular system was not part of what he was trying to do
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10
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79954683145
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I thank the audience of the conference Knowledge and Practice in Minneapolis for their encouraging comments. In February 1997, I discussed this paper at the University of Genoa. I thank Michele Marsonet, Maria Luisa Montecucco, Carlo Penco, Nicla Vassallo, and the students attending the seminar for their useful feedback. I also thank Diego Marconi for his helpful criticisms
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I thank the audience of the conference Knowledge and Practice in Minneapolis for their encouraging comments. In February 1997, I discussed this paper at the University of Genoa. I thank Michele Marsonet, Maria Luisa Montecucco, Carlo Penco, Nicla Vassallo, and the students attending the seminar for their useful feedback. I also thank Diego Marconi for his helpful criticisms
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