Closure and context

Ratio

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 78-82

  Brueckner, Anthony ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949321215     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9329.00053     Document Type: Note

References (4)

1. In Ratio VIII (1995), pp. 70-86. All page references in the text are to this article. Vahid maintains that the claims hold for a parallel closure principle for knowledge, given that justification is a necessary condition for knowing
2. See Fred Dretske, 'Epistemic Operators', Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 1007-23
3. Some theorists hold that the truth value of a knowledge-attributing sentence such as 'S knows that p' depends upon aspects of the context in which the sentence in uttered (which may not involve S). For example, if sceptical possibilities are under discussion in the knowledge-attributing context, then this may raise the standards for knowing to a level that is higher than that imposed by an ordinary conversational context. See, e.g., Stewart Cohen, 'How To Be a Fallibilist', Philosophical Perspectives, 2 (1988), pp. 91-123
4. and Keith DeRose, 'Solving the Skeptical Problem', Philosophical Review, 104 (1995), pp. 1-52. This sort of relativity to context is completely different from that discussed by Vahid. Vahid's contexts involve the putative knower and his epistemic situation, and Vahid's relativity is a function of the evidential situation of the knower