Persons and their properties

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 48, Issue 191, 1998, Pages 159-175

  Stanley, Jason ^a  

^a Cornell University ^*

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EID: 60949310118     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00089     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. The neo-Lockean thesis is inconsistent with the claim that persons are their bodies, unless with David Lewis, 'Survival and Identity', in A. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons (Univ. of California Press, 1976), pp. 17-40
2. we re-interpret body-talk in terms of the language of temporal parts: see J.J. Thomson, 'People and Their Bodies', in J. Dancy (ed.), Parfit and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 203-29, for discussion. I take Lewis' view, however, to be a formal variant of a contingent identity view
3. L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), pp. 66ff
4. P.F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 98
5. G. Nunberg, 'Indexicality and Deixis', Linguistics and Philosophy, 16 (1993), pp. 1-43, at p. 39
6. See L. Schubert and F. Pelletier, 'Problems in the Representation of the Logical Form of Generics, Plurals, and Mass Nouns', in E. LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics (London: Academic Press, 1987), pp. 385-451, at pp. 389-90, for a similar argument against the view that bare plural noun phrases are ambiguous between generic and existential readings
7. See Nunberg for discussions of such examples. See also I. Sag, 'Formal Semantics and Extralinguistic Context', in P. Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics (London: Academic Press, 1981), pp. 273-94, for a discussion of how to incorporate shifted reference into an intensional semantic framework
8. For a discussion of the embodiment relation, see S. Shoemaker, 'Embodiment and Behavior', in his Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge UP, 1984), pp. 113-38
9. E.g., P. Ludlow, 'Implicit Comparison Clauses', Linguistics and Philosophy, 12 (1989), pp. 519-33
10. Issues here are, of course, more complex - see, e.g., H. Kamp, 'Two Theories about Adjectives', in E. Keenan (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Language (Cambridge UP, 1975), pp. 23-55 - but the details do not affect my argument
11. G. Evans, Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 219
12. Cf. C. McGinn, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 51
13. Shoemaker, 'Self-Reference and Self-Awareness', repr. in his Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge UP, 1984), pp. 6-18, at p. 8
14. Cf. H.A. Prichard on Russell's idiosyncratic version of phenomenalism: 'if someone did not understand what was meant by "a body", he could not possibly be brought to understand what was meant by "an appearance"' ('Mr Bertrand Russell on Our Knowledge of the External World', Mind, 27 (1915), pp. 145-85, at p. 176)
15. Cf. also §12 of W. Sellars, 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1 (Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1956), pp. 253-329
16. E.g., 'Suppose A knows non-inferentially that his legs are now crossed. This simply means that he truly believes that his legs are crossed, and that he empirically could not have had that belief unless his legs were crossed in physical fact' (D. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 189)