Against a priori reductions

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 56, Issue 225, 2006, Pages 562-586

  Schroeter, Laura ^a  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949282674     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.459.x     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. See D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford UP, 1996)
2. 'On Sense and Intension', Philosophical Perspectives, 16 (2002), pp. 135-82
3. and 'Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics', Philosophical Studies, 118 (2004), pp. 153-226
4. F. Jackson, 'Armchair Metaphysics', inj. O'Leary-Hawthorne (ed.), Meaning in Mind (Boston: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 23-42
5. and From Ethics to Metaphysics (Oxford UP, 1998)
6. I shall concentrate on their joint paper 'Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation', Philosophical Review, 110 (2001), pp. 315-61, the latest and most careful statement of their position (except where noted, all page references in the text are to this joint paper)
7. It is a response to criticisms raised by N Block and R. Stalnaker, 'Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap', Philosophical Review, 108 (1999), pp. 1-46. Although I agree with Block and Stalnaker's naturalist epistemology, my argument against Chalmers and Jackson differs significantly from theirs
8. I criticize these assumptions in my 'The Rationalist Foundations of Chalmers' Two-Dimensional Semantics', Philosophical Studies, 18 (2004), pp. 227-55
9. Jackson, 'Reference and Description Revisited', Philosophical Perspectives, 12 (1998), pp. 201-18
10. Elements of this model have been elaborated in my 'Gruesome Diagonals', Philosophers' Imprint, 3 (2003), pp. 1-25
11. 'The Limits of Conceptual Analysis', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85 (2004), pp. 425-53
12. and L. Schroeter and J. Bigelow, Jazz and the Classical Model of Meaning', in I. Ravenscroft (ed.), Mind, Worlds, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson (Oxford UP, 2007), forthcoming
13. John Perry introduced the notion of a mental file-folder to characterize the causal-historical factors that explain the apparent stability of subject-matter through changes in one's understanding, in 'A Problem about Continued Belief, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61 (1980), pp. 317-32
14. In 'Words', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 64 (1990), pp. 93-119, David Kaplan sketches a similar approach for individuating words in a public language: in effect, he suggests that speakers participate in something like a public filing system