Realism and mind independence

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 51-70

  Vinueza, Adam ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949278539     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0114.00118     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Kit Fine, "Ontological Dependence", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1995), pp. 269-90.
2. Michael Smith and Daniel Stoljar, "Global Response-Dependence and Noumenal Realism", The Monist 81 (1998), pp. 85-111.
3. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
4. Hartry Field's Realism, Mathematics, and Modality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 2.
5. Azzouni, Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Part III, note 106.
6. Schiffer, "Language-Created Language-Independent Entities", Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), pp. 149-67, here p. 149.
7. Robert Stalnaker, "On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be", in Benacerraf and His Critics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997);
8. Michael Resnick, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997);
9. Alex Barber, "The Pleonasticity of Talk about Concepts", Philosophical Studies 89 (1998), pp. 53-86.
10. Schiffer, "The Mode-of-Presentation Problem", in C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens, Eds., Propositional Attitudes (Menlo Park, CA: CSLI).
11. Peacocke, "What Are Concepts?", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1989), pp. 1-28.
12. Schiffer "Pleonastic Fregeanism".
13. Peter Railton and Gideon Rosen, "Realism" in A Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995),
14. Lewis, '"Truth in Fiction", American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), pp. 37-46,
15. Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 48.
16. Wright, Truth and Objectivity, chapter 1.
17. Devitt, Realism and Truth (second edition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), Chapter 4 and references therein.