The achievement of personhood

Ratio

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 141-156

  Goodenough, Jerry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949276671     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9329.00035     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Recorded in Teichman, 'The Definition of Person', Philosophy LX (1985), pp. 175-185
2. See Kathleen Wilkes, Real People (Oxford: University Press, 1988) Chapter 4 for a discussion of this
3. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690] ed. by Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), Book II Chapter XXVII Section 9 (p. 335 in Nidditch edition)
4. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 215
5. Derek Parfit, 'Personal Identity', Philosophical Review LXXX (1971), pp. 3-27
6. By David Lewis, amongst others. See his 'Survival and Identity', in Philosophical Papers Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983)
7. See Denis Robinson's 'Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy LXIII (1985), pp. 299-319
8. First formulated by Robert Nozick in Chapter 1 of his Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)
9. Peter Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959)
10. See especially Williams' 'The Self and the Future', reprinted in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: University Press, 1973), pp. 46-63
11. David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 171
12. Paul F. Snowdon, 'Persons, Animals and Bodies', in The Body & The Self, edited by J.L. Bermudez, A. Marcel & N. Eilan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 71
13. See Michael Ayers, Locke Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1991)
14. especially Chapter 25, Eric T. Olson, 'Human People or Human Animals?', Philosophical Studies LXXX (1995) pp. 159-181
15. and Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), Chapter 1
16. A suggestion that seems to appeal to, for example, Bernard Williams. See his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), pp. 114ff
17. Dennett, Brainstorms, p. 268
18. Wilfrid Sellars, 'Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man', in Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 39
19. David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967)
20. Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963)
21. W. V. O. Quine, 'Review of Munitz's Identity and Individuation, Journal of Philosophy LXIX (1972), p. 490
22. The alternative is to say that X's mind has been made like Y's, and vice versa, which would leave it open to us to say that X is the same person and the same genius as last week but that all of his psychological qualities have been changed. This is not the same as X becoming Y, for X could have been made like Y in this fashion while Y remained unaltered: clearly X could then not be Y or be identical with Y as Y would still be in existence. The counter-intuitive nature of X's continuing identity depending entirely on the extrinsic state of affairs of Y's continuing changed or unchanged nature remains the strongest challenge to Robert Nozick's 'closest continuer' theory of personal identity. See Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)
23. See Richard Swinburne, 'Personal Identity', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXXIV (1973-4), pp. 231-47
24. and, in a more rigorous version, 'Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory', in Shoemaker & Swinburne, Personal Identity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984)
25. Peter Unger raises this possibility in Identity, Consciousness and Value (Oxford: 5 University Press 1990)
26. Stephen L. White in 'Metapsychological Relativism and the Self', Journal of Philosophy LXXXVI (1989), pp. 298-323
27. Mark Johnston in 'Human Beings', Journal of Philosophy LXXXIV (1987), pp. 59-83