Resisting imaginative resistance

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 55, Issue 221, 2005, Pages 607-624

  Stock, Kathleen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 60949254885     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00419.x     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. By 'imagining that p', where p is a fictional proposition, I mean 'entertaining the thought that p, without asserting that p'. See R. Scruton, Art and Imagination (London: Routledge, 1974), p. 97
2. Hume, 'Of the Standard of Taste', Selected Essays (Oxford UP, 1993), pp. 152-4
3. See K. Walton, 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 68 (1994), pp. 27-50
4. T.S. Gendler, 'The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance', Journal of Philosophy, 97 (2000), pp. 55-81
5. the third from D. Matravers, 'Fictional Assent and the (So-Called) "Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance"', in M. Kieran and D.M. Lopes (eds), Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 99
6. R. Moran, 'The Expression of Feeling in Imagination', Philosophical Review, 103 (1994), pp. 75-106, at p. 95
7. See, e.g., Moran; Gendler; also M. Mothersill, 'Make-Believe Morality and Fictional Worlds', in J. Bermúdez and S. Gardiner (eds), Art and Morality (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 74-95, at p. 77
8. G. Currie, 'Desire in Imagination', in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 200-21. He argues that imaginative failure is not confined to moral propositions, however
9. P. Goldie, The Emotions (Oxford UP, 2000), pp. 21, 59
10. S. Yablo, 'Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda', in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 441-92, at pp. 484-5
11. S. Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 183
12. I discuss this matter in my 'The Tower of Goldbach and Other Impossible Tales', in M. Kieran and D.M. Lopes (eds), Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 107-24
13. That this debate is best viewed as about the relation between moral and descriptive language is urged by F. Jackson, P. Pettit and M. Smith, 'Ethical Particularism and Patterns', in B. Hooker and M. Little (eds), Moral Particularism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 79-99, at p. 81
14. See Hooker, 'Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad', in Hooker and Little (eds), Moral Particularism, pp. 1-22
15. Cf. '... someone who said that clasping the hands three times in an hour was a good action would first have to answer the question "How do you mean?"': P. Foot, 'Moral Beliefs', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59 (1958-9), pp. 83-104
16. The point is also prefigured in M. Tanner's 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality/II', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 68 (1994), pp. 51-6
17. See D. Lewis, 'Truth in Fiction', American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1978), pp. 37-46, at p. 41
18. Currie, The Nature of Fiction (Cambridge UP, 1990), p. 159