Playing the rule-following game

Philosophy

Volumn 75, Issue 292, 2000, Pages 203-224

  Tanney, Julia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 60949190006     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0031819100000255     Document Type: Review

References (46)

1. 'What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying a rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.' Wittgensteinhilosophical Investigations, § 201, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, 1953)
2. I am borrowing these terms, as well as some of the framework for discussion, from, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul discussion, from Wilfrid Sellars's 'Some Reflections on Language Games' in Scienceerception, and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963)
3. The suggestion is that the ability to cite the rules might be considered a (defeasible) sufficient condition for establishing the sought-after 'internal connection'. Whether or not it is also a necessary condition will be considered in the last section. a (defeasible) sufficient condition for establishing the sought-after 'internal connection'. Whether or not it is also a necessary condition will be considered in the last section
4. See, for example, §§28, 29 and 43-49 in Wittgenstein, On Oxford: Basil Blackwell Certainty, Anscombe and von Wright (eds) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960)
5. See Sellars 'Some Reflections on Language Games', op. cit
6. A related worry (about justification) is raised in Lewis Carroll's 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles', Mind, vol. 4 (1895), 278-80
7. reprinted in Mind, vol. 104, no. 416 (1995) pp. 691-93
8. This idea is developed further in part III and also in my 'De-individualizing norms of rationality' Philosophical Studies 79 (1995), 237-58
9. This idea is developed in my 'Understanding oneself, understanding others, ms others', ms
10. I doubt that these abilities are in any interesting way separable; I list them all in order to draw attention to the scope of the claim being made. Perhaps some of the confusion about what kinds of explanations are possible arises because some theorists do think that some of these abilities can be presupposed in order to 'explain' others (e.g, that inferential abilities can be presupposed in explaining linguistic abilities, I doubt that this is coherent. For a related discussion, Dummett's claim that a meaning theory must tell us all that is involved in speaking a language (which, he claims, is the rational activity par excellence) in (most recently) Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991 them all in order to draw attention to the scope of the claim being made. Perhaps some of the confusion about what kinds of explanations are possible arises because some theorists do think that some of these abilities can be presupposed in order to 'explain' others (e.g., that inferential abilities can be presupposed in explaining linguistic abilities). I doubt that this is coherent. For a related discussion, see Dummett's claim that a meaning theory must tell us all that is involved in speaking a language (which, he claims, is the rational activity par excellence) in (most recently) Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991)
11. and John McDowell's response in 'In defense of modesty' in B. M. Taylor (ed.) Michael Dummett (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987)
12. Perhaps the primary motivation for supposing that the theoretical knowledge that purportedly explains the abilities is tacit or implicit is simply the recognition of the obvious fact that the knowledge is not something that the individual herself is usually able to articulate. Here, I explore whether invoking tacit or implicit knowledge can, in any case, avoid the regress threats described above knowledge that purportedly explains the abilities is tacit or implicit is simply the recognition of the obvious fact that the knowledge is not something that the individual herself is usually able to articulate. Here, I explore whether invoking tacit or implicit knowledge can, in any case, avoid the regress threats described above
13. The normal understanding is that implicit knowledge is available to consciousness once it has been made explicit and that tacit knowledge is not normally accessible to consciousness at all. Dennett suggests using 'implicit representation' in a different sense: as information that is logically implied by something that is stored explicitly. (See 'Styles of mental representation'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83, 213-6
14. reprinted in The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, MIT Press, 1987)). Press, 1987))
15. Both versions make the notion of implicit knowledge dependent on explicit knowledge. For discussions of tacit knowledge, S. Holtzman and C. Leich eds, Routledge and Kegan Paul knowledge. For discussions of tacit knowledge, see Gareth Evans, 'Semantic theory and tacit knowledge'. In S. Holtzman and C. Leich (eds) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981)
16. reprinted in his Collected Papers (Oxford University Press, 1985), 322-42 322-42.
17. See also Martin Davies, 'Tacit knowledge, and the structure of thought and language. In C. Travis (ed.) Meaning and Interpretation (Blackwell, 1986); 127-58
18. 'Tacit knowledge and semantic theory: Can a five per cent difference matter? matter?' Mind 96, 441-62
19. and 'Tacit knowledge and sub-doxastic states' in A. George (ed.) Reflections on Chomsky (Blackwell, 1989); 131-52
20. If the notion is coherent, we ought to be able to say what could count as at least prima facie plausible when 'knowledge of the norm' is understood as shorthand for a person's ability to defend, justify or cor evidence that a person sub-cognitively conceptualizes the norm and guides her behaviour in the light of it. But how would we distinguish this from the case where she mis-conceptualizes the norm, but acts in accordance with it none the less? And how would we distinguish, for example, the case where she succeeds in conceptualizing the norm yet fails to implement her understanding of it in action from the case where she simply fails to act in accordance with it? The difficulty in answering these questions puts pressure on the very coherence of the notion of 'sub-cognitive conceptualization'. (See W. V. Quine, 'Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory', Synthese 21 (1970), 393 for similar doubts.) It is arguable that these sorts of distinctions are at least prima facie plausible when 'knowledge of the norm' is understood as shorthand for a person's ability to defend, justify or correct herself by citing a rule. But the linguistic ability that these abilities would require depends upon explicit knowledge and, of course presupposes, and thus cannot figure in an explanation of, the ability to follow a rule
21. There are a number of prima facie targets, including: (1) Those philosophers who suggest that a fruitful task in philosophy of language would be the construction of a theory of meaning knowledge of which would (suffice to) explain a person's ability to understand and speak a language. I suspect that the discussion in this paper uncovers at least a prima facie tension in some of the requirements that Dummett, for examplelaces on a theory of meaning. I have in mind the constraints that a theory of meaning should 'describe, without making any presuppositions, what it is that we learn when we learn to speak' (p. 91, LBT) and that the knowledge ascribed to the speakers is genuineropositional knowledge and not a mere theoretical representation of a practical ability'. These suspicions, of course, have to be examined in detail. See Dummett, 'What is a theory of meaning?' (II), in Hotzmann and Leich (eds) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 99-137
22. Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, op. cit. and John McDowell 'In defense of modesty' op.cit
23. For a discussions about the possible difficulties with theories of meaning in the light of Wittgenstein's reflections on rules, see Crispin Wright, 'How can the theory of meaning be a philosophical project?' Mind and Language, 1, (Spring, 1986), 31-44
24. 'Theories of meaning and speaker's knowledge' in Realism, Meaning and Truth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986)
25. and 'Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and the Central Project Theoretical Linguistics of Theoretical Linguistics' in A. George, (ed.) Reflections on Chomsky, op. cit
26. Linguists and psychologists, following Chomsky, who believe that it is the task of theoretical linguistics to formulate a grammar (a set of rules or principles) the tacit knowledge of which would explain a speaker's competence. See, for example, Reflections on Language (Fontana/Collins, 1976)
27. Rules and Representations (Blackwell, 1980)
28. A corresponding group of theorists from philosophy, experimental and developmental psychology and cognitive anthropology who have suggested attributing to adults a theory of mind in order to explain their ability to understand and predict rational behaviour. for example, Blackwell developmental psychology and cognitive anthropology who have suggested attributing to adults a theory of mind in order to explain their ability to understand and predict rational behaviour. See, for example, Davies and Stone (eds) Folk Psychology - The Theory of Mind Debate (Blackwell, 1995)
29. Astington, Harris, and Olson, (eds) Developing Theories of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1989)
30. Andrew Whiten (ed.) Natural Theories of Mind (Blackwell, 1991)
31. Philosophical discussions in self-knowledge that suppose that a person's Boghossian and Crispin Wright both note and take on board the regress threat posed to traditional accounts of self-knowledge. special access to her own mind genuinely explains her ability to self-ascribe mental states. I discuss some of the issues related to this in 'A constructivist account of self- knowledge'hilosophy, 71, (1996), 405-22 and in 'Understanding oneself, understanding others' (ms.). Paul Boghossian and Crispin Wright both note and take on board the regress threat posed to traditional accounts of self-knowledge
32. See Wright, 'Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensationrivacy Intention', Journal of Philosophy, 86, 11 (1989), 622-35
33. extended version in Meaning Scepticismuhl, Klaus (ed.), (de Gruyter 1991), 126-47
34. and Boghossian 'Content and Self-knowledge'hilosophical Topics xvii (1989), 5-25
35. This version of what is involved in reason-explanation is accepted by most of the people whose views I go on to criticize, although it seems to need reconsideration in light of the conclusions of this section. The important point is that on this model (unless it is supplemented with causation) a reason does not determine, or provide a sufficient condition for, the action that it rationalizes. Note that nothing about the ensuing argument will change significantly if values, judgments, and intentions (or statements expressing them) are added to the model of reason-explanation. Because on this more complex model, either intentions do not determine actions (see Pears, David Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984))
36. or all things considered judgments do not determine intentions (see exploits; it is this gap that makes irrationality possible. Davidson, 'How is Weakness of the Will Possible?' in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980)). It is this gap that reason-explanation exploits; it is this gap that makes irrationality possible
37. See Davidon's discussions of interpretation in his Inquiries into Truth Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) and the large amount of literature discussing his interpretation strategy. and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) and the large amount of literature discussing his interpretation strategy
38. See also Davidson's discussions of irrationality; in particular University Press 'Paradoxes of Irrationality', in R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins (eds)hilosophical Essays on Freud (Cambridge University Press, 1982)
39. where he introduces the 'principle of continence' as an example of a norm of rationality and Annette Baier's response in 'Rhyme and Reason: Reflections on Davidson's Version of Having Reasons', in Lepore and B. McLaughlin (eds) Actions and Events - Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985)
40. For discussions involving knowledge of a theory of mind, see, for example, M. Davies and T. Stone, (eds) Folk Psychology, op. cit
41. and M. Davies and T. Stone, (eds) Mental Simulation (Oxford: Blackwells 1995)
42. See 'De-individualizing norms of rationality', op. cit
43. In 'How to resist mental representations' (a critical notice of Tim The Mechanical Mind) of content-bearing, causally-efficacious states Crane's The Mechanical Mind), International Journal of Philosophical Studies vol. 6 (2), (1998) I attempt to develop this argument in a way that challenges the existence of content-bearing, causally-efficacious states
44. A fortiori it cannot be explained by the obtaining of causal relations between mental events, if this relation is supposed to cement the logical gap that exists between an agent's reasons and her actions. I suggest elsewhere that this motivation lies behind Davidson's claim that something is missing in reason explanation if we consider only the purely justificatory relation between reasons and action and that this intuition motivated his introduction of a 'causal element' into his account of reason explanation. I also argue that his doctrine of anomalous monism - which commits him to the view that the only way to introduce laws into an account of mental causation is via a physical description of mental event-particulars -does not protect him from the charge that in buying into a nomological account of psychological explanation (however the laws are described) he is not leaving space for the possibility of error. See 'Why reasons may not be causes', Mind & Language, 10, nos. 1 and 2 (1995), 105-28. Note that nothing is materially changed in the argument if the 'determinate connection' is thought to hold between overriding reason and action
45. I have not distinguished explicitly between different kinds of standards principles. Rules dictate or determine results even though they admit of exceptions; an accurate statement of the rule would take these exceptions into account. If a contrary result is reached, then the rule must have been abandoned or changed. Principles are like reasons: they incline a decision one way, though not conclusively. They do not necessitate a particular result, and they survive intact when they do not prevail. The discussion above, then, might be construed as suggesting that the norms that govern our broadly rational practices are principles instead of rules Dworkin (in 'Is law a system of rules?' in R. M. Dworkin, (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1977)), makes a logical distinction between rules and principles. Rules dictate or determine results even though they admit of exceptions; an accurate statement of the rule would take these exceptions into account. If a contrary result is reached, then the rule must have been abandoned or changed. Principles are like reasons: they incline a decision one way, though not conclusively. They do not necessitate a particular result, and they survive intact when they do not prevail. The discussion above, then, might be construed as suggesting that the norms that govern our broadly rational practices are principles instead of rules
46. I have read versions of this paper for the philosophy societies at King's College, London; Trinity College, Dublin; University of Bristol; University of Kent; and University of Sussex. The first half was presented at the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Barcelona and the University of Hertfordshire. I received many valuable comments on these occasions. In particular I would like to thank Helene Buerger, John Flower, Simon Glendinning, David Pears, Tony Skillen, Helen Steward, Crispin Wright, and the Editor of this journal for their comments. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for the research leave granted to me by AHRB, during which I completed the final version of this paper College, London; Trinity College, Dublin; University of Bristol; University of Kent; and University of Sussex. The first half was presented at the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology in Barcelona and the University of Hertfordshire. I received many valuable comments on these occasions. In particular I would like to thank Helene Buerger, John Flower, Simon Glendinning, David Pears, Tony Skillen, Helen Steward, Crispin Wright, and the Editor of this journal for their comments. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for the research leave granted to me by AHRB, during which I completed the final version of this paper