Throwing away 'the bedrock'

Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society

Volumn 105, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 81-98

  Read, Rupert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 60949169939     PISSN: 00667374     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00103.x     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, C. Barrett (ed.), (Berkeley: U. Cal. Press, 1970)
2. See the consideration of the term 'form of life' in my 'Meaningful Consequences' (jointly written with James Guetti), The Philosophical Forum XXX:4 (1999), 289-314., for instance
3. Philosophical Investigations R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe (eds.), trans G. E. M. Anscombe (revised edition) (New York: Macmillan, 1958 (1953))
4. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (with F. Ramsey) (New York: Routledge, 1922)
5. My use of the term 'persuasion' here echoes Winch's superb and difficult essay of that title, in MidWest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1992), 123-137. Winch draws it, of course, from Wittgenstein himself
6. For detail, see my 'Meaningful Consequences', op. cit
7. Cora Diamond, 'Throwing Away the Ladder: How to Read the Tractatus', in her The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge: MIT, 1991)
8. James Conant, 'Throwing Away the Top of the Ladder', Yale Review 79 (1991), 328-364
9. and 'Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Wittgenstein', in my and A. Crary's The New Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 2000)
10. See the remark cited in Ray Monk's Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Macmillan, 1990), during Wittgenstein's debates with Turing: 'Obviously . . . the whole point is that I must not have an opinion' (p. 420; see also p. 418). I disagree with Monk's comments on this remark in his text: Monk's view of the later Wittgenstein's 'views' is in the end positivistic. He takes Wittgenstein to have quasi-verificationist, finitist 'views' in the philosophy of maths
11. 'Throwing Away the Ladder', pp. 197-8
12. See also Wittgenstein's On Certainty (New York: Blackwell, 1969, para. 35f; and compare Hume's critique of the notion of 'object' (contrast 'the New Hume's' defence of the metaphysical idea of objects)
13. See e.g. my 'The New Antagonists of "the New Hume"', in my The New Hume Debate (co-edited with Ken Richman; London: Routledge, 2000)
14. Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p. 126
15. My argument above is for instance quite consonant with his powerful paper, 'Wittgenstein on Metaphysical/Everyday use', Philosophical Quarterly 52: 208 (2002), 289-302, reprinted in Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects, edited by K. Morris (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004)
16. Thanks to several audiences over the years - including at 'Mind and Society' in Manchester, at the Phil-Pol-Sociol seminar in Exeter, at St. Andrew's, and at the University of North Florida - for help with the ideas of this paper