The limits of mercy

Ratio

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-11

  Bennett, Christopher ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 60949139634     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2004.00232.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. On the Principle of Proportionality, see e.g., A. von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
2. See for instance, T. Nagel, 'Moral Luck' in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 24-38
3. B. Williams, 'Moral Luck' in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 20-39
4. and Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
5. Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Equity and Mercy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 22 no. 2 (1993)
6. reprinted in A. John Simmons, Marshall Cohen, Joshua Cohen and Charles R. Beitz (eds.), Punishment: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 145-187. References in the text are to the latter version of this article
7. At least if we assume, as Nussbaum does, that mercy means leniency in punishment. For this understanding, see e.g., J. Hampton, 'The retributive idea' in J. G. Murphy and J. Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 158
8. For a wider view of mercy, see P. Twambley, 'Mercy and Forgiveness', Analysis vol. 30 (1976), pp. 84-90
9. For more on these responses to wrongdoing, see my "The Varieties of Retributive Experience", Philosophical Quarterly vol. 52 no. 207 (2002), pp. 145-163
10. See A. C. MacIntyre, "Determinism", Mind 66 (1957), pp. 28-41
11. See R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Ch. 2
12. This is the standard understanding of compatibilist accounts of responsibility. See J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and P. Pettit, 'Strategies for free-will compatibilists', Analysis vol. 56, no. 4 (1996), pp. 191-201
13. For this account of responsibility, see e.g., S. Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)
14. R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), esp. Ch. 6
15. P. Pettit and M. Smith, "Freedom in Belief and Desire" Journal of Philosophy XCIII (1996), pp. 429-449
16. M. Smith, "A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility" in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 293-320
17. See R. M. Adams, "Involuntary Sins," Philosophical Review, vol. XCIV, no. 1 (1985), pp. 3-31. Adams's account of responsibility, sketched briefly at the end of his paper, agrees broadly with the approaches mentioned in n. 17
18. For this notion, see e.g., T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (London: Belknap, 1998), Ch. 1
19. See for instance some of the examples discussed in Alwynne Smart, "Mercy" in H. B. Acton, The Philosophy of Punishment (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 212-227
20. and the discussion in P. Twambley, "Mercy and Forgiveness" Analysis, vol. 30 (1976), pp. 84-90