Intentionality and the physical: A reply to Mumford

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 49, Issue 195, 1999, Pages 225-230

  Place, Ullin T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949131485     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00139     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. U.T. Place, 'Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional' (hereafter IMD), Dialectica, 50 (1996), pp. 91-120
2. C.B. Martin and K. Pfeifer, 'Intentionality and the Non-Psychological', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 46 (1986), pp. 531-54, at p. 531
3. here following W. Kneale, 'Intentionality and Intensionality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 42 (1968), pp. 73-90
4. J.R. Searle, Intentionality: an Essay on the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge UP, 1983), pp. 1-2
5. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), e.g., pp. 43-4
6. N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 2nd edn (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965)
7. I have discussed this issue at greater length in my 'De Re Modality Without Possible Worlds', Acta Analytica, 19 (1997), pp. 129-43
8. C.B. Martin, 'Dispositions and Conditionals', The Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (1994), pp. 1-8
9. and 'Final Replies to Place and Armstrong', in D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place, Dispositions: a Debate (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 178-9
10. For a more detailed analysis and rebuttal of Martin's electro-fink argument, see my 'Ryle's Behaviorism', in W. O'Donohue and R. Kitchener (eds), Handbook of Behaviorism (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), pp. 393-5
11. I have discussed this issue at greater length in my 'On the Nature of Conditionals and Their Truthmakers', Acta Analytica, 18 (1997), pp. 73-87
12. D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge UP, 1997)
13. N. Cartwright, Nature's Capacities and their Measurement (Oxford UP, 1989)