Horwich, meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 50, Issue 199, 2000, Pages 161-174

  Miller, Alexander ^a  

^a CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949131135     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00177     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford UP, 1982).
2. P. Horwich, Critical Notice of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Philosophy of Science, 51 (1984), pp. 163-71;
3. 'Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Nature of Meaning', Mind and Language, 5 (1990), pp. 105-21;
4. 'Meaning, Use, and Truth' (hereafter MUT), Mind, 104 (1995), pp. 355-68;
5. 'Deflationary Truth and the Problem of Aboutness' (hereafter DTPA), in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues, Vol. VIII, Truth (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1997), pp. 95-106;
6. Meaning (hereafter M) (Oxford UP, 1998);
7. Truth, 2nd edn (hereafter T) (Oxford UP, 1998).
8. For the argument of Boghossian's which Horwich finds persuasive, see P. Boghossian, 'The Rule-Following Considerations', Mind, 98 (1989), pp. 507-50.
9. For an attempt to strengthen Boghossian's argument, see my 'Boghossian on Reductive Dispositionalism: the Case Strengthened', Mind and Language, 12 (1997), pp. 1-10.
10. For further useful discussion, see D. McManus, 'Boghossian, Miller, and Lewis on Dispositional Theories of Meaning', Mind and Language, forthcoming.
11. I here limit myself to a terse statement of Horwich's claim that a presupposes an inflationary conception of truth since I am willing to concede this to him for the sake of argument. For a fuller account see MUT pp. 362-3
12. For an account of Kripke's Wittgenstein's arguments and some of the standard responses to them, see Boghossian; also my Philosophy of Language (University College London Press, 1998), chs 5 and 6.
13. The definition of 'bleen', etc., is different from the one given by Goodman in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), but nothing turns on this.
14. Horwich (MUT p. 361)
15. For a useful discussion of some of the issues in this area, see J. Zalabardo, 'Kripke's Normativity Argument', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 27 (1997), pp. 467-88.