Exposing nuclear non-compliance

Survival

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 143-164

  Goldschmidt, Pierre ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 60349123501     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: 14682699     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396330902749764     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. For the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement see IAEA, 'The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972.
2. For the Additional Protocol, see 'Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards', INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.
3. See, for example, George Perkovich, Jessica T. Matthews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller and Jon B. Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf
4. and Pierre Goldschmidt, 'Priority Steps to Strengthen the Nonproliferation Regime', Carnegie Endowment, Policy Outlook no. 33, February 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ goldschmidt_priority_steps_final.pdf.
5. See, for example, Pierre Goldschmidt, 'The Increasing Risk of Nuclear Proliferation: Addressing the Challenge', Belgian Nuclear Society Symposium, Brussels, 26 November 2003, http://www.iaea.or.at/ PrinterFriendly/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2003/gold-schmidt26112003. html
6. and Pierre Goldschmidt, 'IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Noncompliance', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 July 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/ Goldschmidt_Dealing_Preventively_7-12-08.pdf.
7. See, for example, the statement by Reza Aghazadeh, Iran's vice president and president of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, at the IAEA General Conference, 18-22 September 2006.
8. Letter from H.E. Ambassador Dr Soltanieh to the Director General of the IAEA, GOV/INF/2007/8.
9. Referring Iran to the Security Council was consistent with Articles XII.C and III.B.4 of the IAEA Statute and with its practice as demonstrated by the referral of Libya to the Security Council in 2004 on the basis of a report that did not use the word 'non-compliance'. Iran was clearly in non-compliance through failure, over many years, to declare all nuclear material and activities that should have been subject to safeguards, in circumstances where a military purpose was plausible; see Pierre Goldschmidt, 'Rule of Law, Politics and Nuclear Non-proliferation', presentation to the Ecole Internationale de Droit Nucleaire, Université de Montpellier, 7 September 2007, http://www. carnegieendowment.org/publications/ index.cfm?fa=view&id=19564&prog=zgp&proj=znpp.
10. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya', Report by the Director General, 20 February 2004, GOV/2004/12, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ Board/2004/gov2004-12.pdf.
11. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', Report by the Director General, 10 November 2003, GOV/ 2003/75, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/ gov2003-75.pdf.
12. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea', Report by the Director General, 11 November 2004, GOV/2004/84, para. 38, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/ gov2004-84.pdf.
13. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt', Report by the Director General, 14 February 2005, GOV/2005/9, para. 22, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ static/npp/reports/gov2005-9.pdf.
14. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea', GOV/2004/84, para. 38 (emphasis added).
15. Ibid., para. 41.
16. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt', GOV/2005/9, para. 22 (emphasis added).
17. Ibid., para. 23 (emphasis added).
18. IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 2001 ed., International Nuclear Verification Series no. 3, section 2.2(d), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/ publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/Start.pdf.
19. Ibid.
20. If a so-called revised Code 3.1 provision has been agreed to under the Subsidiary Arrangements concluded with the agency.
21. IAEA Safeguards Glossary.
22. The Safeguards Implementation Report, submitted every year to the board, provides a description and analysis of the agency's safeguards operations during the previous year, including a summary of the problems encountered and the secretariat's findings and conclusions. Distribution of the full report is restricted to IAEA member states and it is not available to the general public.
23. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya', Resolution adopted by the Board on 10 March 2004, GOV/2004/18, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ Board/2004/gov2004-18.pdf
24. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005, GOV/2005/77, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.
25. Article III.B.4 states that 'if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security'.
26. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', GOV/2005/77.
27. 6 as feedstock.
28. 'Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers', In Focus: IAEA and Iran, 21 October 2003, http://www.iaea.org/ NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml.
29. UN Security Council, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', 22 April 2004, S/PRST/2004/10, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/411728c84.pdf.
30. Ann MacLachlan, 'France, Libya Initial Nuclear Pact, Emphasize Infrastructure-Building', Nuclear Fuel, vol. 48, no. 50, 13 December 2007, p. 15.
31. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya', Report by the Director General, 12 September 2008, GOV/2008/39, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ Board/2008/gov2008-39.pdf (emphasis added). Such a conclusion raises some questions. First, the word 'continue' seems to imply that in the past the agency has implemented safeguards in Libya as a routine matter. This is not the case, since, as indicated in the report to the board, the agency had 'unrestricted and prompt access, beyond that required under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, to those locations, information and individuals deemed necessary by the Agency to fulfil its verification requirements'. And secondly, why does the agency feel it necessary to officially state now that it will implement safeguards in Libya as a routine matter when the report acknowledges that there are still some unresolved issues such as the origin of 2 tonnes of UF6 as well as other uranium compounds obtained through a clandestine source, that 'there are some parts of Libya's past programme which the Agency has not been able to reconstruct fully' and that the agency still needs to 'work to reach a conclusion about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Libya'? The adoption by the board, on 24 September 2008, of a resolution supporting the continued implementation of safeguards in Libya 'as a routine matter' thus constitutes another detrimental precedent.
32. IAEA, 'IAEA Board Concludes Consideration of Safeguards in South Korea', staff report, 26 November 2004, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/ 2004/south_korea.html (emphasis added).
33. Ibid.
34. This was done only on 24 September 2005 and it was not until 4 February 2006 that the board decided to report the matter to the UN Security Council.
35. Such a conclusion means that 'the Secretariat has found no indication that, in its judgement, would give rise to a possible proliferation concern'. IAEA, 'Safeguards Statement for 2007', para. 13, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2007.html.
36. At least ten AVLIS-related experiments involving exempted or undeclared nuclear material were carried out between 1993 and 2000 (IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea', GOV/2004/84, para. 15). In 2002 and 2003 South Korea refused requests by the agency to visit KAERI's Laser Technology Center (para. 14); it refused to acknowledge in 1999 having conducted plutonium separation experiments (para. 26); and it did not report in August 2004 all past conversion activities (para. 20).
37. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt', GOV/2005/9 (emphasis added).
38. IAEA, Annual Report for 2004 (Geneva: IAEA, 2005), p. 65, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/safeguards.pdf.
39. The February 2005 report to the Board (IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt', GOV/2005/9, para. 26) states 'The Director General will continue to report to the Board of Governors on the implementation of safeguards in Egypt as appropriate'.
40. Ibid., para. 23.
41. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt', GOV/2005/9, para.24.
42. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic', Report by the Director General, 19 November 2008, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/syria/ IAEA_Report_Syria_19Nov2008.pdf.
43. Paragraph 19 of IAEA, 'The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', INFCIRC/153, provides that 'if the Board upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material ⋯ to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute' including a report of non-compliance to the UN Security Council.
44. IAEA, 'Strengthening of Agency Safeguards: Special Inspections', 12 November 1991, GOV/2554 Attachment 1, para. 4.
45. Article 18 provides that if the board 'decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material ⋯ is not diverted to nuclear weapons ⋯ the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required actions without delay'.
46. IAEA, 'Excerpts from Statements made by the Director General under the Agenda item "Strengthening of Agency Safeguards" at the Board's December 1991 Meetings', 22 January 1992, GOV/INF/646, Attachment 1, para. 139.
47. IAEA, 'Strengthening of Agency Safeguards: Special Inspections', 12 November 1991, GOV/2554 Attachment 1, para. 14.
48. The secretariat concluded that all nuclear material in South Korea remained in peaceful activities after 'the Agency was able to clarify all issues relating to past undeclared activities'. IAEA, 'Safeguards Statement for 2007', para. 33. How the secretariat reached this important conclusion after the failures and breaches reported to the board in November 2004 (IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea', GOV/2004/84) is described in Appendix I of the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2007. The latter is unfortunately not publicly available and should be made part of the reports transmitted to the Security Council.
49. Egypt should consider the merit of spontaneously agreeing to implement on a voluntary basis the Additional Protocol until such time the secretariat has concluded that Egypt's declarations are correct and complete and that there is no undeclared nuclear material and activities in Egypt. Such a commitment, while not departing from Egypt's principle decision not to sign and ratify at this stage the Additional Protocol, would make it clear that its principle decision is in no way intended to prevent the agency from drawing the necessary conclusion mentioned above, thereby distancing itself further from Iran's behaviour.
50. For instance, the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2000 reported that, by the end of that year, all states with facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material, except five which were named, had agreed to provide early design information on new facilities. One year later all had done so except Iran, which adapted its subsidiary arrangements accordingly in February 2003. The report for 2002 named four states which had not ratified their Additional Protocol more than five years after signature. Three of them did so within one year of the review of the report by the board.
51. IAEA General Conference resolution adopted on 4 October 2008, GC(52)/ RES/13, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC52/GC52Resolutions/ English/gc52res-13_en.pdf.