The Metaphysics of Knowledge

The Metaphysics of Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-320

  Hossack, Keith ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief; Facts; I concept; Philosophical logic; Philosophy of language; Philosophy of mind; Physical state; Subjectivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 59549100906     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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