Monitoring cartel behavior and stability: Evidence from NCAA football

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 720-735

  Humphreys, Brad R ^a   Ruseski, Jane E ^a  

^a 8 14 HM Tory ^*  (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 59549097336     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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