Design and renegotiation of debt covenants

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 749-781

  Gârleanu, Nicolae ^a,c   Zwiebel, Jeffrey ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 59449101607     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn017     Document Type: Article

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