John Doe subpoenas: Toward a consistent legal standard

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 320-368

  Gleicher, Nathaniel ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 59349105152     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20454712     Document Type: Article

References (252)

1. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 n.6 (1995) (describing Publius, the pen name under which Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison wrote The Federalist Papers).
2. See, e.g., ComCraptic.com - Your Chance To Tell Everyone How You Feel About Comcast Products and Service, http://comcraptic.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2008); DeltaReallySucks.com, http://deltareallysucks.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
3. See, e.g., Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (rejecting a city councilman's attempt to unmask an anonymous critic).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Judge Reverses His Order Disabling Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2008, at A11;
5. Adam Liptak & Brad Stone, Judge Shuts Down Web Site Specializing in Leaks, Raising Constitutional Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,2008, at A14.
6. See Star Wars Kid Is Top Viral Video, BBC NEWS, NOV. 27, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/6187554.stm;
7. Tu Thanh Ha, 'Star Wars Kid' Cuts a Deal with His Tormentors, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 7, 2006, at A8.
8. See, e.g., Mattathias Schwartz, Inside the World of Online Trolb, Who Use the Internet To Harass, Humiliate and Torment Strangers: Malwebolence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008 (Magazine), at 24.
9. See, e.g., Blog Death Threats Spark Debate, BBC NEWS, Mar. 27, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6499095.stm (describing the concerted verbal attacks on Kathy Sierra, a well-known technology blogger, that prompted her to cancel her public appearances and shut down her blog).
10. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Boalt Student Posts "Copycat Threat" to Hastings, Law Blog-WSJ.com, Apr. 20, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/04/20/boalt-student-allegedly-posts-copycat- threat-to-hastings-law;
11. Mitch Wagner, Death Threats Force Designer To Cancel ETech Conference Appearance, InformationWeek, Digital Life Weblog, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2007/03/death-threats-f.html.
12. The volunteer organization Working To Halt Online Abuse reports that more than seventy percent of the victims of online harassment it has worked with since 2000 have been women. Working To Halt Online Abuse, Comparison Statistics 2000-2007, http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/Cumulative2000-2007.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
13. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 6;
14. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 17-18, on file with author).
15. Citron, supra note 10, at 21.
16. Id. at 24.
17. See, e.g., Richard Morgan, A Crash Course in Online Gossip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, at ST7.
18. See infra note 61.
19. 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995);
20. see also id. at 345 (ruling that an Ohio law that forbade any publication promoting a ballot issue unless it contained the "name and residence" of the author was unconstitutional).
21. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2007)
22. (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357).
23. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341.
24. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
25. David L. Sobel, The Process That "John Doe" Is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶ 5 (2000), http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/symposium/ v5i1a3Sobel.html;
26. see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 ("Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.").
27. But see Caroline E. Strickland, Note, Applying Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission to Anonymous Speech on the Internet and the Dbcovery of John Doe's Identity, 58 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1537, 1580-82 (2001) (arguing that Mcintyre has been wrongly applied to anonymous speech online because, among odier things, it was focused on prior restraint of speech).
28. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 16, at 1599.
29. Id. at 1600.
30. Id. at 1559.
31. See generally Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure To Recognise John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 889 (1996) (tracing the history of John Doe pleadings).
32. Id. at 890 & n.22.
33. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that a cause of action existed for a plaintiff who was searched and arrested without a warrant); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (holding local law enforcement officers accountable for beating a suspect to death).
34. Rice, supra note 23, at 897.
35. For a more detailed discussion of IP addresses and Internet infrastructure, see Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV 653, 656-69 (2003).
36. See infra Subsection III.B.i.
37. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005). For a classic example of plaintiff "self-help," see Kaidin Quistgaard, Raytheon Triumphs over Yahoo Posters' Anonymity, SALON.COM, May 24, 1999, http://www.salon.com/tech/log/1999/05/24/raytheon/index.html.
38. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457.
39. Scot Wilson, Comment, Corporate Criticbm on the Internet: The Fine Line Between Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 537 (2002).
40. Sobel, supra note 19, ¶ 6.
41. See, e.g., Quistgaard, supra note 29.
42. Michael Vogel has argued that John Doe subpoenas rely on "relatively mundane rules of civil procedure" and that courts "should be hesitant to imply new procedural rules without clear proof that existing rules are inadequate." Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking "John Doe" Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 840-41 (2004). This Note does not respond to Vogel point by point, but it asserts at least three specific reasons why existing pleading rules are, in fact, inadequate: severe consequences, occurrence of John Doe subpoenas early in trial, and possible lack of opposition from an uninformed defendant.
43. For an in-depdi analysis of the costs and benefits of anonymous speech, see Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 16, at 1578-79.
44. Citron, supra note 10, at 19.
45. Id. at 21.
46. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (considering identification of an anonymous defendant in a trademark infringement claim); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (considering a John Doe subpoena in a claim of trespass to chattels) ; Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (considering a John Doe subpoena in a defamation claim).
47. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . . ").
48. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,340 (1974).
49. 376 U.S. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'. . . .").
50. 388 U.S. 130,148 (1967) (quoting Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ'g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir. 1966)).
51. Aaron Perzanowski, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 841 (2006).
52. Id. at 842.
53. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (finding that, because plaintiff was not a public figure in the controversy concerning which he was defamed, the actual malice standard did not apply).
54. Id. at 345. Lower courts have sought to add detail to this definition. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, identified the five requirements for a limited-purpose public figure as: (1) the plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication, (2) the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in a public controversy, (3) the plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or outcome of the controversy, (4) the controversy existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statements, and (5) the plaintiff retained public figure status at the time of the alleged defamation. Fitzgerald v. Pendiouse Int'l, 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1982);
55. see Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708 (4th Cir. 1991).
56. 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
57. See id.
58. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 539-40 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that a dispute between a teacher's union and a school board was a public controversy);
59. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 964 n.9 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (claiming that a debate over a fistfight at a high school wresding match was a public controversy in part because it "was not a private matter of public concern merely to gossips").
60. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (holding that a scientist who was awarded a mock award for wasteful government spending was not a public figure because he was not a significant figure in any public controversy) ;
61. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979) (holding that the petitioner, who was being investigated in an espionage case and had refused to appear before a grand jury, was not at the forefront of a public controversy).
62. 424 U.S. at 454-55 n.3.
63. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
64. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 476 n.4
65. (quoting David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422,450-51 (1975)).
66. 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
67. See, e.g., Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 350 F.3d 1272, 1278 (D.C Cir. 2003) (finding that the defendant was a limited-purpose public figure, not an involuntary public figure);
68. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 540 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the defendant was not an involuntary public figure).
69. But see Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (identifying an air traffic controller on duty at the time of a crash as an involuntary public figure).
70. Perzanowski, supra note 43, at 850.
71. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974);
72. see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) ("[A]ny person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.").
73. See, e.g., Tu Thanh Ha, supra note 5.
74. See, e.g., Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) ("[S]peech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest government policies." (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
75. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976).
76. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ;
77. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999);
78. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007);
79. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008);
80. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005);
81. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3,775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) ;
82. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (In re AOL), 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
83. See In re AOL, 52 Va. Cir. 26.
84. See Dendrite, 775 A.2d 756.
85. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 70s (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding the journalist's privilege, even though the information sought was crucial to the plaintiffs case, because alternative methods to access the information had not been exhausted);
86. Dangerfield v. Star Editorial, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 833 (C..D. Cal. 1993) (holding that the First Amendment privilege against disclosure could be overcome by a showing of compelling need) ;
87. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984) (articulating a standard to evaluate discovery of a reporter's anonymous source, and ruling that it was not merited in that case).
88. See, e.g., Global Telemedia Int'l Inc. v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (dismissing a cyber-SLAPP suit brought under CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE S 425.16 (West 2004), California's anti-SLAPP statute, by employing a balancing test).
89. 17 U.S.C § 512(h) (2000);
90. see Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying the DMCA standard);
91. Trevor A Dutcher, Comment, A Discussion of the Mechanics of the DMCA Safe Harbors and Subpoena Power, as Applied in RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 493 (2005) (discussing the mechanics of DMCA John Doe subpoenas). At least one court has evaluated a John Doe subpoena for a copyright infringer outside of the DMCA context.
92. See Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
93. See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing Anonymity and Accountability in Cyberspace, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493 (2001);
94. Sean P.Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legblation, and the Blogosphere: New Solutions for an Old Problem, 44 DUQ, L. REV. 607 (2006) ;
95. Joseph R Furman, Comment, Cybersmear or CyberSLAPP: Analyzing Defamation Suits Against Online John Does as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213 (2001) ;
96. Megan M. Sunkel, Comment, And the I(SP)s Have It... But How Does One Get It? Examining the Lack of Standards for Ruling on Subpoenas Seeking To Reveal the Identity of Anonymous Internet Users in Claims of Online Defamation, 81 N.C L. REV 1189, 1189 (2003).
97. At least one author has advocated applying the standard from Dendrite, 775 A.2d 756, to the context of the DMCA.
98. See Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222 (2004). Sony Music Entertainment Inc. also incorporated factors from several of the cases closely analyzed in this Note. 326 F. Supp. 2d at 564-65.
99. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
100. Id. at 579.
101. Id. at 580.
102. Id. at 579.
103. 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
104. Id. at 37.
105. Id.
106. 775 A.2d 756, 763 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). Dendrite affirmed the denial of the plaintiff's motion to discover the defendant's identity. Id. at 772.
107. On the same day, the same court applied an identical standard in Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 77s A2d 773, 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), but came to the opposite conclusion.
108. Id. at 760. Seescandy.com required that the plaintiff "identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant," 185 F.R.D. at 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999), but did not specify what level of notice was actually required.
109. 775 A.2d at 760.
110. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
111. See id. at 1095.
112. Id. at 1096.
113. 775 A.2d at 760.
114. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
115. Id. at 454.
116. The court provides no indication that the defendant received notice of the release of his IP address. Id.
117. Id. at 454-55.
118. Id. at 455.
119. Id. at 461.
120. Id. at 460-61.
121. Id. at 463.
122. Id. at 464.
123. Id.
124. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1,170 P.3d712,715-16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
125. Id. at 719.
126. Id. at 723-24. The question of whether John Doe subpoena standards should include a balancing test remains unresolved, and is addressed in more detail in Part III.F.
127. Id. at 724.
128. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008).
129. See id. at 244.
130. Id. at 245.
131. Id. at 251.
132. See table accompanying note 102 for a graphical representation of this phenomenon.
133. This table shows the factors that each major John Doe subpoena standard includes.
134. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
135. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (In re AOL), 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
136. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3,775 A2d 756,760 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2001).
137. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088,1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
138. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A2d451, 461-63 (Del. 2005).
139. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
140. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244-45 (Ct. App. 2008).
141. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("[N]on-party disclosure is only appropriate in the exceptional case where the compelling need for the discovery sought outweighs the First Amendment rights of the anonymous speaker."). in. See supra text accompanying note 27.
142. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., In re AOL, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
144. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3,775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
145. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,461 (Del. 2005);
146. see also Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
147. See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 455.
148. 47 U.S.C S 551(c)(1) (2000).
149. Id. § 551(c)(2)(B).
150. See, e.g., Roger M. Rosen & Charles B. Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for Internet Defamation, L.A. LAW, Oct. 2001, at 19,19 ("Most ISPs now give their account holders two or more weeks' notice of a subpoena before divulging any information in response to it.").
151. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Ct. App. 2008).
152. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 16, at 1598.
153. See supra text accompanying note 111.
154. Orit Goldring & Antonia L. Hamblin, Note, Think Before You Click: Online Anonymity Does Not Make Defamation Legal, 20 HOFSTRALAB. &EMP.L.J. 383,396 (2003).
155. For more details on the advantages of notification by the plaintiff, see infra Subsection III.B.2.
156. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 16, at 1598.
157. United States v. Dusenbery, 223 F.3d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that notice mailed to a prison inmate was sufficient for a forfeiture action) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), which held that notice must reasonably convey the required information and afford sufficient opportunity for response).
158. 339 U.S. at 318.
159. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A2d 756,760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
160. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1,170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
161. Id. at 719.
162. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
163. Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 719; Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005).
164. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West 2004) (giving the defendant sixty days to file a motion to quash a subpoena under California anti-SLAPP law).
165. See Rosen & Rosenberg, supra note 119, at 19.
166. Only Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001), does not have a strength-of-argument factor in its standard. The 2TheMart.c0m standard is one of the most pro-plaintiff standards adopted by any court.
167. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
168. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231,241 (Ct. App. 2008).
169. 88 4A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
170. 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
171. Id.
172. 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citation omitted) (ruling on the burden facing a plaintiff to overcome a motion to dismiss by the defendant).
173. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1,170 P.3d 712,720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
174. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 243 (Ct. App. 2008).
175. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,458 (Del. 2005) (quoting VLIW Tech., L.L.C. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 611 (Del. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006).
177. Vogel, supra note 34, at 850.
178. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
179. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244.
180. 775 A.2d756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
181. 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245 n.14 (quoting Evans v. Paye, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915, 925 n.13 (Ct. App. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 36 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
183. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 247 (citing Valencia v. Citibank Intl, 728 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
184. Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 463 (Del. 2005). Because the plaintiff in Cahill was a public figure, the court also required that the plaintiff show actual malice on the part of the defendant to prove libel. Id. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan established this requirement nationally, so it does not vary among jurisdictions, but applies for all public figure plaintiffs. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
185. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
186. Vogel, supra note 34, at 807-08.
187. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
188. Vogel, supra note 34, at 807-08.
189. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
190. Ryan M. Martin, Comment, Freezing the Net: Rejecting a One-Size-Fits-All Standard for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers in Defamation Lawsuits, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1217 (2007).
191. Id. at 1243.
192. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (holding that a strong inference of the scienter required for securities fraud had not been established, and remanding for further consideration).
193. Id. at 2504.
194. 15 U.S.C. §l 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
195. 127 S. Ct. at 2504-05.
196. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
197. 690 P.2d 625, 632 (Cal. 1984).
198. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
199. Id. at 1096 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
200. 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
201. Id.
202. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Cir. Ct. 2000).
203. See, e.g., Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
204. 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005). Cahill refers to the Dendrite standard as a "summary judgment" standard, even though it is actually a prima facie standard.
205. See supra Section III.B.
206. For the full text of the updated factor, see infra Section IV.A.
207. Rosen & Rosenberg, supra note 119, at 19.
208. 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
209. Id. at 567.
210. 775 A.2d at 760-61.
211. 884 A.2d at 461.
212. Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
213. Id. (footnote omitted).
214. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 16, at 1601-02.
215. Vogel, supra note 34, at 808.
216. 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
217. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
218. No. 3:07-CV-909 (D. Conn, filed Nov. 8, 2007).
219. See AutoAdmit, http://www.autoadmit.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
220. See Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1.
221. See id.
222. See Citron, supra note 10, at 10.
223. See Second Amended Complaint, Doe I, No. 3:07-CV-909 (D. Conn. Aug. 5, 2008), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/ documents/autoadmit.pdf. For more detail on the events leading up to the lawsuit, see Citron, supra note 10, at 10-14.
224. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 192, at ¶ 23; see also Jarret Cohen, Challenge to Reputation Defender (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.autoadmit.com/challenge.to.reputation. defender.html.
225. See Nakashima, supra note 189.
226. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 192.
227. John Doe 21's Memorandum in Support of Motion To Quash Plaintiffs Subpoena, Doe I, No. 3:07-CV-909, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008).
228. Doe I, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749, at *22.
229. Id. at *13.
230. Id. at *6 n.3.
231. Id. at *5.
232. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Opposition to John Doe 21's Motion to Quash Plaintiffs Subpoena at 1, Doe I, No. 3:07-CV-909, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749.
233. See Doe 1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749, at *5-6.
234. Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 964 n.9 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 189 ("'I didn't understand what I'd done to deserve it,' said the student. 'I also felt kind of scared because it was someone in my community who was threatening physical and sexual violence and I didn't know who.'");
236. Jeff Tyler, Get Yourself a Little Online Privacy, MARKETPLACE, Mar. 2, 2007, http://marketplace.publicradio.org/ display/web/2007/03/02/an-online-identity ("People would bring that up to me in the interview. So when they did, I knew they had searched me on the Internet.").
237. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
238. ReputationDefender, Company: About Us, http://www.ReputationDefender.com/ company (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
239. Article on file with author to preserve the plaintiffs anonymity.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See supra Section II.B.
243. 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
244. 424 U.S. 448, 454 n.3 (1976).
245. See Perzanowski, supra note 43;
246. see also Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 135;
247. supra text accompanying note 54.
248. See supra Section II.B.
249. Doe I v. Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, No. 3:07-CV-909, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749, at *17 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008).
250. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 245 n.14 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Evans v. Paye, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915, 925 n.13 (Ct. App. 1995)).
251. Doe 1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48749, at *20.
252. Id. at *143.