Position auctions with bidder-specific minimum prices

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5385 LNCS, Issue , 2008, Pages 577-584

  Even Dar, Eyal ^a   Feldman, Jon ^a   Mansour, Yishay ^a,b   Muthukrishnan, S ^a  

^a GOOGLE INC   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

VCG AUCTIONS;

COSTS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INTERNET; QUALITY CONTROL; SEARCH ENGINES; WINE;

COMMERCE;

EID: 58849114994     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_64     Document Type: Conference Paper

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