Allocating tradable permits on the basis of market price to achieve cost effectiveness

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 139-149

  Hagem, Cathrine ^a   Westskog, Hege ^b  

^a STATISTICS NORWAY   (Norway)

^b CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Allocation; Climate change; Cost effectiveness; Distributional constraints; Emission permits

Indexed keywords

CLIMATE CHANGE; COMMERCE; COST EFFECTIVENESS;

ALLOCATION; ALLOCATION RULE; COST DISTRIBUTION; DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS; EMISSION PERMITS; EMISSION TARGETS; PERMIT ALLOCATION; TRADABLE PERMITS;

COSTS;

CLIMATE CHANGE; COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; EMISSION; MARKET; PRICE DETERMINATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 58549094703     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-008-9210-3     Document Type: Article

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