Billboards, bombs and shotgun weddings

Synthese

Volumn 166, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 251-279

  Egan, Andy ^a,b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Character; Content; Context

Indexed keywords

EID: 58549088175     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9284-4     Document Type: Article

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