Chapter 106 The Recognition Heuristic and the Less-Is-More Effect

Handbook of Experimental Economics Results

Volumn 1, Issue C, 2008, Pages 987-992

  Goldstein, Daniel G ^a   Gigerenzer, Gerd ^b  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

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Indexed keywords

EID: 58449085485     PISSN: 15740722     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00106-0     Document Type: Review

References (6)

1. Ayton, P., Önkal, D. (1997). "Forecasting futball fixtures: Confidence and judged proportion correct". Unpublished manuscript, City University, London
2. Gigerenzer G. The bounded rationality of probabilistic mental models. In: Manktelow K.I., and Over D.E. (Eds). Rationality: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives (1993), Routledge, London
3. Gigerenzer G., and Goldstein D.G. Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review 104 (1996) 650-669
4. Goldstein D.G., and Gigerenzer G. The recognition heuristic: How ignorance makes us smart. In: Gigerenzer G., Todd P.M., and the ABC Group (Eds). Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart (1999), Oxford University Press, New York 37-58
5. Goldstein D.G., and Gigerenzer G. Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic. Psychological Review 109 (2002) 75-90
6. Hoffrage, U. (1995). "The adequacy of subjective confidence judgments: Studies concerning the theory of probabilistic mental models". Doctoral thesis, University of Salzburg