Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 65, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 25-48

  Araujo, Aloisio ^a   de Castro, Luciano I ^b  

^a IMPA   (Brazil)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Equilibrium existence in auctions; Market for lemmons; Monotonic equilibrium; Positive probability of trade; Pure strategy Nash equilibrium; Tie breaking rule; Winners' curse

Indexed keywords

EID: 58249093040     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.006     Document Type: Article

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