Human factors analysis of the BP Texas City Refinery explosion

Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society

Volumn 3, Issue , 2007, Pages 1444-1448

  MacKenzie, Cheryl ^a   Holmstrom, Donald ^a   Kaszniak, Mark ^a  

^a US Chemical Safety Hazard Board   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARDS; DISTILLATION TOWERS; HUMAN FACTORS; IGNITION SOURCES; INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS; PROCESS UNITS; ROOT CAUSES; SAFETY SYSTEMS; START-UP; TEXAS CITIES; VAPOR CLOUDS;

BACKPROPAGATION; DISTILLATION; HUMAN ENGINEERING; HYDROCARBONS; OCCUPATIONAL RISKS; REFINING; VAPORS;

ERGONOMICS;

EID: 58149516803     PISSN: 10711813     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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