Learning from one's mistakes: Epistemic modesty and the nature of belief

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 82, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 157-177

  Evnine, Simon J ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149508753     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0114.00123     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Jonathan Roorda, "Fallibilism, Ambivalence, and Belief," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997), p. 135.
2. Larry Laudan, "A Confutation of Convergent Realism," in Jarrett Leplin (ed.) Scientific Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 218-49.
3. Richard Foley, Working Without a Net: A Study in Egocentric Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 140.
4. Ronald De Sousa, "How to Give a Piece of Your Mind: Or, the Logic of Belief and Assent," Review of Metaphysics 25 (1971), pp. 52-79;
5. James Hawthorne and Luc Bovens, "The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief," Mind 108 (April 1999), pp. 241-64.
6. Hawthorne and Bovens, "The Preface, the Lottery and the Logic of Belief,"
7. Richard Jeffrey, "Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief," in Marshall Swain (ed.) Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970), pp. 157-85.
8. Bas van Fraassen, "Belief and the Will," Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 235-56.
9. Isaac Levi, Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967);
10. Mark Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
11. David Lewis, "A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance," in Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.) Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
12. Kaplan, Decision Theory as Philosophy, pp. 102-54.
13. "Believing Conjunctions," Synthese 118 (1999), pp. 201-27.
14. De Sousa, "How to Give a Piece of Your Mind";
15. van Fraassen, "Belief and the Will";
16. Roorda, "Fallibilism, Ambivalence, and Belief."
17. Pascal's Wager may be seen as a constraint on rational belief (that it should include a belief in the existence of God) stemming from prudential sources. Whether or not one subjects oneself to that constraint depends on a choice influenced by how much we care about the possible gains and losses of adopting such a belief.
18. Thomas Nagel, "Subjective and Objective," in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 196-213;
19. Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
20. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed., trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), IIx.
21. Henry Kyburg, "Conjunctivitis," in Marshall Swain (ed.) Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970), p. 59.
22. Evnine, "Believing Conjunctions,"