Trust, reciprocity, and social history

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 122-142

  Berg, Joyce ^a   Dickhaut, John ^b   McCabe, Kevin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149326397     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1027     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. ARROW, K. (1974). The Limits of Organization. New York: Norton, York.
2. CAMERER, C., JOHNSON, E., RYMON, T., and SEN, S. (1993). "Cognition and Framing in Sequential Bargaining for Gains and Losses," in Frontiers of Game Theory, (K. Binmore, A. Kirman, and P. Tuni, (Eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3. COSMIDES, L., and TOOBY, J. (1992). "Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange," in The Adapted Mind, (J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby, Eds.). New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
4. COLEMAN, J. (1990). Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
5. CUMMINGS, L., ANDBROMILEY, P. (1995). "The Organizational Trust Inventory (OTI): Development and Validation," in Trust in Organizations (R. Kramer and T. Tyler, Eds.), Twin Oaks, CA: Sage.
6. FEHR, E., KIRCHSTEIGER, G., and RIEDL, A. (1993). "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," Quart. J. Econ. 108, 437-459.
7. Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J., Savin, N., and Sefton, M. (1994). "Replicability, Fairness and Pay in Experiments with Simple Bargaining Games," Games Econ. Behav. 6, 347-369.
8. GEANAKOPLOS, J., PEARCE, D., and STACHETTI, E. (1989). "Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality," Games Econ. Behav. 1, 60-79.
9. GUTH, W., and KLIMENT, H. (1993). "Competition or Cooperation: On the Evolutionary Economics of Trust, Exploitation and Moral Attitudes," mimeo, University of Frankfurt.
10. GUTH, W., OCKENFELS, P., and WENDEL (1993). "Efficiency by Trust in Fairness? Multiperiod Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments with an Increasing Cake," Int. J. Game Theory 22, 51-73.
11. Harrison, G., and Mc Cabe, K. (1993). "The Role of Experience for Testing Bargaining Theory in Experiments," Res. Exp. Econ. 5, 137-169.
12. Hirshleifer, J. (1977). "Economics from a Biological Viewpoint," J. Law Econ. 20, 1-52.
13. HOFFMAN, E., MCCABE, K., SHACHAT, K., and SMITH, V. (1994). "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games Econ. Behav. 7, 346-380.
14. Hoffman, E., and Spitzer, M. (1982). "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests," J. Law Econ. 25, 73-98.
15. Hoffman, E., and Spitzer, M. (1985). "Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice," J. Legal Studies 15, 254-297.
16. KREPS, D. M. (1990). "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
17. MCCABE, K., RASSENTI, S., and SMITH, V. (1994). "Forward and Backward Rationality in the Achievement of Cooperation," mimeo, Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona.
18. McKelvey, R., and Palfrey, T. (1992). "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica 60, 803-836.
19. NEELIN, SONNENSCHEIN, and SPIEGEL (1988). "A further test of noncooperative bargaining theory: Comment," Amer. Econ. Rev. 78, 824-836.
20. Rabin, M. (1993). "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Amer. Econ. Rev. 83, 1281-1302.
21. ROSENTHAL, R. (1982). "Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain-Store Paradox," J. Econ. Theory 25, 92-100.
22. SCHELLING, T. (1980). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
23. SELTEN, R. (1989). "Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior," the 1989 Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lecture, Northwest University, 1989.
24. VAN HUYCK, J., BATTALIO, R., and WALTERS, M. (1993). "Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game: Aggregate Analysis," mimeo, Texas A&M Economics.
25. Williamson, O. (1993). "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," J. Law Econ. 36, 453-486.