Commitment and observability in games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 271-280

  Bagwell, Kyle ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149325844     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80001-6     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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4. FUDENBERG, D., and TIROLE, J. (1991). Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
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9. KREPS, D., and WILSON, R. (1982). "Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica 50, 863-894.
10. MATTHEWS, S., and L. MIRMAN (1983). "Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand," Econometrica 51, 981-995.
11. MYERSON, R. (1991). Game Theory. Cambridge, MA. Harvard Univ. Press.
12. SCHELLING, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
13. SPENCER, B., and BRANDER, J. (1983). "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Rev. Econ. Stud. 50, 707-722.
14. VON STACKELBERG, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleicligewicht. Vienna: Springer.