Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 164-212

  Roth, Alvin E ^a,b   Erev, Ido ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149324992     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80020-X     Document Type: Article

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