Knowing what others know: Coordination motives in information acquisition

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 223-251

  Hellwig, Christian ^a,b   Veldkamp, Laura ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b CEPR   (United States)

^c NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; GAME THEORY; MODELING; PRICE DYNAMICS;

EID: 58149301572     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00515.x     Document Type: Article

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