Comments on Doug Husak: The low cost of recognizing (and of ignoring) the limited relevance of intentions to permissibility

Criminal Law and Philosophy

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 71-78

  Walen, Alec ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Criminal law; Culpability; Doctrine of double effect (DDE); Intention; Mens rea; Moral philosophy; Permissibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 58049194170     PISSN: 18719791     EISSN: 18719805     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11572-008-9064-3     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Anscombe, E. (1968) Modern moral philosophy (Reprinted in Ethics, pp. 186-210, by J. Thomson & G. Dworkin, Eds., New York: Harper and Row).
2. Bennett, J. (1981). Morality and consequences, the tanner lectures on human values III (pp. 46-116). Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
3. Hart, H. L. A. (1968). Intention and punishment, reprinted in Punishment and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Husak, D. (2008). The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy, this issue, doi: 10.1007/s11572-008-9065-2.
5. LaFave, W. (2000). Criminal law, 3rd edn. St. Paul, Minn: West Group.
6. McCarthy, D. (2002). Intending harm, foreseeing harm, and failures of the will. Nous, 36, 622-642.
7. Ross, W. D. (1988). The right and the good. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett (originally published in 1930).
8. Thomson, J. J. (1999). Physician-assisted suicide: Two moral arguments. Ethics, 109, 497-518.
9. Walen, A. (2006). The doctrine of illicit intentions. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 34, 39-67.
10. Walen, A. Intentions that matter for permissibility (unpublished manuscript).