Medellíns clear statement rule: A solution for international delegations

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 77, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 609-615

  Julian, G Ku ^a,b  

^a Department of Law ^*

^b HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58049152355     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (28)

1. 128 S. Ct. 1346(2008).
2. I have discussed and defined the term "international delegations" elsewhere. See generally Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1.
4. Id. art. II.
5. Id. art. III.
6. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
7. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX, § 2, Dec. 15. 1993, 33 I.L.M. 9 ("The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.... The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members."); see also id. art. X, § 3 ("The Ministerial Conference may decide by a three-fourths majority of the Members that any amendment made effective under this paragraph is of such a nature that any Member which has not accepted it within a period specified by the Ministerial Conference in each case shall be free to withdraw from the WTO or to remain a Member with the consent of the Ministerial Conference.").
8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. No. 21 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 800; see also Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6771 (Supp. IV 1999).
9. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
10. U.N. Charter art. 92.
11. Optional Protocol, supra note 9, art. I.
12. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
13. Brief for Petitioner at 28, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1886212.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Unif. Foreign Money Judgments Recognitions Act, § 3, 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 39 (2002); Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971).
16. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
17. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1362 (citations omitted).
18. Id.. at 1350.
19. Id. at 1364.
20. Id. at 1363-64 (emphasis added).
21. Id.. at 1373-74 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3) (1987).
23. Id. § 111(4)(a).
24. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
25. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 330-37 (2000) (discussing how courts use nondelegation canons to impose constraints on administrative power).
26. See Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2006).
27. See Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) (2000) (barring anyone other than the United States from challenging U.S. or state action or inaction based on its consistency with the Uruguay Round Agreements); H.R. REP. NO. 103-316, at 675-77, 1043-44 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4054-56, 4327.
28. 548 U.S. 331 (2006).