Deterrence and the european balance of power: The field force and british grand strategy, 1934-1938

English Historical Review

Volumn 123, Issue 500, 2008, Pages 98-131

  Mckercher, B J C ^a  

^a ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA   (Canada)

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EID: 57749140054     PISSN: 00138266     EISSN: 14774534     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ehr/cen003     Document Type: Article

References (220)

1. 'Minute by Sir R. Vansittart' [DC (M) (32) 117], 2 June 1934, T[he] N[ational] A[rchives], P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], CAB 27/510.
2. D. French, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford, 2000), 168-9.
3. G. Kennedy, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933-1939 (2002), 55-7, 123-5, and the criticism in 123, n. 12.
4. He has also embroidered on this theme in his 'Neville Chamberlain and Strategic Relations With the US During His Chancellorship ', Diplomacy and Statecraft, xii (2001), 95-120
5. and '"Rat in Power" : Neville Chamberlain and the Creation of British Foreign Policy, 1931-1939 ', in T. G. Otte, ed., The Makers of British Foreign Policy From Pitt to Thatcher (Basingstoke, 2002), 173-95.
6. K. E. Neilson, 'The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, British Strategic Foreign Policy, Neville Chamberlain and the Path to Appeasement ', ante, cxviii (2003), 651-84;
7. idem., Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939 (Cambridge, 2006), 91-9. Moreover one of Neilson's other contentions, 'Defence Requirements ', 653, is wide of the mark: 'the D. R. C. has not been seen for what it was: the arena in which British strategic foreign policy was threshed out among competing interests with competing views and, most importantly, the body whose decisions largely determined the path that British strategic defence took in the years until 1939'.
8. Cf. N. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, Vol. I: Rearmament Policy (1976);
9. B. J. C. McKercher, Transition of Power. Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945 (Cambridge, 1999), chs. 5-8;
10. G. Post, Dilemmas of Appeasement. British Deterrence and Defense, 1934-1937 (Ithaca, NY, 1993), 25-45;
11. M. L. Roi, Alternative to Appeasement. Sir Robert Vansittart and Alliancce Diplomacy, 1934-1937 (Westport, CT, 1997), ch. 2.
12. When continental threats to British security arose, a strategy of meeting threats to the home islands before Imperial outposts had long been an axiom of British defence policy.
13. See the classic analysis, D. M. Schurman, Imperial Defence, 1868-1882: A Study in the Decisive Impulses Behind the Change From 'Colonial' to 'Imperial' Defence. Univ. of Cambridge Ph. D. thesis, 1955. I have used a copy of this thesis housed in the Library of the Royal Military College of Canada, where Professor Schurman was Head of the Department of History before his retirement.
14. Cf. C. J. Kitching, Britain and International Disarmament, 1919-1934 (1999), 87-164;
15. B. J. C. McKercher, 'Of Horns and Teeth: The Preparatory Commission and the World Disarmament Conference, 1926-1934 ', in B. J. C. McKercher, ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints on W a r, 1899-1939 (New York, 1992);
16. Z. S. Steiner, 'The League of Nations and the Quest for Security ', in R. Ahmann, A. M. Birke and M. Howard, eds., The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security 1918-1957 (1993).
17. See C. D. Krull and B. J. C. McKercher, 'The Press, Public Opinion, Arms Limitation, and Government Policy in Britain, 1932-1934: Some Preliminary Observations', Diplomacy and Statecraft, xiii (2002), 103-36. In the twelve years after 1922, the year when the defence budget again reflected peacetime conditions, government spending on the armed services declined by more than 30 per cent in real terms.
18. See Appendix 1.
19. Gibbs, Rearmament, 55.
20. Cf. J. R. Ferris, Men, Money and Diplomacy. The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-1926 (Ithaca, NY, 1989), 158-78;
21. P. Silverman, 'The Ten Year Rule', Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, cxvi (1971), 42-5;
22. and responses from K. Booth, 'The Ten Year Rule: An Unfinished Debate', ibid., 58-73;
23. S. W. Roskill, 'The Ten Year Rule: The Historical Facts ', ibid., cxvii (1972), 69-71.
24. T. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville, 1970);
25. E. Goldstein and J. Maurer, eds., The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability, and the Road to Pearl Harbor (1994);
26. P. P. O'Brien, British and American Naval Power. Politics and Policy, 1900-1939 (Westport, CT, 1998), 149-78;
27. S. W. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929 (1968), 300-30.
28. E. Goldstein, 'The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact, 1924-1925 ', in M. L. Dockrill and B. J. C. McKercher, eds., Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1951 (Cambridge, 1996);
29. J. Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925-1929 (Princeton, 1972), 1-79;
30. G. Johnson, The Berlin Embassy of Lord D'Abernon, 1920-1926 (Basingstoke, NY, 2002), 108-35;
31. F. Magee '"Limited Liability"? Britain and the Treaty of Locarno', Twentieth Century British History, vi (1995);
32. P. Urbanitsch, Grossbritannien und die Verträge von Locarno (Vienna, 1968).
33. See Gregory [FO Northern Department] 'Memorandum on the Foreign Policy of His Majesty's Government, With a List of British Commitments in Their Relative Order of Importance', 10 Apr. 1926, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy, Series IA, Vol. I: The Aftermath of Locarno (1966), 846-81. Of thirteen specifi c commitments, the first four in their order of importance were (i) the League of Nations Covenant, (ii) the Treaty of Versailles, (iii) the Treaty of Locarno and (iv) the Washington treaties.
34. Cf. D. Carlton, 'The Anglo-French Compromise on Arms Limitation, 1928', Journal of British Studies, viii (1969);
35. B. J. C. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy (Cambridge, 1984), 140-9.
36. This and the next quotation are from Vansittart memorandum [Committee for Imperial Defence 991-B], 'An Aspect of International Relations in 1930', 1 May 1930, TNA, PRO, CAB 4/19.
37. On disarmament, see C. J. Kitching, Britain and the Geneva Disarmament Conference (Houndmills, NY, 2003);
38. M. Vaïsse, Sécurité d'abord: La politique français en matière de désarmament, 9 décembre 1930-7 avril 1934 (Paris, 1981). On the Manchurian crisis
39. see I. H. Nish, Japan's Struggle With Internationalism. Japan, China, and the League of Nations, 1931-3 (1993);
40. C. Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy. The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (New York, 1973);
41. on reparations and war debts, see B. Kent, The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations, 1918-1932 (Oxford, 1989), 353-62;
42. McKercher, Transition of Power, 84-9, 140-4;
43. on the growth of Nazi political strength
44. see F. McDonough, Hitler and the Rise of the Nazi Party (London, 2003);
45. I. Kershaw, Hitler, Vol. I: 1889-1936: Hubris (1998), 313-75.
46. COS papers on 'Imperial Defence Policy' [COS 306], 24 Apr. 1933, enclosing Colonial Office, India Office, Home Office, Committee for Imperial Defence and Joint Overseas and Home Defence Committee memoranda;
47. and COS papers on 'Imperial Defence Policy '[COS 307], 20 May 1933, enclosing Foreign Office 'Memorandum on the Foreign Policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom ', 19 May 1933, both TNA, PRO, CAB 53/23.
48. COS, 'Annual Review (1933) '[Committee for Imperial Defence 1113-B], 12 Oct. 1933, TNA, PRO, CAB 4/22.
49. COS, 'Annual Review for 1932 by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee'[COS 295], 23 Feb. 1932, TNA, PRO, CAB 53/22. Cf. 'Report by the Deputies of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on the Situation in the Far East '[COS 295 (DC)], 22 Feb. 1932, TNA, PRO, CAB 53/22.
50. Then see COS Meeting 101, 22 Mar. 1932, TNA, PRO, CAB 2/5; CC 19 (32), TNA, PRO, CAB 23/70. I am indebted to Professor George Peden for directing me to these latter records.
51. COS 'Annual Review (1933) '[Committee for Imperial Defence 1113-B], 12 Oct. 1933, TNA, PRO, CAB 4/22.
52. Committee for Imperial Defence Meeting 261, 9 Nov. 1933, TNA, PRO, CAB 2/6.
53. Hankey memorandum [DRC 4], 23 Nov. 1933, with enclosures, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/109. Also
54. see Hankey to Chatfi eld, to Ellington, to Montgomery-Massingberd, to Vansittart, to Warren Fisher, all 23 Nov. 1933, all enclosing 'Terms of Reference ', 28 Nov. 1933, all TNA, PRO, CAB 21/434.
55. D. Cameron Watt made the seminal contribution.
56. See his 'Sir Warren Fisher and British Rearmament Against Germany 'and 'Britain, the United States, and Japan in 1934' in idem., Personalities and Policies. Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (1965), 83-116.
57. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, I, then provided the historiographical touchstone on the first DRC. Subsequent and essential analyses, not all of which agree with Gibbs because of access to more archival sources, include B. Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), ch. 7;
58. McKercher, Transition of Power, 177-85, 188-93;
59. idem., 'From Disarmament to Rearmament: British Civil-Military Relations and Policy-Making, 1933-1934', Defence Studies, i (2002), 21-48;
60. C. Morrisey and M. A. Ramsay, '"Giving a Lead in the Right Direction" : Sir Robert Vansittart and the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee', Diplomacy and Statecraft, vi (1995), 39-60;
61. E. O'Halperin, Head of the Civil Service. A Study of Sir Warren Fisher (1989);
62. Post, Dilemmas of Appeasement, 32-54;
63. W. K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy. British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (Ithaca, NY, 1985).
64. Also helpful is J. P. D. Dunbabin, 'British Rearmament in the 1930s: A Chronology and Review', Historical Journal, xviii (1975), 587-609.
65. Except where noted, the following paragraph is based on Defence Requirements Sub-Committee 'Report', 28 Feb. 1934 [hereafter 1st DRC Report], TNA, PRO, CAB 16/109.
66. These figures are a distillation of those from the 1st DRC Report contained in 'Summary of the Expenditure Necessary to Make Good the Deficiencies Over a Five-Year Programme [Table A (1)] '. DRC Report, Ibid.
67. On the first London naval conference
68. see O. M. Babij, 'The Second Labour Government and British Maritime Security, 1929-1931', Diplomacy and Statecraft, vi (1995), 645-71;
69. McKercher, Transition, ch. 1;
70. Kennedy, 'The 1930 London Naval Conference and Anglo-American Maritime Strength, 1927-1930 ', in McKercher, Arms Limitation, 149-71;
71. S. W. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament, 1930-1939 (London, 1977), 37-70.
72. 1st DRC Report, 'Table B. Naval Deficiency Programme '.
73. 1st DRC Report, 'Table C. Expenditure to Meet Army Deficiencies'.
74. Neilson, 'Defence Requirements', 672.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., 672, 679-80.
77. This and the next quotation are from 'Governing Assumptions', 1st DRC Report. Then see the subsequent section, 'The Test of the Far Eastern Menace '.
78. DRC Meeting 3, 4 Dec. 1933, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/109.
79. 'Observations and Summary', 1st DRC Report.
80. Warren Fisher note [DRC 9], 12 Jan. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/109.
81. Draft Convention Submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation (16 Mar. 1933), LND [League of Nations Document, League of Nations Archives, Palais des Nations, Geneva] Conf. D.157.
82. 'Governing Assumptions', 1st DRC Report.
83. From 'The Test of the German Menace', 1st DRC Report.
84. 'Observations and Summary', 1st DRC Report.
85. Warren Fisher note [DRC 9], 12 Jan. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/109. Cf. Warren Fisher 'Extracts From Lord Milne's Memorandum of 28 October 1932-CP 363 (32) '[DCR 2], 10 Nov. 1933, DRC Report on 'German Disarmament Proposals '[DRC 5], 29 Nov. 1933, especially Appendix I: 'Summary of Present State of German Preparations for Military Rearmament ', Appendix, IIIA: 'Germany', both ibid.
86. On Vansittart's relationships with MacDonald and Baldwin, see Baldwin to Vansittart, 25 Dec. 1933;
87. MacDonald to Vansittart and his wife, 27 Dec. 1933, both VNST [Vansittart MSS, Churchill College, Cambridge] II/1/5.
88. In the Oct. 1931 General Election that brought the National Government to power, the National Labour Party had 13 seats in the House of Commons, the National Liberals 35 and the Conservatives 473. The total number of seats was 615.
89. See D. Butler and A. Sloman, 'General Election Results, 1922-1931', British Political Facts 1900-1975 (4th edn., 1975), 183.
90. Cf. B. J. C. McKercher, 'Old Diplomacy and New: The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 ', in Dockrill and McKercher, World Power, especially 101-5;
91. and idem., 'The Foreign Office, 1930-39: Strategy, Permanent Interests and National Security', Contemporary British History, xviii (2004), 87-109.
92. Warren Fisher to Hankey, 26 Jan. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 21/434.
93. On Simon's dialectical skills, see R. Jenkins, The Chancellors (1999), 367-8. Cf. D. J. Dutton, Simon. A Political Biography of Sir John Simon (1992), 182-3.
94. On NC's abilities and ideas as chancellor of the Exchequer, see Jenkins, Chancellors, 330-64. Cf. D. J. Dutton, Neville Chamberlain (2001), 146-52.
95. This occurred on 20 June 1933 over discussion of both the 'Annual Review 'of Imperial defence policy and immediate measures to improve defences.
96. See COS Meeting 111, 20 June 1933, TNA, PRO, CAB 53/4. Cf. Neilson, 'Defence Requirements ', 682.
97. COS Meeting 124, 24 Apr. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 53/4.
98. Pownall Diary, 2 Oct. 1933, Pownall MSS [Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College, London] 1. For other examples of intra-service wrangling
99. see Pownall Diary, 24 and 28 July 1933, 3 Aug. 1933, all ibid. These comments were not included in B. Bond, ed., Chief of Staff. The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, Vol. I: 1933-1940 (1972). Following references only to Pownall's diary are made when edited out of Professor Bond's book.
100. Pownall Diary, 22 Mar. 1934, Pownall 1.
101. Pownall Diary, 28 Feb. 1934, Bond, Pownall, I, 38. As late as the day before the first DRC Report was signed, Vansittart and Warren Fisher were arguing for more aircraft;
102. see Hankey to Chatfi eld, 27 Feb. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 21/434.
103. For instance, Montgomery-Massingberd to Hankey, 12 Jan. 1934, Hankey to Montgomery-Massingberd, 12 Jan. 1934, both TNA, PRO, CAB 21/387.
104. See Table 1.
105. See the section, 'III. Air Force Deficiencies, War Reserves', in 1st DRC Report. The figure the DRC used here was actually '£3, 685, 000, within the next five years, including personnel costs '. I err on the conservative side in expenditures by referring only to the capital expenses to be made - £3, 505, 000.
106. 'Hankey tells me his opinion is now veering towards believing Hitler's pacific utterances', Pownall Diary, 4 Dec. 1933, Pownall 1. Also Hankey to Simon, 1 Dec. 1933, TNA, PRO, CAB 21/382, where Hankey sees no reason to oppose German demands for a 300, 000-men army.
107. Chief of the Imperial General Staff 'Memorandum', 7 Feb. 1934, TNA, PRO, WO 32/3486.
108. Then see Creedy (permanent undersecretary, War Office) minute, 19 Feb. 1934, on the financial implications of Montgomery-Massingberd's memorandum; with Montgomery-Massingberd minute, 20 Feb. 1934;
109. Hailsham minute, 23 Feb. 1934;
110. Creedy and Montgomery-Massingberd initials, 23 Feb. 1934;
111. all ibid. Also see 'Western Plan Composition of the Field Force and Remaining Formations and Units Not Allotted to the Field Force ', 1934, Army Council, TNA, PRO, WO 33/1341.
112. Except where noted, the next three paragraphs are based on B. J. C. McKercher, 'From Disarmament to Rearmament: British Civil-Military Relations and Policy-Making, 1933-1934', Defence Studies, i (2001), 21-48;
113. Post, Dilemmas of Appeasement, 35-40;
114. Roi, Alternative to Appeasement, 33-45.
115. For instance, see R. Heller, 'East Fulham Revisited', Journal of Contemporary History, vi (1971), 172-96.
116. Cf. M. Pugh, 'Pacifism and Politics in Britain, 1931-1935', Historical Journal, xxiii (1980), 641-56.
117. Cf. K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin. A Biography (1969), 754.
118. Vansittart memorandum [CP 116 (34)], 23 Apr. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/111. The Secret Intelligence Service was controlled by the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office.
119. Division between the FO and Treasury did not occur in the DRC because Warren Fisher took the position that its findings should be those 'not of individuals fighting their respective corners, but of a team engaged in presenting to the Government the best solution we can for ensuring our national safety '. In Warren Fisher to Chatfield, 10 Nov. 1933, TNA, PRO, CAB 21/434.
120. Also see Warren Fisher to Vansittart, 12 Nov. 1933, VNST II/1/5.
121. See his remarks in DC (M) (32) meetings 41-50, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/110;
122. cf. 'Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Report of the Defence Requirements Committee '[DC (M) (32) 120], TNA, PRO, CAB 27/51;
123. see J. R. Ferris, '"Indulged in All Too Little"?: Vansittart, Intelligence and Appeasement', Diplomacy and Statecraft, xiii (1995).
124. DC (M) (32) 45th meeting, 15 May 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 27/507.
125. 'Minute by Sir R. Vansittart' [DC (M) (32) 117], 2 June 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 27/510.
126. Kennedy, Strategic Relations, is prominent.
127. For an example of support, see Hailsham's comments in DC (M) (32) 50th meeting, 25 June 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/110. For Vansittart's lobbying efforts, cf. Vansittart memorandum, 'The Future of Germany '[CP 104 (34)], 7 Apr. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 24/248;
128. diary entry, 28 Apr. 1934, in T. Jones, A Diary with Letters 1931-1950 (1954), 126-9;
129. Vansittart to Simon, 14 May 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 21/388;
130. Vansittart minute, 2 June 1934, VNST [Vansittart MSS, Churchill College, Cambridge] I/1/11;
131. Simon memorandum [DC (M) (32) 118], 14 June 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 27/510;
132. Simon memorandum [DC (M) (32) 119], 14 June 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 27/511. Vansittart advised Baldwin on the Far Eastern situation. MacDonald and Baldwin's statements in DC (M) (32) 50th meeting, 25 June 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/110 are instructive. So, too, is Pownall's observation: 'A C. I. D. meeting in the morning .... The P. M. quite bright on defence questions, is it possible that the leopard is at last changing his spots? ': in Pownall Diary, 31 May 1934, Pownall 1.
133. This and the next two quotations are from 'Appendix III. The Position of the Low Countries. Summary of Information obtained from the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee ', in Ministerial Committee 'Defence Requirements. Report', 31 July 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/110.
134. Hodsoll [Committee for Imperial Defence Secretariat] to King [Admiralty], Ludlow-Hewitt [Air Ministry], Dill [War Office], all 19 Oct. 1934, enclosing Londonderry to MacDonald, 12 Oct. 1934, with MacDonald minute, 18 Oct. 1934, all TNA, PRO, CAB 21/417. For examples of intelligence assessments
135. see Thorne [British military attache, Berlin] report, 3 July 1934, FO 371/17695/4297/20; Committee for Imperial Defence memoranda on German rearmament [from the Admiralty, Air Ministry and War Office], Nov. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 4/23;
136. Foreign Office Central Department memorandum, 'German Rearmament', 19 Nov. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 21/417.
137. Wigram to Hodsoll, 30 Nov. 1934, TNA, PRO, CAB 21/417.
138. Also see Hankey to Warren Fisher, 10 Jan. 1935, TNA, PRO, CAB 21/407: 'I gather from Van[sittart] that the idea is to launch it [the White Paper] almost as soon as the House meets. '
139. Hankey to Warren Fisher, 10 Jan. 1935;
140. Hankey to Vansittart, 11 Jan. 1935;
141. Hodsoll separately to Warren Fisher and Vansittart, 18 Jan. 1935, enclosing 'Imperial Defence (Draft of a White Paper) ', nd [but Jan. 1935];
142. Warren Fisher to Hodsoll, 22 Jan. 1935;
143. Vansittart to Hodsoll, 22 Jan. 1935, with enclosure and Vansittart's marginal comments, all TNA, PRO, CAB 21/407.
144. Vansittart to Hodsoll, 22 Jan. 1935, ibid.
145. Hodsoll to Vansittart, 30 Jan. 1935, ibid.
146. Cmd. 4827: Statement Relating to Defence. Issued in Connexion With the House of Commons Debate on March 11, 1935.
147. Fisher to Baldwin, 26 Feb. 1935, Baldwin MSS [University Library, Cambridge University, Cambridge] 1.
148. A range of historians have looked at the inter-connectedness of the European and East Asian balances of power in the thinking of Vansittart and others before and after the first DRC. Cf. S. Bourette-Knowles, 'The Global Micawber: Sir Robert Vansittart, the Treasury, and the Global Balance of Power, 1933-1935', Diplomacy and Statecraft, vi (1995);
149. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, I;
150. Roi, Alternative to Appeasement, 25-45;
151. Post, Dilemmas of Appeasement, 25-45;
152. Watt, 'Britain, the United States, and Japan'.
153. W. Diest, 'Zum Problem der deutschen Aufrüstung', Francia, v (1977), 539-65;
154. M. Messerschmidt, 'Foreign Policy and Preparation for War ', in W. Diest, M. Messerschmidt et al., eds., Germany and the Second World War, Vol. I: The Build-up of German Aggression (Oxford, 1990), 594-604;
155. G. L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany (vol. I, Chicago, 1970), 204-6.
156. Cf. G. Post, 'Mad Dogs and Englishmen: British Rearmament, Deterrence, and Appeasement, 1934-35', Armed Forces & Society, xiv (1988), 329-57.
157. Cf. G. W. Baer, The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War (Cambridge, MA, 1967);
158. F. Lefebvre D'Ovidio, La questione etiopica nei negoziati italo-franco-britannici del 1935 (Rome, 2000).
159. Pownall memorandum, 9 July 1935, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/112.
160. DRC Meetings 13-14, 'Interim Report' [DRC 25], 24 July 1935, Ibid.
161. C C 40 (35), 24 July 1935, TNA, PRO, CAB 23/82, DPR Meeting 4, 29 July 1935, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/136.
162. Vansittart to Hoare, 9, 19 Aug. 1935, Hoare to Eden, 15 Sept. 1935, all Hoare FO 800/295.
163. DRC Meetings 15-26 (3 Oct. to 14 Nov. 1935), 'Defence Requirements Sub-Committee. Programmes of the Defence Services. Third Report ', Vol. I, 21 Nov. 1935 [DRC 37], 2 vols., 21 Nov. 1935, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/112.
164. 'The soldiers, sailors and airmen are gradually beginning to show signs of no longer being the worst pacifists and defeatists in the country ': Hoare to Eden, 17 Sept. 1935, Hoare FO 800/295.
165. 3rd DRC Report, 38-44, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/112. Cf. War Office memorandum, 'Army Requirements' [DRC 28], 2 Oct. 1935, Air Ministry memorandum, 'Royal Air Force Requirements Additional to the Expansion of First Line Strength for Home Defence '[DRC 30], 2 Oct. 1935, Admiralty memorandum, 'Naval Requirements' [DRC 33], 9 Oct. 1935, all ibid. For balanced analysis of the report
166. see Gibbs, Grand Strategy, 254-68;
167. Post, Dilemmas, 107-15.
168. Cf. I. Colvin, Vansittart in Office (1965);
169. A. L. Goldman, 'Two Views of Germany: Nevile Henderson vs. Vansittart and the Foreign Office, 1937-1939', British Journal of International Studies, vi 6 (1980), 247-77;
170. Post, Dilemmas, 107-15.
171. DRC Meeting 14, 19 July 1935, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/112.
172. DRC Meetings, 15-18, 20, 22-4, ibid. Vansittart to Hoare, 19 Aug. 1935, Hoare FO 800/295, uses the 'bricks without straw' metaphor.
173. E. Haraszti, Treaty-Breakers or 'Realpolitiker'? The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 (Boppard am Rhein, 1974);
174. J. A. Maiolo, 'Armaments Diplomacy and Maritime Power: The Admiralty and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935', Diplomacy & Statecraft, x (1999), 87-126;
175. C. Scammel, 'The Royal Navy and the Strategic Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935', Journal of Strategic Studies, xx (1997), 92-118.
176. See DPR (DR) Meetings in TNA, PRO, CAB 16/123.
177. Committee for Imperial Defence Report 'Defence Requirements. Programmes of the Defence Services '[Committee for Imperial Defence 1215-B], 6 Feb. 1935, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/112. These funds would be added to the totals projected in the 1935 White Paper. The 1936 budget was already established at Σ124 million: Cmd. 5114.
178. Also see DPR (DR) Report [CP 26 (36)], 12 Feb. 1936, TNA, PRO, CAB 24/259.
179. This total comprised four regular Army divisions, a Mobile Division, two Air Defence Brigades and Army Co-operation Squadrons of the RAF, plus 'the necessary complement 'of a General Head Quarters Corps and support troops.
180. See 3rd DRC Report, Vol. I, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/112. Cf. War Office 'Second Interim Report of the Field Force Committee ', June 1935; and 'Military Members' Meeting '[Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Adjutant-General, Quarter-Master General, Master Gunner, Master General of the Ordinance, Permanent Under-Secretary], 14 Sept. 1935, all TNA, PRO, WO 32/3458.
181. Cf. paragraph 5, Committee for Imperial Defence Report 'Defence Requirements. Programmes of the Defence Services '[Committee for Imperial Defence 1215-B], 6 Feb. 1935;
182. paragraph 22, 3rd DRC Report, Vol. I, both TNA, PRO, CAB 16/112.
183. This and the rest of this paragraph are from paragraph 5, ibid.
184. Points 6a and 7b, Appendix I, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 'Suggested Programme for Meeting the Deficiencies Now Existing in the Defence Services ', in 3rd DRC Report, Vol. 2, Ibid.
185. For instance, see Chief of the Imperial General Staff minute concerning 'the higher organization of the first four contingents of the Field Force into Corps and Armies 'to Adjutant-General, Quarter-Master General, Master General of the Ordinance, Permanent Under-Secretary, 18 Nov. 1935, TNA, PRO, WO 32/3461.
186. Paragraph 12, Committee for Imperial Defence Report 'Defence Requirements ', TNA, PRO, CAB 16/112.
187. Cf. then the sections of the Report: 'The International Situation ', 'The Effect of Collective Security on Defence Questions 'and 'The Relationship between Foreign Policy and Defence'.
188. From 'Rough Forecast of Net Estimates for Next Five Years if Present Proposals Are Approved', 3rd DRC Report, Vol. 1, TNA, PRO, CAB 16/112.
189. C C 10 (36), 25 Feb. 1936, TNA, PRO, CAB 23/83.
190. S. Greenwood, '"Caligula's Horse" Revisited: Sir Thomas Inskip as Minister for Defence Co-ordination, 1936-1939', Journal of Strategic Studies, xvii (1994), especially 17-26.
191. Chamberlain to Hilda, 6 Nov. 1937, Chamberlain to Ida [his sister], 14 Nov., 12 Dec. 1937, NC [Neville Chamberlain MSS, University Library, University of Birmingham, Birmingham] 18/1/1027, 1028, 1031.
192. Cf. D. Carlton, Anthony Eden. A Biography (1981), 105;
193. V. Rothwell, Anthony Eden. A Political Biography, 1931-57 (Manchester, 1992), 40.
194. This and the next three sentences are based on Chamberlain to Ida, 4 July, 30 Oct., 26 Nov. 1937, NC 18/1/1010, 1026, 1030;
195. Chamberlain to Hilda [his sister], 24 Oct. 1937, 5 Dec. 1937, NC 18/1/1025, 1030a.
196. Although the literature on Chamberlain and appeasement is substantial, this and the next sentence are based on R. J. Caputi, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement (Cranbury, NJ, 2000);
197. F. McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War (New York, 1998);
198. W. C. Mills, 'The Chamberlain-Grandi Conversations of July-August 1937 and the Appeasement of Italy', International History Review, xix (1997), 594-619;
199. R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (New York, 1993);
200. A. Wilkinson, 'Thanking God for Neville Chamberlain: Appeasement and the English Churches ', Modern History Review, i (1989), 26-7.
201. I. Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet (New York, 1971), 46.
202. For example, Eden to Inskip, 25 Feb. 1937, Eden MSS [The National Archives, Kew] FO 954/4/Def/37/3;
203. Simon to Inskip, 25 Oct. 1937, TNA, PRO, CAB 64/30;
204. Inskip memorandum, 'Cost of Defence Requirements', 23 Nov. 1937, TNA, PRO, CAB 21/531. Admittedly, Eden saw merit in appeasing Germany but, as he developed a pathological hatred of Mussolini, was less inclined to seek agreement with the Italians.
205. Cf. D. Bolech, '"L'Accordo di due Imperi". L'Accordo Italo-Inglese del 16 Aprile 1938: Le Relazioni Italo-Inglesi dal Luglio 1937 alle Dimissioni di A. Eden', Politico, xxxviii (1973), 737-69;
206. W. C. Mills, 'The Nyon Conference: Neville Chamberlain, Anthony Eden, and the Appeasement of Italy in 1937', International History Review, xv (1993), 1-22.
207. For instance, Simon memorandum [CP 165 (37)], 25 June 1937, TNA, PRO, CAB 24/270.
208. COS 'Comparison of the Strength of Great Britain With That of Other Nations as at January, 1938' [CP 296 (37)], 12 Nov. 1937, TNA, PRO, CAB 24/273;
209. COS memorandum, 'Planning for War With Germany ', [COS 644JP], 13 Nov. 1937, CAB 53/34.
210. Cf. COS Meetings 216, 221, both TNA, PRO, CAB 53/8.
211. Inskip 'Interim Report on Defence Expenditure in Future Years '[CP 316 (37)], 15 Dec. 1937, TNA, PRO, CAB 24/273.
212. Cf. Warren Fisher memorandum, 'Defence. Sir T. Inskip's New Report ', 18 Dec. 1937, Warren Fisher [British Library of Economic and Political Science, London] 1.
213. Inskip 'Report on Defence Expenditure in Future Years '[CP 24 (38)], 8 Feb. 1938, TNA, PRO, CAB 24/274;
214. CC 5 (38) 9, 16 Feb. 1938, TNA, PRO, CAB 23/92.
215. Cf. Warren Fisher minute, 15 Feb. 1938, Warren Fisher 1.
216. See M. L. Dockrill, British Establishment Perspectives on France, 1936-40 (Houndmills, 1999), ch. 3;
217. L. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, 1975);
218. G. L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, Vol. II: Starting World War II 1937-1939 (Chicago, 1980), 81-5.
219. See the recent arguments of T. C. Imlay, Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics, and Economics in Britain and France 1938-1940 (Oxford, 2003), who argues that Britain passed 'the test of war' in 1939-40 because of the policies of Chamberlain after 1937.
220. Roi, Alternative to Appeasement.