Applications of game theory in linguistics

Linguistics and Language Compass

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 406-421

  Jaeger, Gerhard ^a  

^a BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749138473     PISSN: None     EISSN: 1749818X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-818X.2008.00053.x     Document Type: Review

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